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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters in macroeconomics. They study the
effects of business cycles on heterogeneous firms and workers and their conse-
quences for the aggregate economy.
The first chapter provides the empirical evidence used to motivate and cal-
ibrate the theoretical framework developed in the second chapter, discusses
the empirical methodology and provides robustness checks to address its lim-
itations. The paper documents two facts. First, aggregate conditions close to
the listing year negatively affect firm-level markups. Second, these effects are
long-lasting but not permanent.
The second chapter explores the role of aggregate fluctuations as a persistent
determinant of heterogeneity in firm-level markups. Informed by firm-level
estimates of markups, the paper builds a general equilibrium model that fea-
tures heterogeneous product markets, customer base accumulation, and firm
dynamics. In the model, firms’ demands are constrained by the size of their
customer bases. Firms can accumulate customers using two complementary
channels: i) increasing sales by lowering prices and ii) making direct invest-
ments in customer acquisition. As the value of operating in each product
market fluctuates endogenously with business cycles, aggregate conditions gen-
erate a selection of the product market composition of the cohorts of active
firms that induces time-varying heterogeneity in their cross-section. This het-
erogeneity is persistent and significantly affects the transmission of aggregate
shocks to the economy and the co-movements of aggregate markups with busi-
ness cycles.
The third chapter develops a structural model of the labor market that features
both worker and firm heterogeneity and where workers accumulate human
capital and search on the job. The paper analyzes the optimal provision of
insurance within the firm through an optimal dynamic contract that, paired
with limited liability on the firm side, implies downward wage rigidity. In
this framework, insurance incentives and contractual rigidities are crucial in
determining the pattern of job matches and separations along the business
cycle. In particular, we show that aggregate fluctuations can alter the sorting
between workers and firms by affecting workers’ search strategies and, as a
consequence, distort their human capital accumulation.
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Chapter 1
Persistent effects of business
cycles: an empirical analysis
of firm-level markups
Abstract
Is it possible for business cycles to persistently affect firm-level markups? In
this paper, I use an age-period-cohort model to estimate cohort effects on
markups for a sample of US listed firms. I proxy cohort fixed effects with
aggregate conditions close to the time of listing and I document two new
facts. First, negative aggregate conditions close to the time of listing are
associated with higher firm-level markups. Second, these effects, contrary to
what the firm dynamics literature documents on firm size, are long-lived but
not permanent fading away after approximately fifteen years. To ensure that
the difficulties linked to the measurement of markups are not confounding the
results I complement the main analysis with a battery of robustness checks on
the measurement of markups.
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1.1 Introduction
Aggregate conditions can have persistent effects on many aspects of the econ-
omy and deeply influence agents’ choices. An extensive labor literature, for
example, documents that graduating or losing a job in a recession leads to sig-
nificant and long-lasting effects on career earnings.1 Similarly, recent studies
find that business cycles can select the types of firms that are active in the
economy, causing persistent size differences across firms belonging to different
cohorts.2
In this paper, I focus the attention to the interaction between firm-level
markups and aggregate conditions at key junctures of firms’ lives. In par-
ticular, can business cycles have a persistent impact also on how firms decide
to price their products? Is it possible for aggregate conditions, at particu-
lar times of firm lives, to permanently affect their markups? The relevance
of these questions hinges on the fact that markups are a central variable in
macroeconomic models.3 Nevertheless, their behavior along business cycles
and the possible effects that aggregate fluctuations have on them is still de-
bated in the literature. Therefore, understanding how business cycles interact
with markups at the firm level can foster our knowledge of how aggregate
fluctuations can persistently influence firms’ behavior and what are the rele-
vant features of firms’ incentive structures that have to be considered when
modeling firm life-cycles.4
I dedicate this chapter to a comprehensive discussion of the effects of busi-
ness cycles on firm-level markups and I present the empirical evidence that I
then use to rationalize and calibrate the theoretical framework developed in
Chapter 2. In addition, I provide details on the empirical methods used to
recover markups from balance sheet data, discuss their limitations and provide
a battery of robustness checks to test their solidity.
1See for example Schwandt and Von Wachter [2019], Oreopoulos et al. [2012], Kahn
[2010].
2See in particular Sedláček and Sterk [2017], Moreira [2015], Pugsley et al. [2019].
3For example, the response of markups is a key channel in the transmission of aggregate
demand and monetary policy shocks in the New-Keynesian models.
4As an example, in Chapter 2, I discuss a theoretical framework in which aggregate
conditions persistently influence the level of markups a firm can charge by affecting its
listing decision.
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Empirically assessing the behavior of markups is challenging, particularly at
the firm level.5 Theoretically, a researcher interested in measuring the markup
charged by a firm would need to observe both prices and marginal costs.
Typically, however, it is difficult to obtain data on both of these quantities. To
overcome these issues, I follow empirical methods developed in the industrial
organization literature that allow the estimation of markups directly from firm-
level data. Despite coming with substantial limitations, these approaches are
particularly helpful as they allow to exploit firms’ optimal behavior to recover
a measure of markups directly from balance sheet data without requiring the
specification of an explicit demand system.
To quantify the persistence of initial aggregate conditions, I adapt a cohort-
age-period model to estimate the effects of aggregate conditions close to the
time of listing on firm-level markups. This particular econometric framework
has been used in the labor literature to estimate the persistence of aggregate
conditions at the time of graduation on workers’ career earnings (Schwandt
and Von Wachter [2019], Altonji et al. [2016], Oreopoulos et al. [2012], Kahn
[2010]). With few modifications, I adopt this empirical strategy to estimate
the persistence of aggregate conditions close to the time of listing on firm-level
markups.
I estimate markups at the firm level for an extended panel of US-listed firms
and I use these estimates to document two main facts.
First, I show that, at the firm level, markups are characterized by an increasing
age profile that reaches a plateau after approximately 20 years.
Second, I document the effects of aggregate conditions close to the time of
listing on the age profile of firm-level markups. As shown by Figure 1.1, I find
that firms that start their listing process in periods of low aggregate activity
exhibit higher initial markups and a flatter age profile compared to similar
firms that face better aggregate conditions close to their listing time. The
magnitude of the estimated effect is statistically and economically relevant,
albeit smaller than the effects on firms’ sizes reported by the literature. In
particular, the estimated effects imply that firms that were close to listing
at the height of the Great Recession, in 2009, are associated with average
5See Nekarda and Ramey [2013] for a review of the difficulties in measuring markups
and their correlations with business cycles.
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Figure 1.1: Cohort effects on markups’ age profile
















Note: The figure plots the age profile for markups estimated from equation (1.9). Specifi-
cally, at each age a, I am plotting µ̂0+φ̂a+(β̂0+β̂1a)Z, where µ̂0 is the average log-markup in
the first available year, φ̂a are the estimated age fixed effects, (β̂0, β̂1) capture the estimated
persistence of aggregate conditions in the first available year. Z is a measure of business
cycle outcomes that takes value 2σ for Peak and −2σ for Trough, with σ being the standard
deviation of quadratically detrended real GDP. The coefficients on which this plot is based
are reported in Table 1.2, Column (2).
markups approximately between 1.4% and 3% higher than the ones of similar
firms that were close to listing in 2007.
It is worth noticing, however, that these effects are consistent with two alter-
native interpretations that could persistently link markups to business cycles
at key moments of firms’ lives. On one hand, it is possible that aggregate
conditions close to the time of listing directly influence firms’ business deci-
sions in a way that is reflected in their markups. For example, they influence
their product development and marketing mixes. On the other hand, it is also
possible that different types of firms, producing different goods or competing
in different markets (e.g. niche versus mass products), assess the profitability
of going public differently at different stages of the business cycle. While the
former interpretation implies that firms actively change their behavior after
listing, and favors a causal interpretation of the effect of business cycles on
markups, the latter suggests that business cycles reflect ex-ante differences in
firm types that induce a selection into listing at specific times. Given the diffi-
culty in disentangling these two alternatives, throughout the chapter I do not
take a stance on which of the two prevails. However, despite the difficulties
in attributing a causal relationship to the effects estimated in this paper, they
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are still useful as indicators of relevant firm-characteristics that are helpful in
advancing our understanding of the incentive structure that firms face when
managing their markups over the course of their lives.
I supplement the empirical analysis with a battery of robustness checks to
address two significant issues inherent to the nature of the empirical exercise
carried out in the paper. These issues are linked to the difficulties in measuring
the output elasticity to variable inputs and the reliance of markup measures
on the availability of variable costs data. First, I address the difficulty of mea-
suring marginal costs by estimating markups using two alternative measures
of costs and I check how different estimates of the output elasticity influence
markups by estimating three different production functions - a sector varying
Translog specification, a sector and sector-time varying Cobb-Douglas product
functions as well as a simple cost-share approach. Second, as an additional
robustness check, I complement the primary analysis by considering a sub-
sample of firms for which I am able to retrieve founding dates. For these
sub-sample, therefore I am able to assign firms to cohorts using their founding
year rather than the first year of available accounting data as in the baseline
sample.6 For this sample, the average effect is qualitatively similar to the one
estimated using the listing year but the effect on the age profile is slightly dif-
ferent. While the effects of business cycles vanish over time when cohorts are
defined on their listing time, the effect of business cycles is stronger and more
persistent for firms that I can follow since their initial incorporation.
Relation to the literature. This paper contributes mainly to the growing
literature in firm dynamics and macroeconomics that extends the extensive
literature on cohort effects in labor market context to firms.7 The analysis on
the persistence of business cycles on markups developed in this chapter, in fact,
complements a growing literature in macroeconomics that studies the persis-
tent effects of aggregate fluctuations on firm sizes (Moreira [2015], Sedláček
and Sterk [2017], Pugsley et al. [2019]). In this literature, the paper closest
in spirit to this one is Moreira [2015]. In this study, she analyzes the effects
of business cycles at the time of firms’ inception on their average size. She
6This robustness check is closer in spirit to the labor literature that analyzes the effect
of business cycles on workers’ earnings at the time of their entry in the labor market or even
at the time of their graduation.
7See, among others, Schwandt and Von Wachter [2019], Altonji et al. [2016] and Ore-
opoulos et al. [2012] that estimate the effects on earnings of entering the labor market during
a recession.
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finds that firms that start their operations during adverse aggregate condi-
tions remain permanently smaller than firms that start during periods of high
aggregate demand. Using a more structural approach than the one followed
by Moreira [2015], Sedláček and Sterk [2017] documents a first-order role of
business cycles in permanently affecting the size distribution of firms directly
affecting the distribution of potential entrants.
Another growing literature that this paper contributes to is the one that links
developments in empirical industrial organization, particularly for the estima-
tion of markups at the firm-level, like De Loecker and Warzynski [2012], De
Loecker and Eeckhout [2017], to the macroeconomic consequences of firm-level
behavior. Notable examples in this literature are, among others, De Loecker
et al. [2020], Autor et al. [2020] and Van Reenen [2018]. Contrary to this
paper, however, at the core of these studies there is the analysis of long-run
trends in aggregate markups that have spurred the debate on the rise in mar-
ket power documented for the US economy and the ensuing macroeconomic
implications. However, by exploring the interaction between markups and
the aggregate state of the economy at a frequency higher than the one cur-
rently dominating this literature, it is possible to uncover new channels for
business cycles in determining firm-level behavior and the fluctuations of our
economies. Consequently, I consider the analysis developed in this chapter
as a complement to this growing literature focused on the long-run trends in
firm-level and aggregate markups.
The inherent difficulties in estimating markups have spurred a lively debate
in this literature with notable contributions from Traina [2018], Syverson
[2019a,b] and Bond et al. [2020], among others. In particular, Traina [2018]
and Syverson [2019a,b] have shown how the estimates of the long-run trends
in markups are sensible to the weighting used in the aggregation (costs versus
sales) and on the balance sheet items used to proxy firms’ variable costs. For
the empirical exercise at the core of this chapter, however, the choice of the
proxy variable does not affect the main results of the paper, despite having
a large effect on the long-run trends. Bond et al. [2020], instead, highlight
some deep issues relative to the identification of firm-level markups using the
ratio between the output elasticity of a variable input and that variable input
cost share in firms’ revenues, which is the baseline estimator of markups at
the firm-level. They show that, for this estimator, the use of revenue data
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instead of quantities induces a first-order issue in identifying markups that
at best delivers a biased estimate of markups. In the most severe case, this
implies that the only information content about markups is contained in the
bias rather than the estimator. I address the concerns raised by their work
as much as possible in the discussion about the estimation of the production
function and throughout the paper. Given data availability, however, I often
have to rely on second-best solutions to the issues raised in their study.
Structure of the paper. The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 de-
scribes the procedure used to estimate markups at the firm level and discusses
its limitations while Section 1.3 describes the empirical methodology used to
compute the correlation between aggregate conditions at listing and markups.
Section 1.4 briefly describes the data used for the analysis and Section 1.5
presents the main results. Section 1.6, instead, reports various robustness
checks on markup measurements. Section 1.7 finally concludes.
1.2 Measuring markups at the firm-level
The estimation strategy I use in this paper exploits firms’ optimal behavior to
back-out an estimate of markups at the firm level without the need to specify
an explicit demand system. This method has been developed and popularized
by De Loecker et al. [2020] and is based on the production function approach
pioneered by Hall [1986, 1988] on industry-level data.
Consider a firm j that produces using the following technology, Qj,t = Q(Xj,t,
Kj,t, ωj,t), where X is a vector of variable inputs, ω is firm specific productivity
and K are predetermined inputs. The cost minimization problem for each




X′j,tPj,t +Rj,tKj,t + λj,t(Qj,t −Q(·))
}
.
The first-order condition, for a generic variable input Xν ∈X, is
∂L(·)
∂Xνj,t





where λj,t can be interpreted as the marginal cost of producing at a given level













Defining the markup as price over marginal costs, µj,t ≡ Pj,tλj,t , it is possible to









where θνj,t is the elasticity of output with respect to the variable inputX
ν .
Obtaining consistent estimates of markups in this setting requires assuming
that firms are free to adjust their prices without incurring any cost. The
use of yearly data to estimate the production function mitigates the potential
drawbacks of abstracting from price rigidities at the firm level.8
1.2.1 Estimation of production function elasticities
The measurement of markups developed by Decker et al. [2017] relies on the
estimation of the output elasticity to variable inputs.
For the baseline results presented in the paper, I estimate the following revenue
Translog production function for each two-digits NAICS code:




j,t + θkvkj,tvj,t + ωj,t + uj,t, (1.4)
where yj,t are firm j’s log-revenue at time t; kj,t the logarithm of its capital
stock and vj,t the log-value of a bundle of variable inputs.
As usual, the main identification challenge in production function estimation
is the simultaneity bias induced by the unobserved time-varying firm-level
productivity, ωj,t.
I follow the proxy variable literature,9 and in particular De Loecker and Eeck-
hout [2017], to estimate the production function in (1.4) using a two-step ap-
8The implicit estimation of markups as wedges between output elasticities of variable
inputs and their expenditure shares arise naturally in any market structure different than
perfect competition. However, these wedges can reflect other distortions if the structural
assumption of no adjustment cost is violated.
9The proxy variable literature, pioneered by Pakes [1994] relies on adopting a control
function to estimate the production function. An alternative approach is given by the liter-
ature on Dynamic Panel data, for more detais see Blundell and Bond [2000].
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proach based on the use of a control function for the productivity process. The
identification relies on the observation that the optimal choice of firms about a
variable input follows a policy function like vj,t = v(kj,t, ωj,t). Then, providing
that the policy function is invertible10, the productivity process can be proxied
by a control function so that ωj,t = ω(kj,t, vj,t) with ω(·) = v−1(·).
First step. In the first step I clean the output value from measurement
errors and unanticipated productivity shocks using a second order polynomial
of capital and variable inputs
yj,t = P (kj,t, vj,t;φ) + uj,t,
where P (·) is a composite function of the productivity and the unknown control
function.11
Second step. Using the estimates of φ from the first step, I can construct a
measure of productivity that does not depend on the measurement error uj,t.
That is,
ωj,t = P (kj,t, vj,t; φ̂)− [θkkj,t + θvvj,t + θkkk2j,t + θvvv2j,t + θkvkj,tvj,t].
Then, exploiting the assumption that productivity follows an AR(1) process,
is it is possible to construct a measure of productivity innovations, ξj,t(Θ), pro-
jecting ωj,t on ωj,t−1. Under the assumption that firms react to unanticipated
productivity shocks contemporaneously so that the lagged values of variable
inputs can be used as valid instruments, the production function coefficients













10Pakes [1994] proves the invertibility of policy functions associated to a wide class of
production functions.
11While it is possible to estimate the coefficient on variable inputs directly at this step,
as noted by Ackerberg et al. [2015], it is more efficient to use the first stage only to clean the
output variable from potential measurement errors and estimate all the production function
coefficients in the second stage.
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The output elasticity to variable inputs that is relevant for the measure of
markups in equation (1.3) therefore is:
θvj,t = θv + 2θvvvj,t + θkvkj,t. (1.6)
Note that, with a Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function the
relevant measure for the output elasticity to variable inputs, θvj,t, is given by
equation (1.6) without the cross-products.
1.2.2 Discussion on limitations
Due to data availability I am not able to separate between prices and quantities
for my measure of firm-level output. As also noted by Bond et al. [2020], this
is problematic as variations in output and input prices could bias the estimates
of the output elasticities and hence the measurement of markups.
To see how lack of price data can make the estimation problematic, consider
the Cobb-Douglas version of (1.4). As discussed by De Loecker et al. [2020],
the value of production can be expressed in logs as yj,t = qj,t+pj,t so that





j,t + ωj,t + uj,t
with x̃j,t = xj,t + p
x
j,t being the deflated values of input x, and p
x
j,t the in-
put price paid by firm j. Note that if we consider the standard specification
when coefficients do not change over time, then the bias caused by not ob-
serving prices would affect the level of markups, but not their time-series
behavior.
In addition, there is the concern that firm-specific shocks could be reflected
in input and output prices. This pass-through is not an issue in the unlikely
case that variations in output prices are completely offset by variations in
input prices. In more realistic settings, in which the pass-trough of shocks
between input and output prices is not perfect, firms will be able to create a
wedge between the input price bundle and the output price. Yet, assuming
a constant returns to scale production function we can link the size of the





Given that the optimal pricing strategy implies a markup over marginal costs
we can rewrite the price as, pj,t = λj,t + µj,t and substitute it back in mea-
surement equation for the production function to get
qj,t + pj,t = θvṽj,t + θlk̃j,t + µj,t + uj,t.
Hence, as long as it possible to control for the markup that a firm is allowed
to charge we can correctly estimate the output elasticities following the pro-
cedure outlined in the previous section. As markups are unobserved, a viable
solution is to approximate them with a function whose arguments are relevant
determinants of markups.
In my empirical application I follow De Loecker et al. [2020] and I include
a sector-year linear function in firms’ market shares and productivities as an
approximation for markups. This is clearly a second-best solution to an im-
portant issue in the estimation of the production function and therefore of
markups’ levels. I verify that the Θ estimates are robust to various specifi-
cation of the production function, but without more detailed data on output
quantities, it is not possible to go beyond these second-best solutions to the
problem.
1.3 Empirical methodology
In this section, I describe the empirical framework that I am relying on to
estimate, at the firm-level, the magnitude and the persistence of aggregate
conditions close to listing on markups.
1.3.1 A reduced-form approach: autocorrelation of cohort-
level markups
Before describing how I adapt age-cohort-period models to estimate cohort
effects on firm-level markups, it is useful to discuss two coarser approaches
that, however, can be informative of the persistence of cohort-level factors in
markups. The first of the two is based on measuring the correlation of markups
across different cohorts with their initial levels. In fact, absent any cohort-
specific component, markups at the cohort-level should not have a significant
correlation with their initial levels. The second one, instead, looks at differ-
ences between cohort-level autocorrelations and aggregate autocorrelations as
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Table 1.1: Correlation of cohort-level markups to their initial levels
Dep.Variable: log(µa,t) (1) (2) (3)
log(µ0,t−a) 0.366*** 0.503*** 0.403***
(0.105) (0.072) (0.097)
log(µ0,t−a)× Age 0.071 -0.022* -0.010
(0.044) (0.012) (0.009)
R2 0.63 0.34 0.14
N 250 370 340
Note: The table reports the elasticity of cohort-level markups with the markup charged in
the first year a cohort is observed. Specifically I estimate equation (1.7). I report results for
three different horizons, 5, 10 and 20 years. Column (1) reports the coefficient of interest
for cohorts of firms from 1961 to 2011 followed for up to 5 years (50 cohorts followed for up
to 5 years). Column (2) is based on firms starting from 1970 to 2006 followed up to 10 years
of age (37 cohorts followed for 10 years). Column (3) follows cohorts from 1980 to 1996 up
to 20 years (17 cohorts for 20 years).
symptoms of the existence of persistent factors that influence markups at the
cohort level.
To estimate the correlation of cohort-level markups with their initial levels I
am exploiting the following specification:
log(µa,t) = α+β0 log(µ0,t−a)+β1 log(µ0,t−a)×a+β2 log(µ0,t)+β3a+β4a2+ua,t,
(1.7)
where µa,t is the average markup of cohort a in year t; µ0,t−a is the average
markup of cohort a in the year of birth; µ0,t is the average markup of entering
firms in year t; and a is age. The elasticity of each cohort markups to their
initial conditions is therefore given by β0 and the elasticity at each subsequent
age is β0 + β1 × a.
The comparison of the coefficients of interest for equation (1.7) estimated
in the main cohort-level sample and is reported in Table 1.1. Even following
cohorts for up to twenty years, as in column (3), the correlation with the initial
level remains high and significant, indicating that there are cohort-level factors
in average markups that do not vanish over time. A similar result can be shown
by comparing the autocorrellation between aggregate markups and cohort-
level ones. Figure 1.2, plots the autocorrelation of aggregate markups together
with the correlation of the average markup by cohort with the average markup
of the same cohort a years in the future. The cohort-level measure of markups
exhibits an higher persistence than the aggregate ones, remaining higher than
zero up to age five. This indicates that cyclical variations in markups across
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Figure 1.2: Markup autocorrelation
























Aggregate µ - BEA measure
Note: The figure plots the cohort-level and aggregate autocorrelation of markups in the
model and in the data. Cohort-level refers to correlations of average markup by co-
horts of firms with the average markups of the same cohort a years into the future, i.e.
Corr(µ̂0,t, µ̂a,t+a), whereˆindicates deviations from an Hodrick-Prescott trend taken across
cohorts of the same age. Aggregate refers to autocorrelations of cost-weighted average markup
in the economy between t and t+ a, i.e. Corr(µ̂t, µ̂t+a) whereˆindicates deviations from an
Hodrick-Prescott trend. The BEA autocorrelation is constructed on a measure of aggregate
markup that does not require the estimation of the production function, as in Kaplan and
Zoch [2020]. Specifically, it is obtained from the ratio of the final producer price index (BEA
code: WPSFD49207) to the intermediate producer price index (BEA code: WPSID61).
cohorts persist into later years without mean-reverting. This particular feature
is not shared by the measure of aggregate markups that does not show any
persistent autocorrelation beyond one year. Importantly, the lack of strong-
autocorrelation in aggregate measures of markups is a characteristic of both
the cost-weighted measure of aggregate markups based on Compustat data and
an alternative one constructed following Kaplan and Zoch [2020] and based
on the Final and Intermediate Demand PPI indexes published by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. The advantage of the latter is that does not require
the estimation of the production function and therefore does not suffer from
the limitations discussed in the previous section, providing a useful robustness
check on the measure obtained from aggregating firm-level estimates.
1.3.2 Measuring cohort effects for firm-level markups
In order to estimate the effects of belonging to a particular cohort, c, on an
individual outcome, yj,c,t, ideally we would want to control for both the effect
of aging and for the effect of contemporaneous aggregate conditions. To avoid
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imposing too much structure on these effects, a natural specification could be
the following:
yj,c,t = α+ φa + φt + φc + uj,c,t,
where φa, φt and φc are respectively age, time and cohort fixed effects.
Unfortunately this model suffers from a well-known identification problem as
the set of age, time and cohort fixed effects are perfectly collinear. As noted
by Heckman and Robb [1985], a simple fix to this problem is to proxy one
of the fixed effects with a variable that is not collinear with the remaining
two.12
I follow the empirical specification proposed by Moreira [2015] and, for each
firm, I proxy cohort effects with a measure of aggregate conditions in the
first year of available accounting data.13 Therefore, the main firm-level spec-
ification that I bring to the data to estimate the correlations of aggregate
conditions on firm-level markups is the following:
log(µj,c,t) = α+ φa + φt + βYc + Xj,tγ + uj,c,t, (1.8)
where µj,c,t is the markup charged by firm j belonging to cohort c at time
t; φa and φt are respectively age and time fixed effects; Yc is a measure of
initial aggregate conditions for firms belonging to cohort c and Xj,t is a vector
of controls that includes sector fixed effects and a second-order polynomial in
firm j’s sale share in her three digits sector.
The main coefficient of interest is β, that, under the standard exogeneity
restrictions, pins down the percent change in average markups resulting from
a one-percent variation in the initial business cycle conditions, after controlling
for aggregate conditions faced by firms throughout their lives and the aging
process. The age fixed effects, instead, are estimates of an age profile of
12The estimation of cohort effects has been mostly exploited in the labor literature to
quantify, for example, the effects of recessions on workers career paths. On this, see among
others Oreopoulos et al. [2012] or, more recently, Altonji et al. [2016].
13In Compustat firms report their balance sheets also a few years before the first trading
date. I use this date as the main measure of cohort effects for two reasons: the first one is that
this is the time in which companies are committing to a new business model and are starting
the process for the IPO; the second one is that this variable is much more populated than the
IPO date. For the companies that report the IPO date (less than 40% of firms in the sample),
the average time between the first available year and the IPO is 1.97 years while the median
is 1 year. Restricting the sample to firms that have the first year of available accounting
data at exactly the IPO year does not significantly affect the results. Appendix 1.B reports
some additional evidences on the relationships between founding dates, first available years
and IPO dates.
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markups that reflects only the dynamics that can be attributed to the aging
process, controlling for cohort and time effects.
1.3.3 Persistence of cohort effects for firm-level markups
The specification in equation (1.8) allows one to measure the average effect on
yearly markups but does not allow to verify if the effects of business cycles are
persistent or tend to vanish as firms age. To assess the persistence of aggregate
conditions around the time of listing and their dynamics over firms’ life cycles,
I rely on the following specification:
log(µj,c,t) = α+ φa + φt + β0Yc + β1Yc × aj,t + Xj,tγ + νj,c,t. (1.9)
The coefficient of interest in this case are β0, that captures the effect on ag-
gregate conditions in the first year, and β1, that estimates the supplemen-
tary effect of business cycle realizations for each additional year firm j is
observed.
The specification in equation (1.9) assumes a monotonic effect of age on the
effects of aggregate conditions at birth. As a robustness check, I also consider
a less demanding specification that allows for a non-monotonic effect of age by
interacting the realizations of aggregate GDP with a set of dummy variables
for each age.
1.4 Data overview
The main data source for the analysis performed in the paper is the annual
segment of Compustat. In this section, I discuss briefly the strengths and
limitations of the data and I provide more details on the data cleaning process
and the construction of the sample in Appendix 1.A.
The dataset includes detailed balance sheet information on US listed firms. It
is widely used in the macro-finance literature but it has been recently used by
De Loecker et al. [2020] to estimate the long-run trends in markups and to
study the macroeconomic effects of market power. For the study performed
in this paper, the data present three main limitations: i) the difficulty of
recovering a consistent measure of variable costs from Cost of Goods Sold
(COGS) due to some freedom in reporting standards for the firms included
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in the dataset;14, ii) the fact that it is impossible to distinguish quantity and
prices and iii) the selection issues that arise from using only listed firms to
measure the effects of aggregate conditions on firm-level markups.
To address the concerns linked to the possible mis-measurement of variable
costs I estimate markups using both measures of marginal costs debated in
the literature, Cost of Goods Sold and Operating Expenditure. The long-run
trends are significantly affected by the choice of this variable15, however, this
choice does not affect the qualitative results of the cohort effects analyzed in
this paper.
The fact that the main sample of the analysis is based on listed firms makes
it harder to pin down the possible mechanisms that are inducing these perma-
nent effects, as the estimated effect on markups can be confounded by other
firm choices that are directly linked to the decision of listing rather than their
markup management. As mentioned, given the data and the empirical setting
it is not possible to distinguish between two alternative mechanisms: either
that business cycles close to the time of listing induce a firms’ decisions that
result in different estimated markups caused by ex-post different product mar-
ket choices, or, equally likely, that business cycles select ex-ante different types
of firms. Nonetheless, this dataset, unlike other firm-level databases, allows to
follow a large number of cohorts for many years giving the possibility to use the
full time-series variation in the proxy variables to approximate cohort effects
and allowing to trace longer age profiles for firm-level markups that are useful
in the calibration of the model developed in chapter 2. Therefore, either if list-
ing is a structural choice that permanently changes the way a firm conducts
its operations or is revealing of its product type, the combination of these two
advantages dampens the concerns that stem from sample selection.
1.5 Main results
In this section I discuss the main results relative to the estimation of the age
profiles and the cohort-effects on firm-level markups.
14See Traina [2018] for an analysis of the long-run trends in markups and how these are
affected by using Operating Expenditure as a measure for variable cost measure.
15See Appendix 1.B for aggregate measures of markups under different specifications.
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1.5.1 Age profile of markups.
The age fixed effects estimated in equation (1.8) show the dynamics of markups
along firms’ life cycles that can be attributed only to aging, taking into account
aggregate conditions and cohort effects. Figure 1.3 plots the fixed effect coef-
ficients together with a 95% confidence interval for the first 20 years of firms’
lives.16 The figure shows how the average markup steadily increases up to 15
years after the firsts available data. Using a structural estimation, Argente
et al. [2018], estimate the price and marginal cost profiles at the product level
and they show that firms increase markups on their products over time and
constantly introduce new products that command an higher share of overall
firm revenues. In their structural estimation markups increase, almost linearly
at the product level for the first 16 quarters from their introduction with newer
products having markups close to 0 at the time of their introduction.
Figure 1.3: Markups’ age profile
















Note: The figure plots the estimated age profile for markups from equation (1.8) together
with the 95% confidence interval. Specifically, at each age a, I am plotting µ̂0 + φ̂a, where
µ̂0 is the average log-markup in the first available year and φ̂a are the estimated age fixed
effects.
1.5.2 Cohort-effects
The main correlations between aggregate conditions and firm-level markups
are reported in Table 1.2. The main result is that the correlation between
16As the estimates of the age fixed effects stabilize after approximately 20 years but the
number of firms decline substantially do to attrition, the point estimates after 20 years are
more volatile but do not add any additional information to the estimates.
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markups and aggregate conditions at the time of the first available balance
sheet data are significantly negative, indicating that firms that start their
listing process in periods of below-trend output tend to charge higher markups
on average.
Considering a two-standard deviation negative change in the cyclical com-
ponent of log-real GDP, approximately -6%, the average effect reported in
Column (1) implies that firms charge a markup −0.06 · −0.249 ≈ 1.4% higher
every year, due to the aggregate conditions they faced when starting the listing
process. To put it in perspective, this effect implies that firms that were close
to listing at the height of the Great Recession, in 2009, charged an average
markup approximately 2% higher than similar firms that were close to listing
in 2007.
Trying to decompose this effect to control for its persistence, Columns (2) and
(3) report the coefficients for two versions of equation (1.9): i) a parametric
one where I restrict the contribution of age on the estimated cohort effect to
follow a linear process, and ii) a semi-parametric one in which I estimate the
effect of the initial aggregate conditions for each age group by means of fixed
effects. In both cases, the coefficients reveal that the relevance of aggregate
conditions is stronger in the initial years of firms’ lives and then progressively
vanishing within approximately ten to fifteen years.17
When the age effect is restricted to be linear, as in Column (2), the effects on
markups in the initial years, is larger in magnitude than the average effect.
A two-standard deviations drop of the cycle component of GDP, implies a
markup in the initial year close to 4% higher than a similar firm that gets
listed when GDP is on trend. Similarly, this implies that, for firms that were
close to listing in 2009, the Great Recession is associated with a 5.1% increase
in the first-year markup compared to similar firms that were close to listing
in 2007.
Column (3), instead, allows more freedom in the measurement of the persis-
tence of aggregate markups and reveals that the markup in the initial year
of firm operations is approximately 5% higher for a firm experiencing a two-
standard deviation negative change in the cycle component of GDP and still
17This result is at odds with what the firm dynamics literature has found regarding the
effects on business cycles on firm sizes that tends to be permanent, see Moreira [2015],
Sedláček and Sterk [2017] and more in line to the labor literature documenting the scarring
effects of recessions.
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significantly higher five years into firms’ lives.18 The age profiles estimated
from equation (1.9) are plotted in Figure 1.1. The figure shows how for firms
that experience positive aggregate conditions, defined as periods when the
cyclical component of GDP is two-standard deviations above trend, close to
their listing date tend to charge an initial markup that is approximately 8%
lower that similar firms that instead face a negative realization of the business
cycle.
In addition, besides the magnitude of the initial effect, it is worth noticing
that firms that are first observed during booms exhibit a steeper age profile
of markups. This particular shape of the age profile is not only a byproduct
of the monotonicity of the age effect imposed by equation (1.9). Figure 1.4
shows a very similar pattern for the age profiles of firms even when the effects
of initial aggregate conditions at each age are estimated using a more flexible
specification than the one discussed in equation (1.9), where the effects of
initial aggregate conditions at each are estimated using the interaction between
the business cycle measure and dummy variables for each age.
As robustness checks, I estimate the cohort effects using also different proxy
variables for aggregate conditions. The results are reported in Table 1.3. The
negative effect of aggregate conditions on markups is robust for most of the
proxy variables considered. The only one that completely fails is the simple
indicator of recessions. This results should not be particularly worrying as
the recession indicator is a poor proxy variable for aggregate conditions as it
pools firms of very different recessions together. In addition, as I use yearly
data, the variation in the recession indicator is very low as it is assigns a
disproportionate amount of firms to booms.
As the main sample of analysis is based on firms that are already mature, I
include fixed effects for deciles of initial firm sizes and deciles of initial sales
to account for differences on markups that could affect markups through sizes
and not only aggregate conditions close to the time of listing.
Table 1.4 reports the coefficients of interest for the baseline specifications in
equation (1.8) and (1.9) with either initial size or initial sales controls. As
expected, not including controls for firms sizes the average effect becomes
insignificant indicating that some of the effects of business cycles on markups
18It is important to note that the coefficients in this specification are not monotone and
are significant only up to age five with the exception of the coefficient on age two.
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Table 1.2: Cohort effects on firm-level markups
Dep. Variable: Log-Markup (1) (2) (3)
Cycle measure -0.249*** -0.672***
(0.064) (0.135)
Cycle measure × Age 0.043***
(0.010)
Cycle measure × Age0 -0.908**
(0.383)
Cycle measure × Age1 -0.856**
(0.346)
Cycle measure × Age2 -0.402
(0.293)
Cycle measure × Age3 -0.574*
(0.312)
Cycle measure × Age4 -0.677**
(0.302)
Cycle measure × Age5 -0.937***
(0.322)
Cycle measure × Age6−10 -0.207
(0.133)
Cycle measure × Age11−15 0.136
(0.137)
Cycle measure × Age16−20 0.149
(0.137)
Cycle measure × Age21−25 -0.051
(0.140)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Initial Size Decile FE Yes Yes Yes
Initial Sale Decile FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
N 91,317 91,317 91,317
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p :∗∗∗< 0.01,∗∗< 0.05,∗< 0.1. The table
reports the main estimates of the elasticities between firm-level markups and aggregate
conditions at the time the firm is first observed. Cohort effects are proxied using quadratically
detrended log real GDP. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates using the specification in
equation (1.8) and (1.9). Column (3), instead, shows estimates of cohort effects persistence
using age-group fixed effects. In this case, the reported interaction coefficients estimate
the effects of initial conditions for the relative age group. The measure of business cycle is
quadratic detrended real log-GDP.
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Figure 1.4: Cohort effects on markups’ age profile














Note: The figure plots the persistence of initial aggregate conditions on the age profile
of markups using a version of equation (1.9) that allows for non monotonic effects of age.
Specifically, at each age, I am plotting µ̂0 + φ̂a + ψ̂aZ where µ̂0 is the average log-markup in
the first available year, φ̂a are the estimated age fixed effects and the ψ̂a are the estimates of
the interaction terms of age dummies and the measure of business cycle in the first available
year. Each ψ̂a, then, estimates the average effect of initial aggregate conditions a years into
firms’ lives. Z is a measure of business cycle outcomes that takes value 2σ for Peak and −2σ
for Trough, with σ being the standard deviation of quadratically detrended real GDP.
are mediated from an effect on size. Decomposing the effect of aggregate
condition close to the time of listing along the age profile of firms, in both cases
we recover the baseline result that these effects are stronger at the beginning
of firms’ listed lives, albeit of a smaller magnitude compared with the baseline
specification highlighting once again the importance of controlling for initial
firm sizes.
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Table 1.3: Cohort effects estimates with different proxy variables
HP Filtered GDP Hamilton-Filtered GDP Unemployment rate Recession Indicator
Dep.Variable: Log-Markup (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cycle Measure -0.092 -0.480** 0.015 -0.292*** 0.006*** 0.008*** -0.022*** 0.011
(0.108) (0.195) (0.049) (0.092) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Cycle Measure × Age 0.040*** 0.032*** -0.0002 -0.003***
(0.015) (0.007) (0.0002) (0.001)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Size Decile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Sale Decile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
N 91,317 91,317 91,317 91,317 91,317 91,317 91,317 91,317
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p :∗∗∗< 0.01,∗∗< 0.05,∗< 0.1. The table reports estimates from equation (1.8) and (1.9) using different proxy variables for initial
aggregate conditions. In particular, I report the main coefficient of interest for Hodrick-Prescott filtered log real GDP (smoothing equal to 6.25); Hamilton filtered log real GDP (one
lag and two leads); the unemployment rate (in percent) and a dummy indicator for when the first available year in the data is indicated as an NBER recession.
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Table 1.4: Cohort effects with either size or sale controls
Dep.Variable: Log-Markup (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cycle measure -0.206*** -0.653*** 0.002 -0.275** 0.083 -0.275**
(0.065) (0.137) (0.055) (0.109) (0.055) (0.112)
Cycle measure × Age 0.045*** 0.028*** 0.037***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Cycle measure × Age0 -0.882** -0.592** -0.531*
(0.393) (0.284) (0.297)
Cycle measure × Age1 -0.827** -0.399 -0.345
(0.353) (0.266) (0.275)
Cycle measure × Age2 -0.375 -0.066 -0.013
(0.298) (0.242) (0.249)
Cycle measure × Age3 -0.549* -0.275 -0.231
(0.315) (0.262) (0.267)
Cycle measure × Age4 -0.679** -0.184 -0.147
(0.303) (0.257) (0.262)
Cycle measure × Age5 -0.945*** -0.180 -0.189
(0.324) (0.266) (0.270)
Cycle measure × Age6−10 -0.180 -0.077 -0.088
(0.134) (0.115) (0.116)
Cycle measure × Age11−15 0.224 0.360*** 0.484***
(0.137) (0.114) (0.115)
Cycle measure × Age16−20 0.220 0.437*** 0.642***
(0.136) (0.123) (0.122)
Cycle measure × Age21−25 -0.009 -0.086 0.084
(0.140) (0.125) (0.126)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Size Decile FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Initial Sale Decile FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10
N 91,317 91,317 91,317 153,255 153,255 153,255 153,255 153,255 153,255
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p :∗∗∗< 0.01,∗∗< 0.05,∗< 0.1. The table reports the main estimates of the elasticities between firm-level markups and aggregate
conditions at the time the firm is first observed. Cohort effects are proxied using quadratically detrended log real GDP. Columns (1-2), (4-5) and (7-8) report estimates using the
specification in equation (1.8) and (1.9) with either initial size or initial sale controls. Columns (3), (6) and (9), instead, report the result of the same exercise for different age




The quality of the data, the difficulty in measuring firm age and the intrin-
sic difficulties in the estimation of markups at the firm level are all possible
causes of concern for the results discussed so far. In this section, I analyze a
battery of robustness checks that address the most important issues affecting
the measurement of markups and firm ages.
1.6.1 Alternative production function: Cobb-Douglas
The ratio estimator of firm-level markups in equation (1.3) is highly dependent
on correctly estimating the elasticity of firm-level output to variable inputs.
An incorrect measure of this elasticity would introduce a bias in the scale
of markups. While this bias may not be too problematic for the analysis of
changes in markups and their long-run trends, this parameter is particularly
relevant in the context of the exercise developed in this paper as I estimate
the level effect of business cycles on the average markup charged by different
cohorts of firms.
Besides the common issues related to the identification of production func-
tions’ parameters, the estimation of a production function in a long panel, like
the one I use in this paper, poses an additional conceptual problem linked to
the time-frame used for the estimation of the technology adopted by firms.
Pooling all years together and estimating the production function by sector
implicitly assumes that the technology available to firms at the beginning of
the sample is exactly the same as the one available to more modern enter-
prises. This is obviously an unrealistic strong assumption that would have
relevant consequences for the measurement of markups if not only the tech-
nology, but also the output elasticities with respect to inputs were constant
over time.
The choice of the Translog as the baseline specification for the production
function is in fact dictated by a compromise between stability of the estima-
tion across sectors and allowing a time-varying elasticity of output to variable
inputs. In fact, even if the baseline production function is constant over time,
the relevant elasticity for the measurement of markups is allowed to vary, as
shown in equation (1.6). Nonetheless, the estimated production function is
still assumed constant throughout the sample.
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Therefore, in order to to address this issue thoroughly, in this subsection I de-
scribe the effects of changing the assumption on the nature of the technology
on the main results of the paper. In particular, I re-estimate output elastic-
ities for a Cobb-Douglas production function in two cases, one in which the
technology available to firms is allowed to vary across sectors and time - Sector-
time varying elasticity - and another one, more basic, where the technology is
allowed to vary only across sectors - Constant elasticity.19
Sector-time varying elasticity. To allow for a sector-time varying tech-
nology, I estimate a revenue production function such as:
yj,t = θvvj,t + θkkj,t + ωj,t + uj,t
for each two-digits NAICS on a five-year rolling window. This allows to con-
struct a series of sector-time varying elasticities to variable inputs {θ̂s,t} from
1952 to 2015.
Constant elasticity. As a useful benchmark to compare the results to,
I estimate the Cobb-Douglas production function across two-digits sectors,
pooling all years.
Figure 1.5 plots the sector average of this estimated elasticities together with
the average elasticity estimated using the baseline Translog production func-
tion in equation (1.6). The figure shows a significant time volatility of output
elasticities and a downward trend in both measures of θv, especially from 1980.
Both estimates show a significant change in the output elasticity over time.
The Cobb-Douglas estimate moves from approximately an average of 0.88 be-
tween 1950 and 1970 to 0.83 after 2000. A similar decline is captured in the
evolution of the elasticity to variable inputs derived from the Translog produc-
tion function. Therefore, even if the baseline estimation using the Translog
production function is assuming a constant technology over time, the time se-
ries behavior of the implied elasticity to variable inputs is in line with a more
flexible specification of the production function that takes into account the
time-varying nature of the technology available to firms.
19While the former is a more coherent robustness check as it allows for a time-varying
elasticity, I find it useful to report also the constant elasticity case as it provides a useful
benchmark, also against other estimates in the literature, for the estimation of the production
function.
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Figure 1.5: Sector-time varying output elasticities to variable inputs






























Note: The figure plots the averages across 2 digits sectors of the elasticities of output to
variable inputs estimated using a Translog and a Cobb-Douglas production function. The
Cobb-Douglas production function is estimated separately for each two-digits NAICS on a
five year rolling window to allow changes in the estimated parameters from 1952 to 2015. The
elasticity for the Translog function, instead, is estimated for each two-digits sector pooling all
years from 1950 to 2017 and then constructed averaging the firm-level elasticities constructed
following equation (1.6).
Table 1.5 reports the estimates of the cohort effects for markups measured
using both the constant elasticity and the time-varying specification. The
estimated effect of business cycles on markups is larger when time variation
in technology are allowed in the estimation. In particular, allowing for time
variation in θv implies an effect of business cycles on markups 25% higher (the
coefficient moves from -0.302 to -0.385). For the time-varying specification,
this implies that firms starting the listing process when aggregate output is
two standard deviations below trend report markups that are approximately
2.6% higher than similar firms that instead start the process with aggregate
output being on trend. When I use the estimate of the production function
with constant elasticity, the same change in output would result in a 2%
difference in markups, which is close to the baseline effect estimated using the
Translog specification. These estimates mean that firms listed at the height
of the Great Recession, in 2009, were able to charge a markup respectively
3% and 2.3% higher than if they decided to go public in 2007. The estimated
persistence, instead, is very similar between the two specifications and the
baseline estimates.
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Table 1.5: Cohort effects with Cobb-Douglas production function
Sector varying θv Sector-Time varying θv
Dep. Variable: Log-Markup (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cycle measure -0.302*** -0.749*** -0.385*** -0.910***
(0.065) (0.137) (0.065) (0.137)
Cycle measure × Age 0.045*** 0.053***
(0.010) (0.010)
Cycle measure × Age0 -1.038*** -1.194***
(0.384) (0.389)
Cycle measure × Age1 -0.829** -0.928***
(0.342) (0.346)
Cycle measure × Age2 -0.489 -0.683**
(0.301) (0.299)
Cycle measure × Age3 -0.656** -0.941***
(0.326) (0.321)
Cycle measure × Age4 -0.798** -0.901***
(0.326) (0.326)
Cycle measure × Age5 -1.067*** -1.166***
(0.335) (0.339)
Cycle measure × Age6−10 -0.263* -0.311**
(0.137) (0.136)
Cycle measure × Age11−15 0.111 0.085
(0.136) (0.135)
Cycle measure × Age16−20 0.134 -0.001
(0.134) (0.136)
Cycle measure × Age21−25 -0.100 -0.023
(0.138) (0.139)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Size Decile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Sale Decile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
N 92,336 92,336 92,336 90,458 90,458 90,458
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p :∗∗∗< 0.01,∗∗< 0.05,∗< 0.1. The table reports the coefficient of interest for the specifications in equation (1.8) and (1.9) plus age
group specific age effects. Markups are measured using the elasticity of output to variable inputs, θv, estimated from a Cobb-Douglas production function in two ways: i) pooling
all years in the sample - Columns (1) to (3); and ii) estimating the production function coefficients on five-year rolling windows for each two-digits sector - Columns (4) to (6). The
measure of business cycle is quadratic detrended real log-GDP.
37
Figure 1.6 shows the estimated cohort effects and the age profiles of markups
for firms that are first observed in booms and in recessions for the two Cobb-
Douglas estimations of the production function. The resulting age profiles
are remarkably similar, indicating a second-order role for the output elastic-
ity of variable inputs in the determination of the cohort effects for markups.
Compared to the baseline profiles in Figure 1.1, both Cobb-Douglas specifica-
tions deliver a higher effect of business cycles on the age profiles. A negative
two-standard deviation of the cycle component of GDP from its trend results
in a 12% higher initial markup when I consider the sector-time variation in
output elasticities, as shown in Figure 1.6a. The estimates of the cohort ef-
fects with the constant Cobb-Douglas production function instead, shown in
Figure 1.6b, deliver an initial markup approximately 9% higher for firms that
experience the same change in the cycle component of GDP. This last re-
sult is closer in magnitude to the baseline results obtained with the Translog
specification.
In terms of persistence, the cohort effects estimated with both Cobb-Douglas
production functions and the ones estimated using the Translog show the same
pattern. Firms that are listed during bad economic times tend to have higher
markups for approximately 15 years of their lives as listed firms.
It is important to note that, despite delivering very similar average elastic-
ities, the time varying estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function,
measures a larger effect of initial aggregate conditions on markups. The rea-
son for this discrepancy can be due to the changing nature of technology for
different cohorts of firms. The estimation of the production function for each
sector across a relatively short horizon, allows to incorporate in the cohort
effects on markups the consequences of business cycles on the technology used
by firms that get listed at different moments of the cycle. These effects, that
are tightly linked to the changing nature of the production process are not
fully captured by the Translog specification despite featuring a firm specific
elasticity of output to variable inputs.20
20Despite being a relevant aspect for the estimation of markups the investigation of dif-
ferent techniques to estimate production functions are beyond the scope of this project.
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Figure 1.6: Cohort effects and age profiles for Cobb-Douglas production function
(a) Time-varying specification





































Note: The figure plots the age profile for markups estimated from equation (1.9) for markups
measured using the output elasticity to variable inputs estimated from a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function. Both the sector-time varying specification and the sector varying specifi-
cation are reported. Specifically, at each age a, I am plotting µ̂0 + φ̂a+(β̂0 + β̂1a)Z, where µ̂0
is the average log-markup in the first available year, φ̂a are the estimated age fixed effects,
(β̂0, β̂1) capture the estimated persistence of aggregate conditions in the first available year.
Z is a measure of business cycle outcomes that takes value 2σ for Peak and −2σ for Trough,
with σ being the standard deviation of quadratically detrended real GDP. Table 1.5, Column
(2) reports the coefficients used to construct these graphs.
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1.6.2 Alternative measure of output elasticity to variable in-
puts: cost shares
The measure of markups at the firm-level relies heavily on the estimation of
the output elasticity to variable inputs. As the estimation of the production
function without price and quantity data risks to be biased, I report the main
empirical analysis of the paper for a measure of markups where the elasticity
of output to variable inputs is not coming from a direct estimation of the
production function but rather from the direct measure of the cost-share in
variable inputs.21 In order to compute total costs I assume a common user
cost of capital of 12% that includes an exogenous depreciation rate, the federal
fund rate and risk-premia, as in De Loecker et al. [2020] and Gutiérrez and
Philippon [2019]. I then average the share of expenditure on variable inputs
over total costs within each year and 2-digits NAICS to compute a new sector-
time varying θs,t to measure markups following equation (1.3).
Also in this case, the qualitative effects of aggregate conditions at the time
of first available balance sheet data are very similar to the baseline results
shown in the main results of the paper. When markups are estimated using
cost-shares, the effects, both on the average effect and its persistence, are very
similar to the ones estimated using the baseline model, as shown in Table 1.6
and Figure 1.7.
As for the baseline results, even when the output elasticity is estimated with
the cost-share of variable inputs a positive two-standard deviation in output
(approximately 6%) translates to a 2% drop in the average markup charged
by firms. Decomposing this effect along the age profile of firms shows that
the effect on the initial markups is more than twice as large as the average
one - a positive two-standard deviation change in output generates a 4.9%
drop in the markup charged in the first year a firm is observed compared to a
similar firm that instead does not face any change in the cyclical component of
GDP. The effect of the initial business cycles, as in the baseline case, vanishes
approximately after fifteen years of firms lives as public companies. Using the
Great Recession as a benchmark, these estimates imply that firms starting
the listing process in 2009 have an average markup 2.25% higher than if they
went public in 2007. The estimated impact on markups in the first year as
21Assuming that the production function follows a Cobb-Douglas and markets for inputs
are competitive then the cost-share in variable inputs is a valid measure for the output
elasticity.
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Figure 1.7: Cohort effects on markups’ age profiles - Cost shares

















Note: The figure plots the age profile for markups estimated from equation (1.9). Specifi-
cally, at each age a, I am plotting µ̂0+φ̂a+(β̂0+β̂1a)Z, where µ̂0 is the average log-markup in
the first available year, φ̂a are the estimated age fixed effects, (β̂0, β̂1) capture the estimated
persistence of aggregate conditions in the first available year. Z is a measure of business
cycle outcomes that takes value 2σ for Peak and −2σ for Trough, with σ being the standard
deviation of quadratically detrended real GDP. The persistence coefficients underlying this
plot are reported in Table 1.6, Column (2).
listed, instead, implies that markups are 5.6% higher for firms going public
at the height of the Great Recession relative to similar firms going public in
2007.
1.6.3 Alternative measure of markups: Operating Expendi-
ture
One of the main issues with Compustat data is linked to the fact that firms
that follow different accounting standards are allowed to assign different ex-
penditures to either Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) or to Selling, General and
Administrative Expenditures (XSGA). As firms are allowed to choose which
reporting standard to abide there is the risk that the variation in COGS does
not reflect true differences in variable costs but rather differences in reporting
standards.22
If the choice of the reporting standard was correlated with aggregate conditions
at the time of first available data the estimate of the effect could be biased.
To ensure that the negative effects of initial aggregate conditions are not due
22See Traina [2018] and De Loecker et al. [2020] for an in-depth discussion of this issue.
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Table 1.6: Cohort effects for markups measured using cost shares
Dep. Variable: Log-Markup (1) (2) (3)
Cycle measure -0.294*** -0.727***
(0.065) (0.137)
Cycle measure × Age 0.044***
(0.010)
Cycle measure × Age0 -1.041***
(0.384)
Cycle measure × Age1 -0.819**
(0.342)
Cycle measure × Age2 -0.453
(0.301)
Cycle measure × Age3 -0.626*
(0.326)
Cycle measure × Age4 -0.781**
(0.327)
Cycle measure × Age5 -1.054***
(0.336)
Cycle measure × Age6−10 -0.247*
(0.137)
Cycle measure × Age11−15 0.113
(0.136)
Cycle measure × Age16−20 0.145
(0.134)
Cycle measure × Age21−25 -0.125
(0.138)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Initial Size Decile FE Yes Yes Yes
Initial Sale Decile FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10
N 92,336 92,336 92,336
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p :∗∗∗< 0.01,∗∗< 0.05,∗< 0.1. The table
reports the coefficient of interest for the specifications in equation (1.8) and (1.9) plus age
group specific age effects. Markups are measure using the elasticity of output to variable
inputs measured using the cost share of variable inputs in total costs. Capital costs are
included with gross user cost of capital of 12%. The measure of business cycle is quadratically
detrended real log-GDP.
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Figure 1.8: Cohort effects on markups’ age profiles - Operating Expenditure
















Note: The figure plots the age profile for markups estimated from equation (1.9). Specifi-
cally, at each age a, I am plotting µ̂0+φ̂a+(β̂0+β̂1a)Z, where µ̂0 is the average log-markup in
the first available year, φ̂a are the estimated age fixed effects, (β̂0, β̂1) capture the estimated
persistence of aggregate conditions in the first available year. Z is a measure of business
cycle outcomes that takes value 2σ for Peak and −2σ for Trough, with σ being the standard
deviation of quadratically detrended real GDP. The persistence coefficients underlying this
plot are reported in Table 1.7, Column (2).
from heterogeneity in reporting standards I re-estimate equation (1.8) using
Operating Expenditures (OPEXP) as the main measure of variable costs for
the construction of variable costs.23 Traina [2018] shows that this choice has
a profound impact on the long-run trend of aggregate markups, however, for
the purpose of this paper the two measures deliver qualitatively very similar
results, as shown in Table 1.7 and Figure 1.8.
In fact, when Operating Expenditures is used to measure the the sales to
variable cost ratio in equation (1.3), the effects of business cycles increase
in magnitude compared to the baseline estimates that uses Cost of Goods Sold
as measure of variable costs. As XSGA includes the fixed costs a firm has to
sustain in order to carry-on production, the higher business cycle effects on
markups when this measure is considered could be indication of the fact that
the selection operated by aggregate conditions reflects the whole structure of
firms costs, affecting also the fixed component of its cost structure.
This implies that a positive two-standard deviation in output (approximately
6%) translates to approximately -3.2% change in the average markups charged
23In Compustat, Operating Expenditures = Cost of Goods Sold + Selling, General and
Administrative Expenditure.
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Table 1.7: Cohort effects from markups measured using Operating Expenditures
Dep. Variable: Log-Markup (1) (2) (3)
Cycle measure -0.487*** -0.909***
(0.051) (0.111)
Cycle measure × Age 0.043***
(0.008)
Cycle measure × Age0 -0.971***
(0.342)
Cycle measure × Age1 -1.056***
(0.266)
Cycle measure × Age2 -1.005***
(0.264)
Cycle measure × Age3 -1.080***
(0.268)
Cycle measure × Age4 -0.940***
(0.265)
Cycle measure × Age5 -0.677***
(0.230)
Cycle measure × Age6−10 -0.511***
(0.107)
Cycle measure × Age11−15 0.062
(0.095)
Cycle measure × Age16−20 -0.225*
(0.116)
Cycle measure × Age21−25 -0.306***
(0.106)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Initial Size Decile FE Yes Yes Yes
Initial Sale Decile FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.32 0.32 0.32
N 81,298 81,298 81,298
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p :∗∗∗< 0.01,∗∗< 0.05,∗< 0.1. The table
reports the main coefficient of interest for the specifications in equation (1.8) and (1.9) plus
age group specific age effects. Markups are constructed using Operating Expenditures instead
of Cost of Goods Sold to mitigate misreporting of variable costs due to different accounting
standards. The measure of business cycle is quadratically detrended real log-GDP.
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by firms. Therefore, when measured with operating expenditures, the Great
Recession translates to an average increase in markups of approximately 3.7%
(firms that start listing in 2009 versus 2007). As for other robustness checks,
decomposing the effect along the life cycle of firms highlights how the initial
effects are larger (approximately -6.1% in the initial year for a positive two-
standard deviation change in the cycle component of GDP) and slowly fading
away in twelve to fifteen years.
1.6.4 Non-parametric cohort effects
An alternative solution to the identification problem of cohort effects in age-
cohort-time models is to choose a normalization for either the cohort effects
or the time effects.24 I follow Moreira [2015] and normalize the cohort effects
so that they sum to zero and are orthogonal to a time trend. The implicit
identification assumption that this normalization choice implies is that long-
run trends are fully captured by the combination of age and time fixed effects
while cohort effects identify cyclical components.
Therefore, I estimate the effects of business cycle for cohorts of listing firms
non-parametrically using the following specification at the firm-level:
log(µj,t) = α+ φa + φt +
C∑
c=1








where φa and φt are respectively age and time fixed effects; 1{j ∈ c} is an
indicator function that takes value one if firm j belongs to cohort c and Xj,t
is a vector of firm-level controls that include size, a second order polynomial
in firm j’s sector shares and two-digits sectors fixed effects.
The constraints on equation (1.10) force the cohort-effects to sum to 0. The
identification assumption behind this normalization choice is that any long-
24Deaton [1997] proposes this normalization in the context of consumers life-cycle prob-
lems. See Schulhofer-Wohl [2018] for a discussion of the time versus cohort normalization in
life-cycle models.
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Figure 1.9: Markups and non-parametric cohort effects








Note: The figure plots the cohort effects estimated using equation (1.10) and the Hamilton
filtered log-real GDP (one lag, two leads) for 51 cohorts of firms (1960-2011) that are observed
for at least 5 years. The error bars plot the 95% confidence interval for each coefficient.
run trend in firm-level markups can be controlled for by the age and time
effects while the cohort effects, by being orthogonal to a time trend, capture
the cyclical effects of markups for each cohort.
As a consequence, to check the robustness of the main estimates I compare
the series of cohort-effects coefficients estimated in equation (1.10) with the
measures of business cycles used as proxy variables in the main specifications
of the paper.
Results. Figure 1.9 plots the series of normalized coefficients in equation (1.10)
and the detrended GDP in the US. Visually, the time series of estimated co-
hort effects is very volatile, but it indicates that periods where aggregate GDP
is above trend are also associated with negative cohort effects on markup. In
fact, the two time series show a correlation coefficient of -0.37, significant at
the 1% level, as reported in Table 1.8. In addition, as shown in the table, this
negative correlation is preserved also with other proxy variables, hence I in-
terpret these results as supplementary evidence for cohort effects on markups
and their negative correlation with aggregate conditions.
46
Table 1.8: Correlation between non-parametric cohort effects and measures of ag-
gregate conditions
Correlation coefficient with cohort effects
Quadratically detrended log-GDP -0.376
(0.006)
Hodrick-Prescott filtered log-GDP -0.075
(0.596)




Note: p-value in parenthesis. The table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients, and
the associated p-values, between cohort effects estimated using equation 1.10 and plotted in
Figure 1.9, with aggregate measures of aggregate conditions. I restrict the sample to firms
that are observed for at least 5 years.
1.6.5 Sub-sample with founding dates
Besides listing, another point in firms’ lives when entrepreneurs face possibly
irreversible product market choices that have long-lasting repercussions on
their business activity is the period in which they found their companies. An
obvious limitations of using Compustat data is that firms balance sheets are
observed only since few years before the time or their first filing, however, using
CRSP it is possible to merge Compustat data to the Field-Ritter dataset and
assign founding dates to approximately 34% of firms in my baseline sample.
This allows to perform a similar analysis to the one developed in the previous
sections with the important difference that I can define cohorts using firms
actual founding dates rather than from the first observed date of their balance
sheets.
Age profile of markups. Figure 1.10 plots the age profiles for this sub-
sample. As expected, the estimated age profile is steeper and implies a 50%
increase in markups when firms are observed since their founding date.
Cohort effects. The effects of initial aggregate conditions are much stronger
in this sub-sample and increasing over time. This is a major difference with
respect to the age profiles computed in the baseline sample. In addition, the
reason why the interaction of business cycle measures and age group fixed
effects are not significant at very early ages can be due to the fact that the
sample in this case is extremely selected as these cells are populated by firms
that go public almost immediately after being founded.
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With all the caveats that this very selected dataset has, it confirms the baseline
thesis of this paper that aggregate conditions can have persistent effects on
the way firms manage their markups. Figure 1.11 plots the effects of aggregate
conditions at birth. In this case the effect of business cycle does not vanish
over time but it is actually persistent leading to a more than 40% difference
between markups of firms born at opposite moments of the business cycle, i.e.
firms founded contemporaneously to positive two-standard deviation change
in cyclical GDP versus a negative two-standard deviation change.
Table 1.9: Cohort effects on markups - from founding dates
Dep. Variable: Log-Markup (1) (2) (3)
Cycle Measure -1.988*** -1.785***
(0.152) (0.441)
Cycle Measure × Age -0.014
(0.026)
Cycle Measure × Age1 -3.912
(3.073)
Cycle Measure × Age2 -0.454
(1.303)
Cycle Measure × Age3 -1.312
(1.104)
Cycle Measure × Age4 -1.123
(0.865)
Cycle Measure × Age5 -1.867**
(0.905)
Cycle Measure × Age6−10 -2.326***
(0.435)
Cycle Measure × Age11−15 -1.136***
(0.332)
Cycle Measure × Age16−20 -1.558***
(0.295)
Cycle Measure × Age21−25 -2.079***
(0.272)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Initial Size Decile FE Yes Yes Yes
Initial Sale Decile FE No No No
R2 0.15 0.15 0.15
N 30,577 30,577 30,577
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p :∗∗∗< 0.01,∗∗< 0.05,∗< 0.1. The table
reports the main coefficient of interest for the specifications in equation (1.8) and (1.9) plus
age group specific age effects. The sample is constructed retrieving founding dates for a
subsample of Compustat firms using the Field-Ritter Dataset of Fouding Dates. Cohort
effects are proxied with aggregate conditions at the founding date rather than the first
available year, which is closer to the start of the IPO process. The measure of business cycle
is quadratic detrended real log-GDP.
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Figure 1.10: Markups’ age profile - sub-sample from founding dates















Note: The figure plots the estimated age profile for markups from equation (1.8) together
with the 95% confidence interval. Specifically, at each age a, I am plotting µ̂0 + φ̂a, where
µ̂0 is the average log-markup in the first available year and φ̂a are the estimated age fixed
effects.
Figure 1.11: Cohort effects on markups’ age profile - sub-sample from founding
dates















Note: The figure plots the age profile for markups estimated from equation (1.9). Specifi-
cally, at each age a, I am plotting µ̂0+φ̂a+(β̂0+β̂1a)Z, where µ̂0 is the average log-markup in
the first available year, φ̂a are the estimated age fixed effects, (β̂0, β̂1) capture the estimated
persistence of aggregate conditions in the first available year. Z is a measure of business
cycle outcomes that takes value 2σ for Peak and −2σ for Trough, with σ being the standard
deviation of quadratically detrended real GDP. The persistence coefficients underlying this
plot are reported in Table 1.9, Column (2).
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1.7 Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper I estimate the persistence of aggregate conditions at time of
listing for a sample of US listed firms. I adapt an age-period-cohort model
to firm-level data using a proxy variable approach to solve the well-known
identification issues in these types of models. Specifically, I proxy cohort fixed
effects with aggregate conditions close to the time of listing. I find that firms
that are first observed in periods of bad aggregate conditions end up charging
an higher markup throughout their lives. The average effect on markups is
between -0.29% and -0.38% for a 1% change in the cyclical component of GDP.
To put it in perspective, these effects imply that firms that were close to list
at the height of the Great Recession, in 2009, were able to charge an average
markup up to 3% higher than similar firms that instead started their listing
process in 2007.
Decomposing this average effects along firms’ life cycles uncovers profound
differences in the impact of initial aggregate conditions of the age profile of
markups. In particular, the effect of aggregate conditions are stronger in the
first years of firms lives - with effects ranging approximately between -0.62%
to -0.91% for a 1% change in the cyclical component of GDP - and then
fading approximately after twelve to fifteen years. This has profound effects
on the estimated age profiles for firms that start their listing process in booms
compared to similar firms that instead decide to go public in recession, with
the latter exhibiting higher markups on average but a flatter age profile.
Given the data used in this paper and the inherent nature of markups, that
makes them very hard to measure, I run a battery of robustness checks aimed
at minimizing concerns on the relevance of markup measurements for the re-
sults uncovered in the paper. In particular, I consider different measures for
the elasticity of output to variable inputs by using different specifications for
the production function and by estimating it directly using cost-shares. In all
cases the results are not significantly affected by this choices. An interesting
results is linked to the time horizon in the estimation of the production func-
tion. Given the length of the sample used, allowing for a sector-time varying
technology proves to be important to correctly capture the changing nature
of production technologies over time and fully capture the effects of business
cycles. In addition, I address the concerns relative to difficulties of consis-
tently measuring variable costs by estimating cohort effects also for markups
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constructed using two different measures of costs. In both cases, the results
for cohort effects are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
Despite the range of robustness checks, the core of the analysis is centered
around the sales to variable cost ratio as the main estimator of markups.
In a recent work, Bond et al. [2020] highlight how this particular estimator
suffers from first-order identification issues linked to both the way in which
firm output is measured, revenue instead of quantities, and the type of input
bundle I need to use to estimate both the production function and markups.
They show that when revenues instead of quantities are used in the estimation
of the production function, the ratio estimator does not identify markups. To
correct for this issue as much as possible, in the estimation of the production
function I follow De Loecker et al. [2020] and I include controls to mitigate the
bias in the estimated revenue elasticity. This is a clear second-best solution and
more work is definitely needed to extend the analysis carried out in this paper
to a setting with better data where the identification of firm-level markups
can be improved.
The effects reported in this paper indicate a long-lasting, albeit not persistent,
effect of business cycles on firm-level markups. This finding complements re-
cent developments in the firm dynamics literature that find significant effects
of business cycles on firm sizes. In this literature, rather than firm-level pro-
ductivity, whereby more productive firms are born during booms, aggregate
conditions at the time of inception and the resulting easiness of expanding
their customer bases appear to drive these size differences. As recessions are
periods in which it is hard to find customers, firms that start their business in
these periods suffer from a persistent size gap that never recovers. The fact
that I find an effect on markups is suggestive of an additional channel through
which business cycles can influence firms’ behavior, one in which markups and




1.A Details on data sources
The main data source used in the paper is the annual version of North-America
COMPUSTAT accessed through WRDS on April, 2020. For the sub-sample
of firms with founding dates, I rely on the Field-Ritter Database of Founding
Dates. I merge it to the main sample using the links between firm identifiers
in COMPUSTAT and firm identifiers in the CRSP Database (accessed using
WRDS) and the Field-Ritter dataset. The aggregate time series at annual
frequency for US real GDP (series ID: GDPCA) and unemployment rate (series
ID: UNRATE) are from FRED.
Sample selection and data cleaning
• I consider only domestic, consolidated statements of industrial firms in-
corporated in the United States and that report their balance sheet in
U.S. dollars;
• I exclude financial firms (SIC codes: 6900-6999) and utilities (SIC codes:
4900-4999);
• The capital stock is computed using the perpetual inventory method
(PIM), iterating forward on the capital accumulation equation, kj,t =
(1− δj,t)kj,t−1 + ij,t.
I initialize the value of the capital stock, kj,0, with the first non-missing
observation for the gross value of property, plant and equipment (PPEGT).
For each firm, I then construct a series of net investments, ij,t−δj,tkj,t−1,
by taking the first difference of the reported net value of property plant
and equipment (PPENT), i.e ij,t − δj,tkj,t−1 = PPENTj,t − PPENTj,t−1. In
the few cases in which the value of PPENT is missing, I take a liner
interpolation within each reporting spell using neighboring values before
constructing the investment series. I deflate the series of net investment
using the deflator for private, non-residential fixed investments (BEA
code: B008RG);
• I drop observations with negative sales, capital or employment;
• For the main empirical results presented in the paper, I restrict the
analysis to firms that report their first accounting data between 1960
and 2017. The main reason of focusing on this restricted sample is to
avoid considering the set of very old firms that, by construction, report
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their first balance sheet in 1950. The results for the whole sample of
firms are qualitatively very similar.










Mean 1,896.29 1,309.84 7.41 1,660.52 1,217.25 13.16
Standard Dev. 10,706.65 8,162.24 35.50 11,423.76 7,865.71 10.62
25th Percentile 26.814 16.47 0.15 9.46 7.04 5.00
Median 139.10 87.62 0.80 53.87 39.63 10.00
75th Percentile 659.27 430.44 3.54 318.22 227.79 19.00
N 181,173 181,173 165,657 179,910 178,603 183,381
Note: Main variables used for the estimation of the production function and the measure-
ment of markups. Financial variables are deflated using GDP deflator (base year 2010).
COMPUSTAT sample 1960-2017, firms observed from initial year of available accounting
data.




Cobb-Douglas TransLog Cost Share
Mean 1.52 1.53 1.50 1.57
Standard Dev. 0.99 1.04 1.01 1.10
25th Percentile 1.09 1.10 1.07 1.12
Median 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.34
75th Percentile 1.64 1.65 1.64 1.69
N 174,581 183,381 177,386 181,173
Note: Markups measures. COMPUSTAT sample 1960-2017, firms observed from initial
year of available accounting data.
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1.B Additional figures
Figure 1.B.1: Joint distribution of First Available Year -IPO Year and First Avail-
able Year -Founding Year





















Note: The figure plots the joint distribution of First Available Year -IPO Date First Avail-
able Year -Founding Year for the subset of Compustat firms for which I have the date of the
IPO. Each dot is an observation in the sample and darker colors indicate higher mass.
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Figure 1.B.2: Sale weighted aggregate markups with different estimates for the
elasticity of output to variable inputs



















De Loecker, Eeckhout and Hunger (2018)
Note: The figure plots the sale weighted average markup in the sample. The dotted line is
from De Loecker et al. [2018].
Figure 1.B.3: Cost weighted aggregate markups with different estimates for the
elasticity of output to variable inputs




















De Loecker, Eeckhout and Hunger (2018)
Note: The figure plots the cost-weighted average markup in the sample. The measure








In this paper, I explore the role of aggregate fluctuations as a persistent de-
terminant of heterogeneity in firm-level markups. To analyze how business
cycles generate dispersion in firm-level markups, I estimate the age profile of
markups at the firm level and I use it to calibrate a general equilibrium model
that features heterogeneous product markets, customer base accumulation and
firm dynamics. In the model, firms’ demands are constrained by the size of
their customer bases. However, firms can accumulate customers using two
complement channels: i) increasing sales by lowering prices and ii) making
direct investments in customer acquisition. As the value of operating in each
product market fluctuates endogenously with business cycles, aggregate con-
ditions generate a selection on the product market composition of the cohorts
of listing firms that results in heterogeneity in the optimal customer acquisi-
tion processes of active firms. This heterogeneity, is persistent and is able to
significantly affect the response of the economy to aggregate shocks.
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2.1 Introduction
Recent research has found significant and persistent effects of initial aggregate
conditions on firm sizes. Firms that start their activities during bad economic
times suffer from a size gap compared to similar types of businesses that start
during booms. Notably, rather than firm-level productivity, whereby more
productive firms are born during booms, aggregate conditions at the time of
inception and the resulting easiness of expanding their customer bases ap-
pear to drive these size differences. 1 Interestingly, as aggregate conditions
can influence other aspects of firms’ operations, a similar mechanism could
potentially affect also how firms manage variables that are commonly con-
sidered more volatile and less history-dependent, like prices and consequently
markups.
The prominence of price-cost markups as one of the critical variables for the
transmission of aggregate shocks is well established in macroeconomics. Un-
til recently, however, estimates of their co-movements with business cycles
have relied mostly on aggregate or industry-level measures.2 The increased
availability of firm-level data and the development of methods that allow es-
timating markups at finer levels of aggregation have spurred an increase in
the number of papers studying the dynamics of markups at the firm level. As
most of these studies focus on long-run dynamics,3 shedding more light on
the determinants of markups heterogeneity and their interplay with business
cycles, is a promising avenue to uncover new channels for the transmission of
aggregate shocks at frequencies higher than the ones currently dominating the
literature.
In this chapter, I build on the empirical analysis developed in chapter 1 on the
persistence of business cycle effects on firm-level markups and I complement it
with an analysis of the contemporaneous correlation of markups with business
cycles along firms’ age profiles. In addition, I develop a theoretical framework
that is able to match three main facts about firm-level markups and their
business cycle behavior.4
1See Sedláček and Sterk [2017], Moreira [2015].
2See, among others, Rotemberg and Woodford [1999] and Bils [1987]. For a recent
analysis of how aggregate macroeconomic shocks transmit to aggregate and industry-level
markups see Nekarda and Ramey [2013].
3Relevant contributions in this field are, among other, De Loecker et al. [2020], Traina
[2018], Autor et al. [2017], Hall [1988].
4I discuss the details of the empirical methodology used to estimate markups and the
persistence of business cycles on markups in Chapter 1.
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First, I show that the estimated age profile of markups is mildly increasing in
firms’ age. Second, I estimate the effect of aggregate conditions at the time
of listing on the age profile. Third, I show that firm-level markups are coun-
tercyclical and that the countercyclicality is not constant throughout firms’
lives. Importantly, older and larger firms are associated with less counter-
cyclical, if not procyclical, markups. Contrary to other studies that highlight
how markups’ countercyclicality is decreasing as firms age, I show that the
cross-sectional heterogeneity in markups’ can be at the root of the observed
difference between the cyclicality of aggregate measures of markups, that are
usually found to be acyclical or mildly procyclical, and firm-level estimates of
markup cyclicality that instead are countercyclical.
The reasons why these facts are particularly interesting from a macroeconomic
perspective are twofold. First, in a world where the composition of firms in
the economy is not fixed, the macroeconomy’s response to aggregate shocks is
bound to be shaped by the characteristics of active firms. Second, the cross-
sectional composition of active firms can be persistently affected by lagged
realizations of the business cycle, as aggregate conditions early in firms lives
or close to firms’ structural decisions, like listing, have persistent effects on how
firms manage their markups. In light of these results, a model that is able
to characterize both the firm-level and the aggregate behavior of markups
and, at the same time, incorporate firms’ life cycles can be useful to identify
the relevant margins of heterogeneity in the cross-section of active firms and
to quantify how relevant the composition of firms’ characteristics is for the
transmission of aggregate shocks.
With these empirical evidence at hand, I rationalize the empirical facts sum-
marized above by building a firm dynamics model with product-market het-
erogeneity and customer base accumulation. The novelty of the mechanism
proposed in this paper relies on the fact that firms use two joint channels
to accumulate customers: i) increasing sales, and ii) directly investing in a
range of activities that are specifically designed to increase the reach of their
products.5
5The importance of pricing in models with customer markets dates back to Phelps and
Winter [1970], Bils [1989] and more recently Nakamura and Steinsson [2011]. In the firm
dynamics and pricing literature, many studies have looked at the effects of investing in goods’
quality to acquire customers or in the role of sales for customers’ acquisition. However, the
combination of these two channels and its effects on markups has not been explicitly tackled.
In this literature, the papers that are the closest in spirit to this one are Sedláček and Sterk
[2017] and Hong [2017]. Among others, see Perla [2019], Gilbukh and Roldan [2018], Gourio
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The mechanism I explore relies on an implicit selection on the cohorts of
newly listed firms operated by business cycles. Specifically, in the model each
prospective public firm’s profitability depends on the product market in which
it operates, which in turn dictates whether it is more important to list during
a recession or an expansion. The fact that business cycles influence the listing
choice of firms is based on the observation that the economy’s aggregate state
does not uniformly influence the profitability of firms operating in different
product markets. As the option value of becoming a public firm fluctuates
endogenously with the cycle and depends on firm product markets6, the com-
position of listed firms in the economy can be shaped by the aggregate state
at the time of their choice. As firms age, and gain even more relevance in
the overall economy, they help transmit past business cycles realizations to
the aggregate economy through the cross-sectional composition of active firms
that gets shaped also by the history of business cycle realizations.7
In the model, business cycles have different effects on the profitability of firms
because, depending on the product market in which they are active, firms face
different trade-offs between using prices and directly investing in customer
base. The main distinction between these two channels is in the nature of the
investment they entail and how effective the two are in relaxing firms’ demand
constraints. For example, acquiring customers by selling more output can be
easily achieved by lowering prices. This strategy could be an effective way of
increasing demand for goods whose production can be easily scaled to satisfy
large markets and where customers are more focused on prices and care less
about brand values or other goods’ characteristics. In these markets, there-
fore, the price lever could be particularly convenient as it enables firms to
increase their output immediately and, at the same time, lock more customers
in their specific varieties. Hence, for firms deciding to operate in these prod-
uct markets, the acquisition of new customers relies on acting prevalently on
prices. For firms that operate in less scalable markets or where customers are
and Rudanko [2014], Argente et al. [2018], Fitzgerald and Priolo [2018], Bilbiie et al. [2019],
Edmond et al. [2018], Kueng et al. [2014], Foster et al. [2016].
6Among other, Stoughton et al. [2001], Chemmanur and He [2011], Chemmanur et al.
[2018] provide empirical evidence that not only funding needs but also many factors, linked
to firms’ product market characteristics, influence their decisions of going public at specific
times.
7Heterogeneous financial frictions have also been used in the literature to rationalize
differences in firm-level markups, see Gilchrist et al. [2016] and Altomonte et al. [2018].
However, in the context of the mechanism proposed here, financial frictions would exacerbate
the effects of business cycles on markups and therefore are not included. Nevertheless, their
interactions with customer markets and markup cyclicality is an exciting topic that I leave
for future research.
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highly sensitive to other goods’ characteristics besides prices, the expansion of
their customer bases relies more heavily on targeted investments in product
characteristics, like quality, marketing, or other forms of intangible capital. In
these cases, investments in demand creation necessarily require a diversion of
resources from production to direct customer base acquisition.
Given that firms face demands with different sensitivities to customer bases
and the acquisition of new customers relies more heavily on firms’ sales in some
markets but not in others, aggregate conditions can affect the relative efficacy
of these two investments and persistently impact the aggregate economy by
skewing the composition of public firms’ cohorts towards product markets that
rely more heavily on either one of the two channels. Newly listed firms will
operate in the product market that appears to be more profitable, depending
on the aggregate state, at the time of their decision. As I assume a common
cost of listing across markets, fluctuations in expected profitability create the
premises for an endogenous selection of newly listed firms due to business
cycles.
In addition, I show that it is necessary to allow for investments in customer
base to depend on firms’ sales to generate a realistic life-cycle path for firm-
level markups. Without this dependence, the model would not be able to
reproduce the estimated age profiles. Allowing firms to acquire customers
with an alternative channel, instead, is essential to generate cohort-effects and
cyclicality profiles that are close in magnitude to the empirically observed
ones.
I calibrate the stationary solution of the model to match the estimated age
profile of firm-level markups. Interestingly, the parametrization that delivers
the best fit implies a negative relationship, across product markets, between
the sensitivity of demands to customer bases and the relevance of firms’ sales
in attracting customers. On the one hand, product markets in which firms can
benefit a lot from expansions in customer bases are also those where the price
lever is less relevant. On the other hand, firms operating in product markets
with relatively lower demand sensitivities exhibit higher dependence on sales
for their customer accumulation process. Under this baseline parametrization,
I show that the model is able to replicate the cyclicality profile of markups
and generate at the same time strong countercyclical markups for small and
young firms and pro-cyclical aggregate markups. This feature is consistent
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with the numerous empirical evidence both at the aggregate and at the firm
level.
Relation to the literature. A large number of studies in macroeconomics
have established the importance of firm dynamics for the behavior of output,
investment and employment along the business cycle.8 However, the connec-
tion between aggregate fluctuations and firm characteristics is a topic that
has gained relevance only recently, particularly in relation to the deep causes
of observed firm heterogeneity and how this heterogeneity can be connected
to business cycles.9 Are ex-ante firm characteristics the main driver of ex-
isting differences in the cross-section of firms or the history of idiosyncratic
shocks for each firm is the main determinant of the observed firm outcomes?
A compelling thesis of this literature is that firms are endowed with ex-ante
heterogeneous characteristics that play a significant role in determining their
economic outcomes (Pugsley et al. [2019], Hottman et al. [2016], Foster et al.
[2016, 2008]).
Sedláček and Sterk [2017], Hoffmann [2017], Moreira [2015], Alp [2019] develop
models where business cycles can select new firms on ex-ante characteristics
and show that business cycles at inception is an important determinant of
employment fluctuations and a persistent source of firm heterogeneity. These
papers are very close in spirit to this one, albeit their primary focus is on firm
size while I stress that the channels analyzed in these studies have the ability
to affect also firms’ markup choices persistently. Hence, I am contributing to
this literature by adding a new margin along which firms can be permanently
affected by business cycles, not only their size but also the way they manage
their markups.10
Customers and their valuation of firms’ products have a central role in the
framework developed in this paper. Recently, the importance of firm and
products’ appeal in explaining the dispersion in firms’ outcomes, such as sales
and size, has been empirically investigated using various structural approaches.
For example, Hottman et al. [2016] find that firms’ appeal and the number of
8Among many others see Ottonello and Winberry [2019], Carvalho and Grassi [2019],
Bloom et al. [2018], Clementi and Palazzo [2016], Fort et al. [2013] , Moscarini and Postel-
Vinay [2012] and Khan and Thomas [2008].
9Notable examples in this literature are Luttmer [2007] and more recently Arkolakis
[2016] and Bernard et al. [2019].
10Another paper explicitly models firm growth and heterogeneous markups along firms’
life cycles is Peters [2018]. However, his focus is on long growth and the ensuing misallocation
effects of markups rather than business-cycle consequences.
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products they produce can account for a large share of the observed variation
in firms’ sales and are a key component in explaining firm heterogeneity.11
Similarly, Argente et al. [2018] estimate the life cycle of revenues at the product
level finding that a large share of the variation in firms’ sales can be explained
by product appeal. Using firm-level transaction data and a structural model
of the production network, Bernard et al. [2019] find that downstream factors,
especially the number of customers, are a key determinant of the observed
variation in firms’ sales.
In addition, I also touch upon the vast literature on the cyclical behavior of
markups. This literature can be broadly divided into two strands. The first
one that, mostly due to data limitations, focuses prevalently at the aggregate
or industry-level measure of markups see, for example, Ramey [2016], Bils
[1987], Nekarda and Ramey [2013]. The second one, more recent, that instead
uses firm-level data to estimate markups at the firm-level and links markups
with firm-level incentive mechanisms and time-varying market structures that
determine the business cycle behavior of markups at the firm level. Notable
examples in this literature are Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008], Bilbiie et al.
[2012], Hong [2017], Gilbukh and Roldan [2018] and Burstein et al. [2019].
Anderson et al. [2018], using data on listed US firms find that firm-level gross
margins, a measure highly correlated with markups, do not respond to high-
frequency monetary policy and oil price shocks, suggesting that markups could
be acyclical also at the firm-level. The main reason for the difference with the
results discussed in this chapter is the use of a different subsample. In fact,
to maintain consistency with other data sources used in their study, Anderson
et al. [2018] focus only on firms belonging to the retail sector. For the analysis
developed here, instead, I include firms in all sectors of the economy.12
The use of customer capital to deliver countercyclical markups is not novel,
see for example Gourio and Rudanko [2014], Ravn et al. [2006], Bils [1989], the
contribution of the analytical model developed in this paper is that it consid-
ers two complementary channels through which firms can acquire customers,
and it highlights how business cycles can permanently influence firms’ choices
11Specifically, using a structural model and product-level data they estimate that four-
fifths of the variation in firms’ sales can be attributed to firm appeal and product scope.
12Albeit large, the retail sector accounts for approximately 10% of aggregate US employ-
ment on average. Including all firms in the Compustat sample, instead, allows to cover
approximately 30% of aggregate employment on average.
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on how to accumulate customer capital most effectively .13 More recently,
the importance of customer base in firm dynamics model has been recently
explored by Neiman and Vavra [2019], Bornstein [2018], Perla [2019]. Neiman
and Vavra [2019] document an increase in niche consumption and they use
an heterogeneous agents model to look at product level data. They use a
framework close to the one used in this paper but they do not focus on the
behavior of markups nor on business cycle implications of their documented
consumer behavior. Similarly, Bornstein [2018] uses a model with heteroge-
neous taste shocks to highlight how population aging can impact business dy-
namism. Overall, this literature highlights how the connections between firms
and customers can have profound repercussions on the macroeconomy. Pa-
ciello et al. [2019], instead, study how customer retention incentives influence
the pass-through of productivity shocks to firm-level markups. I contribute
to this strand of studies by analyzing the relationship between customer ac-
quisition and markups when firms are allowed to use both prices and direct
investments in customer acquisition to manage their customer base.
The importance of product selection to match many business cycle features of
firms balance sheets, such as procyclical profits and countercyclical markups,
has been investigated by Dhingra and Morrow [2019] and Bilbiie et al. [2012]
among others. More recently, Bilbiie et al. [2019] focus on the importance of
product selection as a determinant of market power. In this paper, I follow the
spirit of the analysis carried out in these papers, but I consider firms’ product
market choices not as a continuous choice but something that can be done
only infrequently and at particular junctures of firms’ lives.14
Structure of the paper. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2
briefly summarizes the motivating evidences on the correlations between ag-
gregate conditions early in firms lives and markups that are explored in more
details in Chapter 1. Section 2.3 develops a theoretical model that incorpo-
rates incentives to accumulate customer base together with the documented
effects of aggregate conditions on markups. Section 2.4 discusses the calibra-
13On a similar note, Crouzet and Eberly [2018], Cavenaile and Roldan [2019] and Belo
et al. [2019], analyze the importance of intangible capital for market concentration and
firms’ valuations. In this paper’s context, investment in customer base is akin to a form of
intangible investments, but the focus is again shifted from the analysis of market power to
the interaction of business cycles and markups.
14See Stoughton et al. [2001], Wies and Moorman [2015], Bernstein [2015] and Chem-
manur et al. [2018], Chemmanur and He [2011] to see how the decision of going public is
linked not only linked to funding requirements but also to product-market considerations.
González [2020]...
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tion of the model and the main functional form assumptions while Sections
2.5 and 2.6 present the main implications of the model. Finally, Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 Motivating evidence
In this section, I summarize the empirical evidences on firm-level markups
used to motivate and then calibrate the model developed in this paper. More
details on the empirical analysis, its limitations and various robustness checks
are discussed in Chapter 1.
2.2.1 Persistent effects of business cycles on markups
There is robust evidence of persistent effects of business cycles on firm sizes
(Moreira [2015], Sedláček and Sterk [2017]). In this section, I extend the ex-
isting analysis on firm sizes to firm-level markups. In particular, I break the
multicollinearity in a standard cohort-age-time model by proxying cohort fixed
effects with aggregate conditions close to the time of listing. This strategy al-
lows to study how business cycle realizations at the time of relevant structural
decisions about firms operations and organization, such as listing, can be in-
formative on how firms manage their markups and the persistence of business
cycle realizations on the cross-sectional composition of active firms.
The main firm level specification that I bring to the data to estimate the
persistence of the correlation between initial aggregate conditions and firm
level markups is the following:
log(µj,c,t) = α+ φa + φt + βYc + Xj,tγ + uj,c,t, (2.1)
where µj,c,t is the markup charged by a firm j belonging to cohort c at time
t; φa and φt are respectively age and time fixed effects; Yc is a measure of
initial aggregate conditions for firms belonging to cohort c and Xj,t is a vector
of controls that includes sector fixed effects and a second order polynomial in
firm j’s sale share in her three digits sector.
The main coefficient of interest is β, that, under the standard exogeneity
restrictions, pins down the percent change in average markups resulting from
a one percent variation in the initial business cycle conditions, after controlling
for aggregate conditions faced by firms throughout their lives and the aging
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process. The age fixed effects, instead, are estimates of a counterfactual age
profile of markups that reflects only the dynamics that can be attributed to
the aging process, controlling for cohort and time effects.
The specification in equation (2.1) allows to measure the average effect on
yearly markups but does not allow to verify if the effects of business cycles are
persistent or tend to vanish as firms age. To assess these features of aggregate
conditions around the time of listing, I rely on the following specification,
log(µj,c,t) = α+ φa + φt + β0Yc + β1Yc × aj,t + Xj,tγ + uj,c,t. (2.2)
The coefficient of interest in this case are β0, that captures the effect on ag-
gregate conditions in the first year, and β1, that estimates the supplemen-
tary effect of business cycle realizations for each additional year firm j is
observed.
The specification in equation (2.2) assumes a monotonic effect of age on the
effects of aggregate conditions at birth. As a robustness check, I also consider
a less demanding specification that allows for a non-monotonic effect of age by
interacting the realizations of aggregate GDP with a set of dummy variables
for each age.
2.2.2 Cyclicality of firm level markups along the age profile
It is reasonable to think that the elasticity of markups with respect to con-
temporaneous aggregate conditions is not constant over firm life cycles. For
example, Gilchrist et al. [2017] show that for reasons linked to the availabil-
ity of internal funds, smaller firms tend to react more strongly to aggregate
shocks.15
To quantify how the elasticity to current business cycle conditions changes
along firms’ age profiles I am considering the following specification:
log(µj,t) = α+ β0Yt + β1Yt × aj,t + β2Yt × a2j,t + φa + φj + Xj,tγ + uj,t, (2.3)
where φa are age fixed effects, φj are firm fixed effects and aj,t is firm j’s
age at time t measured in years since the first available year of balance sheet
data. The object of interest is the set of βi with i = {0, 1, 2} as they estimate
15Hong [2017] estimates the cyclicality profile for a subsample of European firms providing
additional evidence for the counterciclicality of markups at the firm level.
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the strength of the contemporaneous elasticity between the business cycle
and the firm-level markup at different stages of firms’ life-cycle, depicting the
evolution of the correlation between output and markups as firms age. I am
not including time fixed effects as I would like the identifying variation for the
cyclical response of markups to come from within-firm changes in markups.
The inclusion of firm fixed effects in the specification ensures that any variation
that could be attributed to cohort-level factors is already controlled for by
this set of fixed effects, allowing me to not include aggregate conditions at
the time of listing as an additional control in this specification. As discussed
in the previous section instead, for the estimation of cohort effects and the
age profile, I use time fixed effects rather than GDP realizations to control for
contemporaneous aggregate conditions as they allow to simultaneously control
for all time-dependent characteristics that could otherwise bias the estimation
of markups’ age profile.
2.2.3 Summary of empirical evidence
The empirical analysis unveils three main facts on the relationship of firm-level
markups with business cycles:
1. Markups increase as firms age, see Figure 2.2a;
2. Aggregate conditions at the time of listing exhibit a negative correlation
with the average markups firms charge. Moreover, firms that are first
observed during recessions report higher initial markups but flatter age
profiles, see Figure 2.13a;
3. The contemporaneous correlation between firm-level markups and busi-
ness cycles is negative and decreasing with age and size, see Table 2.2,
Column(1).
In the next sections of the paper, I explore how the combination of sales and
direct demand investment in a model where firms are required to accumulated
customers, can account for these empirical facts and help reconciling the fact
that aggregate measures of markups are less countercyclical, if not acyclical
or even procyclical, with respect to firm-level ones.
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2.3 A model with product market selection and cus-
tomer base accumulation
I consider an economy where firms operate in different product markets and
where demands are constrained by the size of firms’ customer bases. Firms
can expand their customer bases in two ways: i) either by increasing sales,
something easily achievable by cutting prices or ii) by devoting some resources
specifically to the creation of customer base.16
2.3.1 Demographics and preferences
The economy comprises two sides: a production side and a consumption side.
Time is discrete and denoted by t.
The production side of the economy is focused on listed firms. In particular,
it is populated by heterogeneous firms, indexed by j, that produce a set of
differentiated varieties and operate in distinct product markets, indexed by
i. These firms have the incentive to accumulate customers using both sales
and direct marketing investments. The degree to which firm demands are
responsive to the size of customer bases and how relevant sales are in the
accumulation of new customers depend on the product market in which firms
operate. Importantly, firm types are fixed and are not allowed to change also
at time of listing. Nonetheless, the composition of listing firms is allowed to
fluctuates endogenously. This is because the profitability of listing responds
endogenously to aggregate shocks and its response is heterogeneous across
product markets. Exit is exogenous but determined by each firm’s age after
listing, denoted by a.
The consumption side of the economy, instead, is populated by a represen-
tative household that makes standard consumption, saving and labor supply
choices.
2.3.2 Consumption side
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical households. They
derive utility from consuming an aggregate index of all varieties produced by
16In Sedláček and Sterk [2017] customer bases are managed only through firms’ direct
investments that, in that context, are assimilated to marketing expenditure. Other papers in
the literature (see among others Moreira [2015], Hong [2017] and Gourio and Rudanko [2014]
as recent examples), instead, assume that firms’ customer capital is accumulated exclusively
through firms’ output. In this paper I focus on the combination of both channels.
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listed firm. Notably, households form habits over each variety produced by
listed firms.17
















where, with a slight abuse of notation, Jt(i) is the set of listed firms operating
in product market i, bj(i),t is the size of the customer base for firm j in product
market i and cj(i),t is consumption of firm j(i)’s variety.
Importantly, the utility weight for the household is an increasing function
of the customer base served by each variety. This formulation captures the
notion that households attach more weight to consumption of varieties that
are perceived to be relatively more attractive. Throughout the paper I am
assuming that households take the size of the customer base for each variety,
bj,t, as given when making their consumption choices.
The function ki(·) captures the sensitivity of each incumbent’s demand to the
size of its customer base and varies across different product markets.18 Hence,
the elasticity of the function ki(·) tells by how much firms’ demands increase
(in percentage terms) when their individual customer bases increase.
To capture the idea that higher demand sensitivity to customer bases should
directly translate to higher demand I rely on the following reduced form spec-




It is a useful formulation as it guarantees a constant elasticity of the utility
weights to the size of firm’s customer base, a feature that is going to be helpful
17See Ravn et al. [2006] for a discussion of the introduction of deep habits in macroeco-
nomic models.
18For customer base I mean the set of potential customer of a company, i.e. those that
are aware and willing to buy a certain good/service.
19I take this functional form for the utility weights from Sedláček and Sterk [2017]. As
they show, it is possible to micro-found the utility function by considering the customer base
of each firm as a measure of awareness of their products among household members. Goods
in which an increase in awareness leads to large increases in demand can be thought of as
mass goods. In contrast, demands of niche goods are not very sensitive to this awareness
measure.
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in the calibration of the model and to introduce some heterogeneity across
product markets that differ primary by the value assigned to εib.
Household problem
I model the demand side of the economy using a representative household
that every period maximizes its utility choosing the level of habit-adjusted









PtCt + qtBt+1 = wtHt +Bt + Πt,
where Bt is the stock of risk-free bond in period t, wt is the wage and Πt
denotes aggregate profits from the production side of the economy while Pt is
the habit-adjusted, aggregate price index.20
2.3.3 Production side
The production side of the economy models explicitly only on the activities
carried out by listed firms. Given their relevance in the economy,21 listed firms
are the main focus of this paper and they differ between each other along two
margins: i) the type of products they sell and ii) their age since listing.
In the background, I assume that the economy is populated by a mass of
smaller firms that, given their limited size and resources, do not compete for
customers with listed firms.22 Firm types are fixed and are not affected by the
listing process. Every period, some firms go public and the attractiveness of
becoming listed varies by the product type each firm sells. For some types, it
is more attractive to go public during expansions while for others during re-
cessions. For example, firms that sell products that rely heavily on marketing
and similar investments to attract customers might find the option of going









21On average, firms included in Compustat account for approximately 30% of non-farm
business employment in the US.
22An implication of this assumption is that I can abstract from explicitly modeling the













Note: Decisions timeline for listed firms in each product market.
public more appealing in expansions rather than in recessions. This formula-
tion is useful in this context as it allows the point of the business cycle at the
time of listing to be correlated with ex-ante firm characteristics.23
Hence, product types are going to affect two aspects of firms’ production.
First, given the presence of deep habits on household preferences, firms in
each product market will face demands that are sensitive to the size of their
customer bases and this sensitivity varies across products. Second, the rela-
tive importance that firms’ output has in the acquisition of customer is also
a characteristics that is specific to the product type in which each firm op-
erates. This margin of heterogeneity, therefore, links the optimal strategy to
accumulate customers to the product market faced by each firm.
Incumbent firms
In this section, I describe the behavior of incumbent firms. They are active in
a finite number of product markets, indexed by i, and their demands are con-
strained by the size of their customer bases. Hence, at any point of their life-
cycle they face a trade-off between accumulating new customers and harvesting
the maximum possible profits from their current customer base.24
23However, it is also reasonable to consider that, as firms decide go public, they can use
the extra funding and publicity to redirect their marketing operations towards markets that
appear more profitable when making the listing choice. It is difficult to empirically identify
these two motives, but, in the context of the theory developed in this paper, it is important
that the correlations summarized in Section 2.2 are informative of either ex-ante firms’ types
or their choices upon listing. In both cases, there exists a link between business cycles at the
time of listing and the cross-section of firms’ characteristics that can be used to discipline the
model and study the effects of this dimension of firm heterogeneity on the macroeconomy.
24The invest/harvest trade-off is common in models of customer markets and it is also
documented empirically in Galenianos and Gavazza [2017]. From now on, when there is no
risk of confusion, I drop the dependence on the product market in firm subscripts, so that a
firm in product market i is denoted simply by j instead of j(i).
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Firms’ demands. As customers are able to form habits on listed firms’
varieties, firm demands are constrained by the size of the customers they are
able to reach.
Proposition 1. Given the consumption index for listed firms as in equation







Proof. Details on the derivation of firms’ demand functions are reported in
Appendix 2.C.
Accumulation process for customer base. To model the fact that firms
can use multiple channels to relax their demand constraints I am assuming
that firms’ customer bases evolve according to the following rule,
bj,t = (1− δ)bj,t−1 +QtFi(yj,t,mj,t), (2.7)
where mj,t is the expenditure on direct demand investments (e.g. marketing,
product quality improvements, sale strategies etc) expressed in units of labor
and yj,t are firm j’s sales, and Qt is an aggregate stochastic shock that influ-
ences the ability of firms to accumulate customers and is meant to capture, in
reduced form, the effects of aggregate demand shocks.25
Previous studies have mostly focused on formulations of the law of motion
for customer base where the acquisition of new customers depended only on
either m or y.26 The novelty of this formulation, therefore, relies on the joint
role of firms’ sales and direct investments in the definition of firms’ investment
in customer base. In the next sections, after having described the rest of the
model, I discuss more in detail how the dependence of customer accumulation
25Mechanically Q increases the ability of firms to recruit new customers along all chan-
nels. This effect is comparable to aggregate demand shocks if periods of higher than usual
aggregate demand are also periods when it is easier to acquire customers. Albeit in very
reduced form, this shock is meant to capture this effect.
26Sedláček and Sterk [2017], Perla [2019] construct models where firms accumulate cus-
tomer bases by investing resources in the accumulation of new customers but their sales are
irrelevant for the determination of the pool of potential customers. Moreira [2015], Hong
[2017], Gilbukh and Roldan [2018], among others, assume that firms build customer bases
by locking customers to their products but the only possibility for them to acquire new
customers is only through sales. Bornstein [2018] uses taste shocks to lock-in customers in
relationships with specific firms and prices are a tool that increases the probability of a good
match.
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to both channels of investment deeply affects the economy’s behavior over the
business cycle thanks to the selection effect embedded in this framework.
The function that governs the acquisition of customers by firms is indexed
by the product market in which each firm operates as the dependence of in-
vestments in customer base to firms’ output varies across product markets.
Therefore, product markets differ in the sensitivities of demand functions to
customer bases and in how strongly the customer accumulation process in each
product market depends on sales. To keep the interaction between these two
investment channels as tractable as possible I am modeling firms’ investment
in customer base with the following CES function:
Fi(yj,t,mj,t) = [ψiy
σ
j,t + (1− ψi)mσj,t]
1
σ . (2.8)
The advantage of this formulation is that it allows to capture both the rele-
vance of each channel in the acquisition of customers, through the dependence
parameters ψi, that are also allowed to vary across product markets, and the
complementarity between the two channels, captured by the elasticity of sub-
stitution, 11−σ .
Incumbents’ problem
An incumbent in product market i chooses how much to produce and invest
in customer base taking into account the household’s demand for its specific
variety and the law of motion of its customer base.
Each incumbent internalizes that the size of its customer base can be used to
relax the demand constraint, hence, in any period, firms will optimally adjust
their prices and direct demand investments to balance their contrasting incen-
tives to increase their customers and extract revenues in every period.27
Formally, the optimal choice of the incumbent is the solution to the following
problem:
Vi(bj,t−1, aj,t;St) = max
pj,t,yj,t,hj,t,
mj,t,bj,t
 pj,tyj,t − wt (hj,t + ζ(mj,t)) ++(1− ρ(aj,t))Et [qt,t+1Vi(bj,t, aj,t+1, St+1)]
 ,
(2.9)
27These harvest-investment motives are common in model of customer markets where
prices can be used to relax the demand constraint.
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subject to the relevant constraints










aj,t+1 = aj,t + 1, (2.13)
where equation (2.10) is the law of motion of customer base, equation (2.11)
is the demand constraint, equation (2.12) is the technology available to listed
firms and the conditions in (2.13) are the simple evolution of firm j’s age.
Proposition 2. The optimal markup management of listed firms can be sum-





















where ρ̃(aj,t) = (1− ρ(aj,t) is the surviving probability up to t, µj,t = wthj,tαyj,t
Pt
pj,t
is the firm-level markup and µ̄ is the markup that would prevail under standard
monopolistic competition and without dynamic incentives in pricing.
Proof. Details on the proof and derivations in Appendix 2.C.
Looking at the right hand side of (2.14) is helpful to uncover the effects of
the main incentive at work in the model. Noticing that it is always positive
implies a positive difference between the inverse markup charged by firm j and
the inverse of the standard monopolistic competition markup. The fact that
the process for the acquisition of new customers induces some dependence on
firms’ output creates the incentive to set markups below the standard monop-
olistic competition value. This is because firms internalize the positive effects
that higher levels of output have on their current and future demands. This
incentive structure is also responsible for an increasing age profile of firm-level
markups. Note that, as firms age and the size of their customer base increases,
the trade-off between keeping prices low to acquire customers and harvesting
profits from the customer base already in place moves in favor of the latter,
putting an upward pressure on markups. Firm-level markups then converge
towards the monopolistic competition level, but only in the limit.
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In addition, the fact that firms discount profits using the household stochas-
tic discount factor is responsible for the cyclical behavior of markups. With
a procyclical stochastic discount factor, on the margin firms value customers
more in booms than in recessions. This implies that, as firms can use sales to
attract customers, they are more willing to charge lower markups to optimally
increase their customer base in expansions rather than in recessions, generating
countercyclicality in firm-level markups.28 Even if all firms discount the future
with the same discount factor, and hence would face identical countercyclical
incentives, age fully determines the probability of survival and therefore is a
fundamental variable for the determination of the benefit of having a larger
customer base in the future. As young firms face a higher probability of ex-
iting the marker, they will have an higher incentive to exploit their current
customer base compared to older firms in the same product market. This fea-
ture, therefore, is helpful in generating an age profile in the countercyclicality
of firm-level markups.
The presence of both sales and direct investments in the determination of
firms’ investments in customer base is a key element for markup dynamics
along the age profile of firms. A model in which firms were able to attract
new customers without changing markups, would not generate an increasing
age profile of markups as the one observed in the data.
Listing process
I use the listing process and its strict link to product markets as a modeling
shortcut to account for a broader range of business decisions that firms take in
consideration when going public and that are linked to the way they manage
their products. In the finance and marketing literature there are numerous
studies that show how the decision of going public is a transforming event for
a firm that is influenced not only by funding needs but also by product market
considerations.29
28As noted in Beaudry and Guay [1996], Cooper and Willis [2014] for RBC and Clementi
and Palazzo [2016], Winberry [2020] for state-of-the-art heterogeneous firms models, includ-
ing habit-formation in the utility function is sufficient to generate a procyclical stochastic
discount factor. This feature makes the model consistent with recent empirical evidence in
finance that finds countercyclical risk-free rates at various time horizons.
29For example, Wies and Moorman [2015] founds that after going public firms tend to
introduce more varieties of the same product in order to increase sales but holding back
on the development of new products. On a related note, Bernstein [2015], finds that going
public reduces firms’ patent quality. Chemmanur and Yan [2009] established another link
between product markets and the decision of going public studying how IPO outcomes can be
affected by product market advertising. Chod and Lyandres [2011], instead, highlights how
the different ownership structure between private and public firms allows the latter to take
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The economy is divided into a fixed number of product markets, i = 1, ..., I,
and, for each of them, I assume that there is a positive mass of firms in every
period. Every period, in each of these product markets, firms compete for
access to at most ωi listing opportunities.
30
The mass of successful new listings in every product market i, Γi,0,t, therefore,
can be described by the following matching function linking available oppor-
tunities with the mass of firms competing to become listed in product market






Once a match is formed, firms have to pay a common cost denominated in
units of aggregate consumption, Xt, to finalize the listing process. Firms that
successfully list in a product market, then, will face the same problem as other
incumbents with the only difference that they will start their operations with
the customer base that they have accumulated in their pre-listing years. To
keep the model tractable I do not model explicitly the pre-listing years but in
simulating the model I allow for different initial conditions by drawing values
for the starting level of customer bases in each product market from distinct
uniform distributions. I calibrate the distributions so that the evolution of the
sales profiles in the model is consistent with the data.31
Free entry implies that, in equilibrium, the expected value of becoming a public
firm in each product market with initial customer base bi,0,t−1, has to be equal
to the cost of listing, hence, for each product market i:
Γi,0,t
ei,t
Vi(bi,0,t−1, 0, St) = Xt. (2.16)
Selection mechanism. The free-entry condition ensures that the cost of
listing is equal to the expected value of being matched with an available listing
on riskier product market strategies thanks to higher risk sharing among shareholders while
Grullon et al. [2006] shows how firms capital structure affects their advertising strategies.
30Competition among firms in their listing process might ensue for a variety of reasons.
For example, firms might compete in their listing process for investors and markets’ attention.
As the strategic choice of listing, albeit very interesting, is not the main focus of this paper,
this margin not explicitly modelled in the paper and is left for future research.
31It is possible to easily extend the framework developed in this paper to allow for a
mechanical non-listed sector without deeply affecting the results, as model simulations with
exogenous processes for the initial customer base highlight that, in this framework, the
average sizes of initial conditions are more relevant that their variances. On a similar note,
Vardishvili [2018] and Carvalho and Grassi [2019] relax the assumption of a continuum of
homogeneous potential entrants in models with firm entry and exit showing that this has a
profound effect on the aggregate economy.
76
opportunity in each product market. It is important to note that, while the
cost of listing is common across all product markets, the expected value of
becoming a listed firm depends on the demand characteristics in each product
market because, depending on the aggregate state of the economy, the value
of being listed strongly depends on the incentive to acquire customers, which
in turn is governed by the elasticity of the demand shifter to customer base,
and whether firms rely more on sales or direct demand investments to acquire
customers. For example, the value of becoming listed in product markets
where prices are not as effective as direct investments to increase demand is
higher in periods where these investments are very effective.
This detachment between a common cost of listing and heterogeneous firm
values across product markets is the main driver of the selection effect operated
by aggregate conditions at the moment of listing. Given that the value of
operating in a specific product market, Vi(bi,0,t−1, 0, St), responds differently
to the same aggregate shock across product markets but firms that compete
to become listed face the same cost regardless of the product market in which
they operate. Free entry, therefore, guarantees that the expected value of
listing is equalized across product markets, as firm will compete to go public
as long as the expected value of being public is equal to the listing cost. Thus,
success probabilities in each product market,
Γi,0,t
ei,t
, have to adjust to guarantee
that the expected value of listing is equalized across product markets. As the
number of opportunities is fixed, any change in success probabilities has to be
due to a change in the mass of firms competing and ultimately succeeding to
go public in each product market.
2.3.4 Aggregation and market clearing
From (2.14) it is possible to see that incumbents with the same age, a, oper-
ating in the same product market, i, face the same problem and therefore will
make the same decisions. This observation makes the aggregation very easy
as each cohort of listed firms operating in a specific product market behaves
as a mass of homogeneous firms.




ei,tXt = Yt, (2.17)
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and the law of motion for the mass of listed firms in each cohort-product cell
is
Γi,a,t = (1− ρ(a− 1))Γi,a−1,t−1. (2.19)





Γi,a,tpi,a,tyi,a,t = PtYt. (2.20)
In this economy households are the unique owner of firms, hence, firms’ dis-
count their future values using the stochastic discount factor of the represen-
tative household that in turn depends on the distribution of listed firms in
each product market-cohort cell. As a consequence, the aggregate state of the
economy, St, includes the distribution of active firms, Γi,a,t, in each product
market-cohort cell (i, a), plus the set of exogenous processes for aggregate pro-
ductivity, At, the listing cost, Xt and aggregate demand conditions, Qt.
2.3.5 Equilibrium definition and solution method
Definition (Equilibrium). A recursive equilibrium in this economy is a set of
policy and value functions, for each product market and cohort pair, such that
the household and the incumbents’ problems, equation (2.5) and equation (2.9)
are satisfied. The free entry condition, equation (2.16), is respected and mar-
kets clear following equations (2.17) and (2.18). In addition, the distribution
of listed firms over age and product markets follows equation (2.19) while the
exogenous states (At, Xt, Qt) follow standard AR(1) processes.
Solution method. The aggregate state is an infinite dimensional object due
to the fact that firms are potentially infinitely lived. As an approximation, I
assume that firms have finite lives, as in Sedláček and Sterk [2017]. Paired
with the assumption of finite number of product markets, this approximation
makes it possible to keep track of each point of the firms’ distribution and to
solve the model using standard perturbation techniques. The accuracy of the
solution increases the longer the life-span of firms. I discuss the model details
more in depth in Appendix 2.C.
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2.4 Calibration
In this section I discuss the functional forms that I have not yet specified in the
description of the model and I discuss the approach followed in the calibration
of the model.
One period in the model corresponds to one year in the data. The calibration
of the model in geared towards capturing the correct size and shape for the age
profile of markups. In particular, the calibration of the subset of parameters
controlling product market heterogeneity, i.e. the share of current demand in
the accumulation of customer base and the sensitivities of firms’ demands to
customer base, it is based on matching moments from the stationary solution
with their closest empirical counterparts. I discuss the detail more in depth
in the following paragraphs.
2.4.1 Functional forms
The production of customer base is governed by the CES function in equa-
tion (2.8). Importantly, I am allowing the weight on current output in accu-
mulating customer base to vary across product markets. Direct investments
in customer base are subject to the following cost function: ζ(mi,a,t) =
mχi,a,t
χ .
The exit probabilities at each age are set according to the following rule:
ρ(a) = ρ0 + ρ1a, with ρ0 and ρ1 measured using a simple regression on Com-
pustat exit rates.
With these specified functional forms the model economy is governed by the
following parameters: [α, β, δ, ν, χ,X, φ, η, σ, {εib}Ii=1, {ψi}Ii=1, {κi}Ii=1, {b0,i}Ii=1,
{ωi}Ii=1, , ρ0, ρ1].
I choose the number of product types, I, to match the dispersion in firm sizes
conditional on age. Specifically, to allow the model to have firms of the same
age but with different sizes, I set I = 10 and target the average sizes in each
size decile in the data. The reason why I choose to match the dispersion of
firm sizes with product markets in the model relies on the observation that
firm sizes can be informative of the type of products they produce and act
as proxies for the product market in which they operate. Firms that operate
in large, scalable markets, for example, where the ability to reach a large
number of customer is an important driver of demand, will also be bigger
in sizes while firms that operate in more niche markets will tend to remain
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relatively smaller as their ability to serve their customers does not depend
heavily of their size.
The maximum age, ā, is set at 60, which is approximately the 99th percentile
of the age distribution in the sample used in the empirical section of the
paper.
The utility function of the household is chosen to keep the consumption side
of the model as tractable as possible, hence
U(Ct, Ht) = log(Ct)− νHt.
Labor disutility, ν, is set so that the habit-adjusted real wage, wP , is equal to
the inverse of the monopolistic competition markup, as this particular value is
very convenient when solving for the stationary solution of the model.
2.4.2 General parameters
As labor is the only input in production, I set α to 1 so that firms operate
with constant returns to scale technologies. The discount factor for the repre-
sentative household, β, is set to 0.96 for consistency with the macro literature
that uses yearly data.
The elasticity of the cost function of direct investments in customer base, χ, is
set to 2 and the elasticity of the matching function between potential entrants
and available blueprints, φ, is 0.156 as in Sedláček and Sterk [2017]. The price
elasticity of firms’ demands, η, is set to 3.857 to ensure that the markup under
monopolistic competition is equal to the average markup of older firms (25
years and more). This parametrization results in a monopolistic competition
markup of 1.35 that is higher than the usual values used in the literature.
However, the dynamic incentives of the model ensure that the resulting cost-
weighted average markup in the economy is approximately 1.3, which is a
value closer to the the range usually seen in the literature.
The stationary solution is very sensitive to the depreciation rate of the cus-
tomer base, δ. I set δ equal to 0.2 which is on the high range of the documented
customer capital depreciation rates but it is still much lower than deprecia-
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tion rates estimated for advertising and marketing expenditures or customer
turnover rates documented in the literature.32
The elasticity of substitution between sales and direct demand investments for
the creation of customer base, 11−σ , is set approximately to 0.67 (σ = −0.5)
to capture the fact that current output and direct investments are not perfect
substitutes in their ability to attract new customers.
As in the model firms belonging to the same cohort and product market are
identical by construction, I use the cyclicality profile for cohort-level markups
to calibrate the volatility of the exogenous process so that the model profile
matches the estimate one.
2.4.3 Product markets and demand parameters
After having set the values for the general parameters, I am left with the follow-
ing product market specific parameters that have to be calibrated: κi, ψi, ωi,
εib and bi,0. These are respectively: the scale of firms’ demands in each product
market, the relevance of sales in customer acquisition, the mass of available
listing opportunities, the elasticity of firms’ demands to their customer base
and the average size of initial customer base upon listing. All these parameters
are calibrated so that the model is able to reproduce the reduced form evidence
on the age-profiles of firm-level markups discussed in section 2.2.
In particular, the model features two margins of heterogeneity: age and prod-
uct markets. While age is directly observable, even if with some error, product
market types are more difficult to identify directly from firms balance sheet
data. However, through the lenses of the model, the product market in which
a firm operates is the main determinant of its optimal size. This is because
firms have to use labor inputs to attract customers, either through sales or
through direct investments, therefore firms that operate in product markets
that exhibit higher demand sensitivity will also have bigger optimal sizes. As
a consequence, the size distribution of relatively older firms can be informa-
tive of their product types as these firms are more likely to have reached their
optimal production scale.
The number of listing opportunities in each product market, ωi, are calibrated
to match the share of firms in each size decile and are scaled so that aggregate
32For a discussion on recent estimates of customer turnover rates and marketing invest-
ments see Gourio and Rudanko [2014] and Foster et al. [2016].
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demand at the stationary solution of the model is equal to 1. The average sizes
of initial customer bases are the last parameters to be calibrated so that the
stationary solution of the model exhibits a convex age profile for sales growth
in line with the data.33
I calibrate ψi and ε
i
b so that the average age profile of markups implied by
the stationary solution of the model matches the profile estimated using equa-
tion (2.1). The intuition behind this choice is linked to the fact that the
elasticity of demand with respect to the customer base is a key determinant of
the growth rate of firms as it regulates how much firms benefit from an extra
unit of customer base.
The values of κi, instead, are chosen to match the size distribution of old
firms in the data. In practice, for each product market, I choose the value
of κi such that the size of 25 years old firms in the model equals the average
size of firms between 25 and 30 years in the data. As mentioned before, the
intuition for this relies on the fact that it is more likely that older firms have
already reached their optimal production scale hence while the elasticity of the
demand shifter ki(bj,t) is informative of the growth path as firms age, its scale
is tightly linked to the optimal size of firms.34 The full baseline calibration of
the model is reported in Table 2.1.
Moments matching procedure
In order to pin down the values of ψi and ε
i
b I am using the following procedure.
Starting from guesses for each ψi and ε
i
b, ψ̃
(0) = {ψ(0)i }, and ε̃(0) = {ε
i,(0)
b },
I solve for the stationary distribution of the model and I measure the age
profiles for markups as









i Γi,aµi,a is the average markup at each age across product types.
The empirical counterparts for these age profiles are given from the age fixed
effects estimated using the model in equation (2.1). The condition I am using
33In the model simulations, initial customer bases in each product market are allowed
to fluctuate between [0, 2b0,i] by drawing i.i.d. shocks from a set of uniform distributions
between (−1, 1). Varying these parameters does not significantly affect the overall behavior
of the model. I provide more details in Appendix 2.C.
34For example, the size of 25 years old firms in product market one is matched to the
average size of firms in the first decile of the size distribution of 25-30 years old firms.
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to pin down the values for {ψi, εib} is:
(ψ̃∗, ε̃∗) = arg min
ψi,εib
{(
Pµa (ψ̃, ε̃)− φ̂a
)′ (
Pµa (ψ̃, ε̃)− φ̂a
)}
.
In practice, I include the first forty age fixed effects from equation (2.1) and the
growth rates relative to age-zero at the stationary solution to pin down twenty
parameters. The model, however, does not perfectly replicate the age profile
of markups due to the non-linearities in the mapping between the age profile of
markups at the stationary solution and the estimated age fixed-effects.35
35A procedure similar in spirit to the one described here is adopted in Christiano et al.




α Technology 1 CRS technolgy
β Discount factor 0.96 Annual discount rate in macro-literature
γ Utility weight of non-listed goods 2.17 Employment in non-listed firms equal to 2/3
δ Customer base depreciation 0.20 Customer turnover ratio [Gourio and Rudanko, 2014]
η Price elasticity of demand 3.86 Monopolistic markup equal to 1.35
ν Labor disutility 0.766 Habit-adjusted real wage equal to η−1η
χ Curvature of cost function for customer base
investments
2.0 Quadratic cost [Sedláček and Sterk, 2017]
φ Matching function elasticity 0.16 [Sedláček and Sterk, 2017]
X̄ Average entry cost 33.60 Average success in product market (1) equal to 0.99
σ Elasticity of sales and markups for customer
base accumulation
-0.5 Elasticity of markups and advertising ≈ 0.67 (Compustat)
ρ0, ρ1 Exit rates 0.08, -0.001 Exit rates by age (Compustat)
ρA, σA Productivity process 0.95, 0.15 Markup ciclicality profile, see Figure 2.5
ρQ, σQ Demand process 0.95, 0.4 “ ”
ρX , σX Entry cost process 0.95, 0.6 “ ”
Ω Measure of listing opportunities 1.105e−5 Normalization so that aggregate output equals 1 at the stationary solution
Product Market Parameters Target Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ψi Share parameter in Fi(yj(i),t,mj(i),t) Age profile of markups 0.647 0.568 0.529 0.539 0.524 0.490 0.427 0.336 0.216 0.058
εib Elasticity of ki(bj(i),t) Age profile of markups 0.424 0.437 0.537 0.740 0.886 1.005 1.101 1.195 1.335 1.635
κi Scale of ki(bj(i),t) Average size of mature firms 4.875 14.947 17.543 9.560 6.243 4.529 3.979 3.832 3.026 0.954
b0,i Avg. initial customer base Sales’ growth profile 2.779 6.009 9.194 15.064 21.301 27.313 32.367 36.831 43.284 69.350
Γi,0
ei
Success Probability in i Share of firms in i when old 0.999 0.231 0.116 0.071 0.045 0.029 0.018 0.01 0.006 0.002
Note: The table reports the main calibration of the model. Note that instead of the values for the masses of listing opportunities in each product market, ωi, that are of small
significance given the normalization, the table reports the implied success probabilities.
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2.4.4 Stationary solution and model’s fit
The model is calibrated so that the moments implied by the stationary solution
and the empirical targets are matched.
Figure 2.2 reports the three main calibration targets: i) growth profile of
markups; ii) the size distribution of firms and iii) the age distribution. The
growth profile of markups shows the growth rates of markups relative to the
initial year for both the model and the data. The non-linearities in the map-
ping between the model-based growth profiles and the age fixed-effects prevent
the model of achieving a perfect fit. Looking at the ratio of average size of firms
by product markets with the average size of firms by size decile, the model
is able to generate a realistic size distribution.36 Despite the very mechanic
evolution of firm sizes, due to the mechanic law of motion for the distribution
of active firms, the model replicates also the age distribution of firms quite
well.
Figure 2.3, reports the values for the product market characteristics under the
baseline calibration. In particular, the model implies a negative relationship
between the share parameters of firms’ sales for customer acquisition and
the elasticity of demand to customer base. This stark negative relationship
between the two implies that firms operating in product markets with high
demand sensitivity to customer base are also characterized by a low incentive
to use the price lever to attract customers. These characteristics of the demand
properties in each product market turn out to be heavily responsible for the
dynamic response of the model to aggregate shocks and for the transmission
of aggregate shocks as they directly control the way firms use both prices and
employment for the acquisition of new customers.37
Even if the model is geared toward replicating the age profile of markups it is
important to check how it performs in replicating some non-targeted moments
in the data. To this end, Figure 2.4 compares the growth profile by age groups
for markups and firms size, measured by employment.
36The model achieves a perfect fit for firms of age 25 in the model with the average of
mature (25 to 30 years) firms in the data. The figure plots the ratio between the averages
in the model and in the data across all ages
37A more careful estimation of these demand parameters, rather than a simple calibration
is particularly interesting and of clear importance for the mechanisms outlined in this paper.
However, a more detailed discussion and assessment of the identification of these parameters
in the class of models used in this paper are left for future research.
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Figure 2.2: Stationary solution targets
(a) Age profile of markups
























































Note: The figure reports the main calibration targets. Panel 2.2a reports the age profile
of markups in the model and in the data up to 25 years, from estimating age fixed effects
in equation (2.1) in the main sample and at the stationary solution. Panel 2.2b reports the
average size of firms in each product market relative to the average size of firms in each size
decile in the data. The calibration targets firms age 25 years old in the model, the panel
reports the average for all ages. Panel 2.2c reports the age distribution of firms in the the
data and at the stationary solution.
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Figure 2.3: Product market characteristics in baseline calibration
(a) Sales shares and demand elasticities
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Note: The figure reports the relationship between the parameters determining the hetero-
geneity across product markets in the model. Panel 2.3a plots the relationship between the
elasticity of demand to customer base versus the share of current sales in direct demand
investments creation. Panel 2.3b plots the scale parameter in the demand shifter ki(bj(i),t).
The markup profile is tightly linked to the target moments, thus is not sur-
prising that the model replicates this one as well. The employment profile,
however, is not targeted and the model is able to fully generate a growth pro-
file that follows the data only for the first years of firms lives. In particular,
the model is not able to generate the strong kink observed in the employment
growth rates measured in the data. As firms in the model tend to grow rela-
tively fast, the model base profile slightly over-represents the growth rates in
early years of firms’ lives and then gradually slows down at later years. The
main reason for this last effect is mainly mechanical and linked to the solution
approach I use. In fact, as I solve for the policy functions and the stationary
solution by truncating the lives of firms at 60 years, firms in the model start
actively shrinking in size when they get closer to the end of their life. This
dynamic puts a downward pressure on firms sizes, preventing the model to
fully capture the higher growth of older age groups. A possible solution to
this limitation comes at the cost of greater computational complexity. Push-
ing the end of firms’ lives further in time, thereby extending the number of
years firms are allowed to live is likely to improve the solution and address
this issue better. However, as the main focus of this paper is the behavior
of markups and given that the size profile implied by the model, albeit not
perfect, follows the one estimated in the data reasonably well, especially for
young firms I opt for the most tractable solution and keep the maximum al-
lowed age close the one observed in the data. Linked to the issue discussed in
the previous paragraph, comes another limitation of the model again related
to the fact that firms grow too fast in the model relatively to the data. As
87
Figure 2.4: Age profiles - model vs data
(a) Markups


































































Note: The figure plots the implied age profiles for markups, employment and sales in the
data and in the stationary solution of the model. Note that while the age profile of markups
and the shape of the sales profile are target in the calibration, the age profile of employment
is not.
shown in Figure 2.4c, the average sales by age groups in the model exhibits
a less convex profile compared to the data. This is due to firms in the model
growing too fast in their initial years and slowing down as they reach maturity.
This discrepancy can be deduced also by looking at the average growth rates
of employment by age group in Figure 2.4. Firms tend to grow too fast early in
their lives and then they stop as they approach the end of their lives. The intu-
ition for this behavior hinges on the fact that, in the baseline calibration, sales
and direct demand investments are not perfect substitutes. As a consequence,
accumulating and maintaining a customer base requires a constant investment
of resources, either through direct demand investment or indirectly through
lower markups to boost sales. As firms age, the incentive to extract rents
from the current customer bases dominates the accumulation incentive and
firms start optimally increasing their markups, decreasing their investments
in demand creation and optimally shrinking their sizes. Figure 2.5 plots the
cyclicality profile for cohort-level markups in the data and the model. The
model is able to replicate the ciclicality pattern observed in the data, where
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Figure 2.5: Markup cyclicality profile



















Note: The figure plots the cyclicality profile estimated at the cohort-level in a sample
of cohorts followed up to 10 years and in a sample of model generated data obtained from
simulating the model for 2500 periods. More specifically the figure plots the coefficients of the
interaction between age dummies and contemporaneous realizations of the cycle component
of GDP, i.e. β̂a from log(µc,a,t) = α + φa + φc +
∑10
a βaDa × Zt + uc,a,t where φa, φc
are respectively age and cohort fixed effects, Zt is a measure of contemporaneous business
cycles and Da is a set of dummies for each age. Data reports the point estimate and a one
standard deviation error band. The estimates are based from aggregating the main sample
at the cohort level and following cohorts for up to 10 years. Model is based on following
cohorts for 10 years from a dataset based on model simulations of 2500 periods. In the
model the measure of business cycles are deviations of output from the stationary solution.
the correlation of the cohort-level markup is increasing as we consider cohorts
of older firms.
2.5 The role of product market heterogeneity and
aggregate shocks
In this section, I assess the role of differences across product markets by dis-
cussing the model’s response to aggregate shocks under different calibrations of
the model. Specifically, I progressively eliminate the main channels of hetero-
geneity across product markets: the sales share in customer base investments
and the sensitivity of demand to customer base. I compare the baseline cali-
bration to two alternatives: a first one, in which investment in customer base
accumulation have the same sales sensitivity in each product market (constant
ψi case), and a second one, in which firms’ demands exhibit the same elasticity
to customer base (constant εib case).
38
38Figure 2.A.1 plots the two different calibrations together with the baseline. To preserve
the size differences across product markets and maintain some consistency with the baseline
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In addition, I discuss the role of the exogenous processes in shaping the correla-
tions between aggregate markups and business cycles. Specifically, I simulate
the model under different mixes of exogenous shocks and report the corre-
lation coefficients between aggregate output and two measures of aggregate
markups, the cost-weighted average, and the simple average.
2.5.1 Impulse response analysis
To assess the role of product market heterogeneity for the transmission of ag-
gregate shocks, I compare the economy’s responses under different calibrations
of the parameters governing product market heterogeneity. First, I analyze the
transmission of productivity shocks, then I look at aggregate demand shocks
and finally to listing costs shocks.39
Aggregate productivity shocks
Figure 2.6 shows the impulse responses of the economy to a positive one-
percent aggregate productivity shock for the baseline calibration, the constant
sale share case, and the constant demand elasticity case. I discuss these two
alternatives in turn.40
Common sales share, ψi. Under this calibration, the only difference across
product markets is how sensitive firms’ demands are to the size of their cus-
tomer bases. Interestingly, as shown in the first panel of Figure 2.6a, the re-
sponse of output is practically identical to the baseline case. The intuition for
this result follows from noting that, compared to the baseline calibration, the
composition of newly listed firms, shown in Figure 2.6b, is not highly affected
by the change in TFP when ψi is constant. This result indicates that incum-
bents’ profitability is not affected by the relevance of sales in the acquisition
of customers. However, as shown from the last two panels of Figure 2.6a, the
responses of the cost-weighted and the simple average markups are quite differ-
ent from the baseline calibration. In particular, setting all product markets to
the same average value for ψ induces a large procyclical response of aggregate
markups. To grasp some intuition, consider that the aggregate productivity
economy, I recompute the scale parameters in firms’ demands, κi, to match the average size
of old firms in both alternative calibrations.
39Appendix 2.A reports the impulse responses to each shock for markups and the mass
of firms for each product market and age cohort.
40Figure 2.A.2 reports the IRFs to aggregate productivity shocks for markups and masses
of active firms by cohort and product market.
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shock makes production more efficient, lowering marginal costs. Given that
sales are still a method to acquire customers, firms can trade-off the boost in
productivity from the aggregate shock with an increase in markups.
This mechanism is particularly strong for bigger and older firms, contributing
to the high response of cost-weighted markups with constant ψi. In the base-
line calibration, instead, firms with high demand sensitivities operate in prod-
uct markets where sales are relatively ineffective in accumulating customers.
This implies that to exploit the higher profitability generated by higher TFP,
firms are incentivized to invest in relaxing their demand constraints via direct
demand investments. However, as sales and direct investments are comple-
ments in the investment function for customer base, higher TFP strengthens
these large firms’ incentive to accumulate customers, putting downward pres-
sure on aggregate markups.
In addition, given higher productivity, the profitability of firms in all product
markets increases, boosting listing. Consequently, the share of young firms in-
creases, lowering the simple average markups in the economy below its steady-
state level for some periods. This is because the increase in the share of new
firms outweighs the fact that active firms can charge higher markups. When
the sale share in customer acquisition, ψi, is constant across product markets,
the average markup’s initial response is less negative than in the baseline cali-
bration. In this case, fewer firms have to rely on direct investment in customer
acquisition and can exploit the benefits of being more productive. As a larger
fraction of newly listed firms chooses product markets where demand is not
very sensitive to customer base accumulation, the average markup overshoots
its steady-state value before converging back to it as more firms can exploit
the productivity boost to charge higher markups.
Common demand elasticity, εib. Under this calibration, the only element
that differentiates product markets is the role of sales in the acquisition of new
customers.
The main effect caused by this alternative calibration is a significant change
in the composition of newly listed firms, as shown in the third panel of Fig-
ure 2.6b.
Compared to the baseline case and the calibration with differences in εib, now
a positive TFP shock induces a similar increase in listing across product mar-
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kets. This implies that cohorts of newly listed firms are more homogeneous.
This, in turn, generates a response of the average markup that is smaller than
under the previous calibration. The intuition hinges on the fact that, in this
case, the economy does not feature firms that are very eager to accumulate
customers, and hence the initial value of markups that they choose to set is
higher compared to the baseline for newly listed firms.
The initial response of the cost-weighted measure of markups, instead, is more
muted under this calibration because firms that were previously operating in
product markets with high-ψ and low-ε are now facing stronger incentives
to accumulate customers. Hence, as productivity increases, the incentive to
extract rents from the current customer base is counterbalanced as higher pro-
duction can lead to larger future profits thanks to the role of sales in building
customer base. These two contrasting forces cancel out in the aggregate con-
tributing to the minimal response of cost-weighted markups to TFP shocks.
Through the same reasoning, we can rationalize the larger response of output.
In this calibration, more firms are eager to use prices to expand their customer
bases, which implies that as productivity improves, incumbent firms do not
increase markups as much and more output is produced.
It is worth mentioning that the transmission of TFP shocks on markups in this
economy is very different from the standard procyclical results induced by price
rigidities. In this model, markups’ cyclical behavior, both in the aggregate
and at the firm level, is dictated more by the dynamics of the incentives to
accumulate customers than by the response of marginal costs.
Aggregate demand shocks
Figure 2.7 plots the impulse responses to a positive one-percent aggregate
demand shock for the baseline economy, the economy with constant demand
elasticities and the one with constant sales share in customer base invest-
ments.41
Common sales share, ψi. As discussed in the previous section, when the
only difference across product markets is the elasticity of demand to customer
base, the composition of newly listed firms does not change dramatically com-
pared to the baseline case.
41Figure 2.A.3 reports the IRFs to aggregate demand shocks for markups and masses of
active firms by cohort and product market.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to aggregate productivity shock
(a) Aggregates












































(b) New firms in each product market








































Note: The figure plots the impulse responses to a 1% aggregate productivity shock for
selected aggregate variables under three different calibration of product market parameters
ψi, ε
i
b. Baseline shows the IRFs to the baseline calibration of the mode where both ψi and
εib vary across product markets. Common ψi shows the IRFs for a calibration of the model
where product markets differ only across the demand elasticity εib and ψi is set at the average
value for all i. Common εib, instead reports the IRFs for a calibration of the model where
product markets differ only across ψi and ε
i
b is set at the average value for all i.
Nonetheless, the response of markups to aggregate demand shocks presents
stark differences across the three calibrations. This is due to the deep changes
in the composition of newly listed firms caused by fluctuations in Q. In fact,
a positive shock to Q triggers a period in which the efficiency of customer
base investment is high, which improves the profitability of firms operating in
product markets that depend heavily on customer acquisition. In turn, this
improvement induces a shift in the composition of new listings towards product
markets characterized by highly sensitive demands and low dependence on
sales to accumulate customers, as these product markets are relatively more
profitable in periods of high demand. However, incumbent firms in these
markets can enjoy the enhanced efficiency of their investment and hence, are
incentivized to increase their markups. Consequently, both the cost-weighted
and the average markups in the economy overshoot their steady state values,
reflecting the fact that after an aggregate demand shock, the composition of
active firms in the economy shifts towards product markets that rely a lot on
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to aggregate demand shock
(a) Aggregates








































(b) New firms in each product market








































Note: The figure plots the impulse responses to a 1% aggregate demand shock for selected
aggregate variables under three different calibration of product market parameters ψi, ε
i
b.
Baseline shows the IRFs to the baseline calibration of the mode where both ψi and ε
i
b vary
across product markets. Common ψi shows the IRFs for a calibration of the model where
product markets differ only across the demand elasticity εib and ψi is set at the average value
for all is. Common εib, instead reports the IRFs for a calibration of the model where product
markets differ only across ψi and ε
i
b is set at the average value for all i.
customers but in which acquiring new customers does not depend a lot on
sales and therefore prices.
When the sales share in the customer base investment function is fixed at its
average value across product markets, instead, more firms are eager to reduce
markups to expand their customer bases in periods of favorable aggregate
conditions. This is because firms in highly sensitive product markets now
rely relatively more on sales compared to the baseline calibration. As sales
and direct demand investment are not substitute, these firms respond to their
incentive to accumulate customers by aggressively cutting prices to benefit
from the favorable economic climate.
The differences between the cost-weighted share of markups and the average
markup can be again rationalized by looking at the change in the composition
of newly listed firms. As more young firms are going to operate in product
markets where they are eager to accumulate customers relative to the steady-
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state, on impact, the response of cost-weighted average markups is larger than
the simple average. Also, old and large firms are more willing to lower their
prices to increase their sales and benefit from easier customer acquisition due
to the shock, contributing in keeping aggregate markups below their stationary
solution levels.
Common demand sensitivity, εib. Under this calibration, the line of rea-
soning outlined in the previous paragraph is partially reversed. As all product
markets feature the same demand sensitivity aggregate shocks induce a smaller
change in composition, confirming the finding that this particular margin of
heterogeneity across product markets is highly relevant for the selection effect
of business cycles.
The third panel of Figure 2.7a shows that the average markup exhibit strong
counterciclicality. This is a direct consequence of the combination of two facts.
First, contrary to the baseline and the calibration with common ψi, with ho-
mogeneous demand sensitivities, the economy experiences an overall increase
in the number of young firms. Second, not only these firms are relatively
more eager to accumulate customers, but they also operate in product mar-
kets where this incentive is stronger.42 This pushes down the average markups
more than the cost-weighted one as more young firms enter the market and
both incumbents and newly listed firms are eager to use the price lever to
build their customer base.
Listing cost shocks
Figure 2.8 plots the impulse responses to a one-percent increase to listing cost
for the baseline economy, the economy with constant demand elasticities, and
the one with constant sales share in customer base investments.
The overall behavior of the economy in response to this shock resembles closely
the inverse of aggregate productivity shocks.43 The intuition relies on noticing
that while better productivity pushes firms to go public more in product mar-
kets that do not rely heavily on customer acquisition (low εib), higher listing
costs do the opposite, making listing less profitable for these firms as they
42Notice that high ψi product markets, under this calibration, face stronger incentives to
accumulate customer as the common εb is higher than the one associated in these product
markets under the baseline calibration.
43Figure 2.A.4 reports the IRFs to listing cost shocks for markups and masses of active
firms by cohort and product market.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse responses to listing cost shock
(a) Aggregates





































(b) New firms in each product market










































Note: The figure plots the impulse responses to a 1% listing cost shock for selected aggregate
variables under three different calibration of product market parameters ψi, ε
i
b. Baseline
shows the IRFs to the baseline calibration of the mode where both ψi and ε
i
b vary across
product markets. Common ψi shows the IRFs for a calibration of the model where product
markets differ only across the demand elasticity εib and ψi is set at the average value for
all is. Common εib, instead reports the IRFs for a calibration of the model where product
markets differ only across ψi and ε
i
b is set at the average value for all i.
operate in product markets that do not have strong growth prospects. As a
consequence, as output falls, both cost-weighted and average markup increase
countercyclically.
Common sales share, ψi. When the model is calibrated to homogenize
firms across their incentive to use sales as a tool to acquire customers, the
overall response of the economy is very similar to the baseline one. Again, the
reason is that having product markets with similar sales share parameters does
not dramatically affect the composition of new listings. The transition back to
the stationary solution however is different. The average and the cost-weighted
markups revert back to their stationary solution levels more quickly, with the
average markup overshooting its stationary value. The positive entry cost
shock reduces the number of young firms in the economy, and as these firms
age, they can increase their markups more quickly than the baseline.
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Common demand sensitivity, εib. The calibration with common demand
sensitivity generates very different responses to a one-percent increase in the
listing cost. As in the previous section, muting the heterogeneity of demand
sensitivities generates a big change in the composition of newly listed firms.
In this case, the increase in listing costs, increases the fall in listings of firms
that have weaker dependence on customer base accumulation on sales. These
firms are also the ones that are bigger and have more growth potential, thus
output falls by more than in the baseline cases.
As now all firms use prices to increase their customer base, the responses of
both cost-weighted and average markups are muted. In this case, average
markups overshoot their stationary value even sooner than under common
sales shares. This is because the early cohorts of newly listed firm age are
relatively more populated by firms that use prices to attract customers, while
they try to reach their optimal size, pushing the average markups below its
stationary level.
2.5.2 The role of aggregate shocks
The model developed in this paper features three sources of uncertainty: ag-
gregate productivity shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and listing cost shocks.
In this section, I discuss the role of different shock mixes in shaping the cor-
relations between output and aggregate measures of markups.
To this end, Figure 2.9 summarizes the relationships between correlation co-
efficients of the average and the cost-weighted average markup obtained from
simulating the model with different shock mixes. Looking at these two mea-
sures of aggregate markups is helpful as they allow to build some intuition on
the role of changes to the composition of active firms for markup cyclicality.44
Two interesting patterns emerge.
First, when aggregate productivity shocks are the unique source of business
cycles in the economy, cost-weighted and average markup exhibit a stark dis-
tinction in their cyclical behavior. While the former measure is strongly pro-
cyclical, the latter is mildly countercyclical. This pattern is consistent with
the observation that, as productivity improves, incumbent firms increase their
production as well as markups. However, higher volumes due to higher produc-
44For mode details on the IRFs to each shock for markups and firm masses by age and
product market see Figures 2.A.2, 2.A.3 and 2.A.4.
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Figure 2.9: Correlation coefficients with output of cost-weighted and average
markup for different shock mixes




















Note: The figure plots the correlation cofficients between different shock mixes of the model.
ˆvariables denote deviations from a Hamilton filter trend (one lag, two leads); µcwt and µt
are respectively cost-weighted and average markup. A: TFP shocks, Q : Aggregate demand
shocks and X : Listing cost shocks.
tivity more than compensate the customer loss caused by increase in markups.
As noted in the previous section, the average markup in the economy, which
reflects the extensive margin more strongly, is countercyclical as positive pro-
ductivity realizations are associated with a spur in new listings that increase
the share of young firms in the economy putting downward pressure on the
average markup, see Figures 2.6b and 2.10.
Second, when listing cost shocks are the only sources of aggregate fluctuations,
both cost-weighted and average markup exhibit countercyclicality. In contrast,
aggregate demand shocks make both measures of markups procyclical, albeit
the average exhibits a higher correlation with output than the cost weighted
one.
The explanation of these patterns has to searched again in the changes to the
composition effects at the extensive margin that these shocks generate, see
Figure 2.10 for the IRFs for the total mass of newly listed firms for the three
different shocks.
When output is driven exclusively by aggregate demand shocks, high-output
periods are also times when investment in customer base is more efficient.
This creates incentives for incumbent firms to lower their markups regardless
of their product market. As these firms are also relatively larger, at the in-
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Figure 2.10: Impulse responses for the total mass of newly listed firms











Note: The figure plots the IRFs for the total mass of newly listed firms to one-percent
shocks to aggregate productivity, aggregate demand and listing costs.
tensive margin, cost-weighted markups tend to decrease as output increases
following a positive demand shock. At the extensive margin, however, posi-
tive aggregate demand shocks reduce the total mass of firms in the economy,
as more firms attempt listing in product markets that have smaller success
probabilities, those that are highly sensitive to customer base acquisition.45
This behavior, therefore, skews the cross-section of active firms toward older
and larger firms that are both less responsive to the business cycle and that
have higher average markups. Hence, as fewer young firms get listed, periods
of high demand and high output are also associated with a pool of active firms
overpopulated by old incumbents. This change in the composition at the ex-
tensive margin pushes for an increase in cost-weighted and average markups
and thus a positive correlation with total output. The resulting correlation in
Figure 2.9 is the combination of these two forces. The higher procyclicality of
average markup can be explained by noting that, by construction, the simple
average is a measure more sensitive to changes at the extensive margin, thus
is more sensitive to the fact that periods of high-demand will reduce the total
number of listings.
The first-order consequence of an increase in listing costs, instead, is that fewer
firms are listed in all product markets. This extensive margin response then
45See Figure 2.7b. Notice that as customers are easier to acquire, operating in product
markets that are highly sensitive to customer base becomes more attractive as these are
markets that are ex-ante more profitable.
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increases the relative weight of older and larger firms in the economy, putting
an upward pressure on average markup. As the reduction in the number of
firms is also associated with a decline in total output, this dynamics rationalize
the countercyclical behavior of both average and cost-weighted markups, as
shown in Figure 2.9.In addition, this effect is stronger for firms operating in
product markets with low demand sensitivity to customer base that are also
less willing to use prices to manage their customer base. The intuition for this
stronger selection effect is that, in these markets, firms reach their optimal size
earlier in their life-cycle, hence, their present discounted value is more affected
by aggregate conditions at the time of listing, given that business cycles at the
beginning of their listed lives have a greater scope to persistently affect their
values. All these effects compound to generate a negative correlation between
output and the average markup in the economy.
The recessions caused by an increase in listing cost shocks, instead, force
especially young firms to lower markups, attempting to counteract the effects
of lower sales with lower prices. Older firms, instead, being less sensible to
the loss of customers caused by the initial reduction in output are able to
recoup their losses in customers faster than young firms and therefore can
benefit from relatively higher demand and increase their markups, leading
to a lower counterciclicality of cost-weighted markups compared to that of
average markup when listing cost shocks are the only source of business cycles
in the economy.
As shown by Figure 2.9, combining the three shocks allows the economy to
generate both countercyclical average markup, and slightly pro-cyclical aggre-
gate (cost-weighted) markups. Under the baseline calibration, increasing the
strength of productivity shocks would push the economy towards generating
more pro-cyclical aggregate markups while increasing the role of aggregate
demand shocks would induce stronger compositional effects of business cy-
cles.
2.5.3 Extensive versus intensive margin
The response of aggregate markups to aggregate shocks is driven by the com-
bination of the change in incumbents’ responses and the change in the product
market composition of cohorts of newly listed firms. To disentangle the contri-
bution of the two channels to the correlation of aggregate markups with output
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Figure 2.11: Role of firm composition for the transmission of aggregate shocks







































































Note: The figure plots impulse response to a one-percent change in technology, aggregate
demand and listing cost processes. In the simulations, the fixed-distribution variables are
constructed using log-linearized versions of (2.21) and (2.22).
I adopt the following strategy. I simulate the model fixing the distribution of
active firm in each product market-age cell at its stationary solution value and
I recompute the correlations of aggregate markups with output under different
shock mixes.
Specifically, I construct average (µ̃t) and cost-weighted (µ̃
cw
t ) markups with a























where Γ̄i,a indicates the mass of firms with age a that populate product market
i absent any aggregate shocks.
Figure 2.11 plots the impulse responses to a one-percent change in the ex-
ogenous variables for the average and cost-weighted measures of markups in
two versions of the economy: i) the baseline one and ii) one in which the dis-
tribution of firms in the economy is kept constant at its stationary solution
throughout the simulations.
101
Figure 2.12: Correlation coefficients with output of cost-weighted and average
markup for different shock mixes































Note: The figure plots the correlation cofficients between different shock mixes of the base-
line model and a model where average and cost-weighted markups are constructed keeping
a the distribution of firms at the stationary-solution values at each simulation period. ˆvari-
ables denote deviations from a Hamilton filter trend (one lag, two leads); µcwt and µt are
respectively the cost-weighted and average markup. A: TFP shocks, Q : Aggregate demand
shocks and X : Listing cost shocks.
The figure helps understanding how compositional changes in the cross-section
of active firms influences the response of the economy to aggregate shocks. As
noted before, the average measure of markups is more responsive to changes to
the composition of firm population in the economy. Intuitively, this is due to
the fact that differences in product markets and the implicit selection operated
by business cycles have more bite on the average that is a measure more
sensitive to changes in the overall mass of firms. From the impulse responses
in Figure 2.11, we can see that this is particularly true for productivity and
listing cost shocks.
The differences in the propagation of aggregate shocks caused by the missing
compositional channel has deep repercussions also on how different shocks im-
pact the correlations between output and markups, as show in Figure 2.12.
Notably, keeping the distribution of firms at the stationary solution levels,
radically affects the correlation between output and markups, especially for
productivity and listing cost shocks. These correlations are consistent with the
shock propagations highlighted by the impulse response functions presented in
Figure 2.11. For simulations in which productivity is the only source of busi-
ness cycles the model with a constant distribution generates highly procyclical
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markups, both average and cost-weighted. To see why, consider that a positive
productivity shock pushes all firms to increase markups, as the potential loss
from an increase in prices is compensated from the gain in customers derived
from increased production. However, by keeping the mass of firms in the econ-
omy fixed, both the average markup and the cost-weighted one move in the
same direction resulting in a highly positive correlation with output.
2.6 Main results
In this section, I describe the main model results. In particular I document the
ability of the model to generate age profiles and cohort effects that are in line
with the empirical evidence presented in Section 2.2. In addition, I show that
the model replicates the observed correlations between markups and output
both at the firm and aggregate level. Moreover, I test the ability of the model
to capture relevant incentives at the firm-level by estimating cohort effects
and age profiles for advertising expenditure, a close empirical counterpart for
direct demand investments.
2.6.1 Persistent effects of business cycles
Cohort effects on firm-level markups. The selection mechanism embed-
ded in the listing phase of the model allows business cycles to have persistent
effects on the life-cycle behavior of firm-level markups.
Figure 2.13b shows the age profiles estimated using equation (2.2) on a dataset
of model-generated data. The figure shows that the model can qualitatively
reproduce the age profile and the cohort effects estimated in real data and
reported in Figure 2.13a. Firms that start their operations during a recession
end up charging higher markups and operate on a flatter age profile. Through
the lenses of the model, these effects are highly tied to differences in the
demand characteristics of the different product markets. As recessions are
periods in which it is difficult to attract customers, new listings are skewed
towards product markets that guarantee higher up-front profits. These are
specifically those that do not require big investment in demand acquisition and
where the optimal size is reached earlier in firms lives. These product markets
are characterized by a relatively low dependence of demand on customer base,
and this implies that firms operating in these markets have a low need to
expand their customer base. This lack of incentives to attract new customers
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Figure 2.13: Cohort effects and age profile of markups
(a) Data





































Note: The figure plots the age profile for markups estimated from equation (2.2) for the
main sample and for a panel dataset constructed from simulating the model for 2500 periods.
Specifically, at each age a, I am plotting m̂0 + φ̂a + (β̂0 + β̂1a)Z, where m̂0 is the average
markup in the first available year, φ̂a are the estimated age fixed effects, (β̂0, β̂1) capture the
estimated persistence of aggregate conditions in the first available year. Z is a measure of
business cycle outcomes that takes value 2σ for Peak and −2σ for Trough, with σ being the
standard deviation of listed firm output. In the model the measure of business cycles are
deviations of output from the stationary solution.
makes them particularly appealing during bad economic conditions when the
option value of expanding the scale of operations is smaller. Moreover, as
firms that operate in these markets have a smaller optimal size than firms
operating in other product markets, they can afford to charge higher markups
from the start of their activities as they have weaker incentives to accumulate
customers.
Quantitatively, running the same regression as in (2.2) on model-generated
data, reveals that a two-standard deviations positive increase from the sta-
tionary solution value of aggregate output induces an initial negative change
in firm-level markups of approximately -1.4%, compared to an effect of ap-
proximately -4% in the baseline empirical specification. Therefore, the initial
effect of aggregate conditions in the model is approximately 35% of the one
estimated in the data for similarly sized changes in the cycle components of
GDP. One of the main driver of this effect is the role of demand shocks in
business cycles. As also noted in the previous section, see Figure 2.7b, in-
creasing the dependence of business cycles to demand shocks increases the
ability of the model to generate dispersion in the characteristics of entrants,
increasing the magnitude of business cycle effects on the average age profile of
markups.
Alternatively, the persistence of business cycles can be checked by comparing
the correlation of cohort-level markups at different ages with their initial level.
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Figure 2.14: Autocorrelation of aggregate markups in the data and in the model






















Model - cohort-level µ
Data - cohort-level µ
Model - aggregate µ
Data - aggregate µ
Note: The figure plots the cohort-level and aggregate autocorrelation of markups in the
model and in the data. Cohort-level refers to correlations of average markup by co-
horts of firms with the average markups of the same cohort a years into the future, i.e.
Corr(µ̂0,t, µ̂a,t+a), whereˆindicates deviations from an Hodrick-Prescott trend taken across
cohorts of the same age. Aggregate refers to autocorrelations of cost-weighted markup in
the economy between t and t + a, i.e. Corr(µ̂t, µ̂t+a) whereˆ indicates deviations from an
Hodrick-Prescott trend.
Figure 2.14 shows a comparison of these correlations for the data and the
model. As business cycles persistently affect the cohort of newly listed firms
along their product market, the autocorrelation of markups across cohorts -
i.e. the correlation of the average markup by cohort with the average markup
of the same cohort some years in the future - exhibits an higher persistence
than the aggregate measure of markup, remaining higher than zero up to age
five. This result indicates that cyclical variations in markups across cohorts
persist into later years without mean-reverting. This particular feature is not
shared by the measure of aggregate markups that does not show any persistent
autocorrelation beyond one year, both in the model and in the data.46
2.6.2 Markups’ co-movements with aggregate conditions
A well-known fact in models with customer markets where firms’ sales af-
fect the number of customers they can acquire is that markups are strongly
countercyclical. The intuition hinges on the fact that, due to deep-habits and
procyclical stochastic discount factors, firms value extra customers more in
46The cohort-level autocorrelation in the model can be made even stronger allowing for
initial conditions in customer base accumulation to be correlated with the aggregate state
of the economy.
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Table 2.2: Markups’ co-movements with the cycle
Dep.Variable: Log-Markup Data Model
Cycle Measure -0.359∗∗∗ -0.352
(0.124)
Cycle Measure × Age 0.051∗∗ 0.102
(0.020)





Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p :∗∗∗< 0.01,∗∗< 0.05,∗< 0.1. The table
reports estimates of the co-movements between firm-level markups and a measure of business
cycle. Data reports the coefficients of interest from estimating equation 2.3 on the main
sample of firms followed up to 25 years; controls include firm fixed effects, sector shares, HHI
index in three digit NAICS, cash holdings and log-employment; the measure of business cycle
is quadratically detrended log-real GDP. Model shows the coefficients of running a regression
as in equation 2.3 on a model simulated dataset; controls include age fixed effects, firm sizes
and cohort fixed effects; the measure of business cycle is the log-deviation of output from
the stationary solution value. The data are constructed by simulating the model for 2500
periods and then keeping firms up to 25 years to maintain consistency with the empirical
counterpart.
booms than in recessions. Hence, when a recession hits, firms will find it prof-
itable to exploit their current customer base rather than keep markups slightly
lower to benefit from an higher customer base in the future. These incentives
are at play also in the model presented in this paper with the addition that
age is also an important force in determining the co-movements of markups
with aggregate conditions. Table 2.2 reports the coefficients for a version of
equation (2.3) estimated on model simulated data, showing that the model
can replicate the age profile for the cyclicality of firm level markups.
A direct consequence of the fact that markups become less countercyclical as
firms grow is that weighted and unweighted measures of aggregate markups
in the model exhibit different cyclicality.47 In particular, under the baseline
calibration, cost-weighted measures of markups in the model features a 0.1
correlation with aggregate output, while the unweighted average shows a−0.14
correlation with aggregate output.48 The root of this difference is once again
linked to the nature of firm heterogeneity in the model. As firms age and
grow bigger, their incentives to adjust markups in reaction to business cycles
47Note that unweighted measures of markups overrepresent the behavior of small firms
relatively to their contribution to total output.
48As noted by Edmond et al. [2018] in a large class of models the correct model based
measure of aggregate markups is a cost-weighted average rather than a sale-weighted average.
This is true also in the model developed here as I show in Appendix 2.C
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diminish as they get closer to the monopolistic competition limit and reach
their optimal scale of operations. This intuition is also shown more formally
in Proposition 2.
Moreover, the firms that are destined to grow in size and command a larger
share of the overall economy are also those that operate in product markets
with a large demand elasticity to customer base. Under the baseline calibra-
tion, these product markets are associated with relatively low sales relevance
in the acquisition of new customers. This implies that the largest firms in the
model do not respond strongly to business cycles not only because they are
larger, hence closer to the monopolistic competition limit, but also because
they operate in product markets where the price lever is not very effective in
managing the size of their customer bases.
The age and product market heterogeneity present in the model, therefore,
is important to generate dynamics of aggregate markups that speak both to
the literature on firm-level estimates, that, as documented also in this pa-
per, founds strong negative co-movements between markups and aggregate
conditions and to the broader and older literature on markup cyclicality that
instead estimates acyclical or even procyclical markups.49
2.6.3 Testing the model’s predictions using Advertising Ex-
penditure.
The model presented in the paper is geared towards explaining the behavior
of markups using the heterogeneity in customer accumulation motives that
firms operating in different product market have. However, the fact that firms
in the model can explicitly devote resources to the acquisition of customers
allows them to compare the behavior of direct investment in demand with a
similar empirical counterpart. To check if the model delivers sensible results
on this margin, which is completely untargeted, I estimate the cohort effects on
a measure of advertising intensity in a small sub-sample of firms that report
their expenditure on advertising. I define advertising intensity as the ratio
on advertising expenditure to total operating expenditure. As direct demand
investments in the model are denoted in units of labor, the model counterpart
for this measure is the ratio of firms’ wage bill that directly depends on these
direct investments, i.e. ζ(mj(i),t) over [ζ(mj(i),t) + hj(i),t]. I then estimate the
49See among others, Nekarda and Ramey [2013].
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Figure 2.15: Cohort effects and age profiles for intensity of advertising expenditure
(a) Data



















































Note: The figure plots the age profile for the intensity of advertising expenditure (Advertis-
ing expenditure/Operating Expenditure) from equation (2.2) for the main sample and for a
panel dataset constructed from simulating the model for 2500 periods. Specifically, at each
age a, I am plotting m̂0 + φ̂a + (β̂0 + β̂1a)Z, where m̂0 is the average advertising expendi-
ture in the first available year, φ̂a are the estimated age fixed effects, (β̂0, β̂1) capture the
estimated persistence of aggregate conditions in the first available year. Z is a measure of
business cycle outcomes that takes value 2σ for Peak and −2σ for Trough, with σ being the
standard deviation of listed firm output. In the model the measure of business cycles are
deviations of output from the stationary solution.
effects of initial aggregate conditions on this measure using equation (2.2) in
the data and in a model simulated dataset.
The comparisons of the age profiles is reported in Figure 2.15. Figure 2.15a
shows the estimated age profiles for firms that are first observed in periods
of above trend GDP in the data while Figure 2.15b replicates the exercise
in the model. While the size of the initial effects of aggregate conditions is
very similar, a recession of two-standard deviations in the model generates an
increase in the intensity of advertising intensity that is approximately 90% of
the one estimated in the data. However, the overall impact on the age profiles
is very different, especially for firms that are first observed in booms.
The main reason for this detachment between the model prediction and the
data is likely due to the very stark assumption in how the model deals with
direct demand investments. As firms’ age, they expand both their customer
base and their production capabilities. As sales is a channel through which
firms can accumulate customers, in the model, the need to divert resources
from production to customer acquisition decreases mechanically as firms age.
The additional mechanism that makes firms that start their operations more
reliant on direct demand investments is the fact the these firms are self-selected
in product markets where customers are less responsive to sales and more
sensitive to the direct investments (low ψ product markets).
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A potential explanation for the very different age profiles in the data instead
can be linked to the fact that firms that start their operations in booms are
facing also higher competition and therefore need to keep up spending on
advertising as they age. These competition effects are not present in the model
hence the product market choice and the aging structure of the economy fully
determine the age profiles of direct demand investments.50
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I study how aggregate conditions at relevant junctures of firms
lives can have persistent effects on firm choices and how these choices affects
the behavior of both firm-level and aggregate markups.
I describe new empirical evidences on the effect of business cycles at the time of
listing finding that firms that experience economics booms close to their listing
date tend to start their activities as listed firms with lower initial markups and
steeper age profiles.
In addition, I characterize the correlation of firm-level markups along the
age profile, confirming recent existing evidence on the cyclicality of firm-level
markups that finds a declining countercyclicality as firms grow. I then show
that these empirical evidences are consistent with a model of firms dynam-
ics that features heterogeneous product markets and realistic firms life cy-
cles.
A novel feature of the model is that firms rely on both sales and direct demand
investments to acquire customers and relax their demand constraints. Notably,
product markets differ among each other along two main margins: i) how
sensitive firms demands are to the size of customer base and ii) how relevant
firms’ sales are for the acquisition of new customers.
I discuss how varying the margins of heterogeneity across product markets
influences the transmission of aggregate shocks and how different shock mixes
can results in different correlations between a cost-weighted measure of aggre-
gate markups and the simple average markup in the economy. As the cost-
weighted measure is more affected by the behavior of incumbents, looking at
the differences between the two measures is helpful to build some intuition
50Explicitly modeling the interaction of higher competition and product market charac-
teristics with business cycles is left for future research.
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of the role of the extensive and intensive margin for the cyclical behavior of
aggregate markups in the economy.
I then show that business cycles have persistent effects on markups as they
operate a selection along product markets on the cohorts of firms that start
they operations in booms or in recessions. In particular, firms that get listed
in periods of high aggregate demand, when it is relatively easier to attract
new customers operate in product markets that require large investment in
customer base and guarantee large long-term values at the cost of charging
lower initial markups to build the necessary customer base.
The fact that sales are a necessary component for the acquisition of new cus-
tomers makes the pricing choice of firm akin to an investment: lowering prices
allows to increase sales and therefore enjoy a larger customer base in the
future. As young firms are more likely to exit the market, they will also
respond more strongly to business cycle matching the decline in the counter-
ciclicality of markups along firms’ age profiles and allowing to reconcile the





2.A Additional tables and figures
2.A.1 A reduced form approach: autocorrelation of cohort-
level markups
To estimate the autocorrelation of cohort level markups I am exploiting the
following specification at the cohort level
log(µa,t) = α+β0 log(µ0,t−a)+β1 log(µ0,t−a)×a+β2 log(µ0,t)+β3a+β4a2+ua,t,
(2.A.1)
where µa,t is the average markup of cohort a in year t; µ0,t−a is the average
markup of cohort a in the year of birth; µ0,t is the average markup of en-
tering firms in year t; and a is age. The elasticity of each cohort markups
to their initial conditions is therefore given by β0 and the elasticity at each
subsequent age is β0 + β1 × a. The comparison of the coefficients of interest
for equation (2.A.1) estimated in the main sample and in a dataset of model
generated data is reported in Table 2.A.1.
The model slightly overestimates the correlation with the markup charged in
the initial year and the decline in the correlation induced by age. However,
both coefficients are similar in magnitude and indicate that each cohort of
firms in the data and in the model shares some common feature that only
slowly fades away with time. In the model, this feature is the product market
composition of different cohorts of firms.
Table 2.A.1: Auto correlation of firm-level markup
Dep.Variable: Log-Markup Model Data
Log-Markup at A0 0.583 0.503***
(0.072)





Note: The table reports the elasticity of cohort-level markups with the markup charged in
the first year a cohort is observed. In the data each cohort of firms starting from 1970 to
2006 is followed up to 10 years of age (37 cohorts followed for 10 years), robustness checks
for 5 and 20 years give qualitatively similar results. For the model simulated data I run a
simulation of 2500 period for each cohort and then I keep 37 cohorts of firms for 10 periods
to have a comparable number of cohorts in the model simulation and in the data, increasing
the number of simulated cohorts does not significantly change the results. Robustness checks
for cohorts followed for 5 and 20 years deliver qualitatively similar results.
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Figure 2.A.1: Product markets characteristics under different calibrations
0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6





























Note: The figure plots the parameters defining product market characteristics under the
different calibrations discussed in Section 2.5.
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Figure 2.A.2: Impulse response functions to aggregate productivity shocks for
markups and mass of active firms by cohort and product market
(a) Markups
































































































































Note: The figure plots impulse response functions and percent deviations from the station-
ary solution to a one-percent productivity shocks. Each panel reports the IRFs for selected
cohorts in a given product market. Darker colors are younger cohorts and selected cohorts
are firms aged a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40}. The time periods are years since the shock
realization. Therefore, each dot shows the response of firms aged a years old t periods after
the shock.
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Figure 2.A.3: Impulse response functions to aggregate demand shocks of markups
and masses of active firms by cohort and product market
(a) Markups

























































































































Note: The figure plots impulse response functions and percent deviations from the sta-
tionary solution to a one-percent aggregate demand shocks.Each panel reports the IRFs for
selected cohorts in a given product market. Darker colors are younger cohorts and selected
cohorts are firms aged a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40}. The time periods are years since the
shock realization. Therefore, each dot shows the response of firms aged a years old t periods
after the shock.
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Figure 2.A.4: Impulse response functions to listing cost shocks for markups and
masses of active firms by cohort and product market
(a) Markups























































































































Note: The figure plots impulse response functions and percent deviations from the station-
ary solution to a one-percent listing cost shock. Each panel reports the IRFs for selected
cohorts in a given product market. Darker colors are younger cohorts and selected cohorts
are firms aged a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40}. The time periods are years since the shock
realization. Therefore, each dot shows the response of firms aged a years old t periods after
the shock.
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2.B Measuring markups in a model with customer
base accumulation and dynamic pricing
The estimation strategy for firm-level markups outlined in the previous chapter
relies on the assumption that pricing decisions are static. In other words, firms
reset their prices every period without being subject to price rigidities (like
menu costs or other adjustment costs).
However when firms’ customer base accumulation is influenced by the level of
their demand, even without price rigidities, their pricing choices are going to
be dynamic as their current production contributes to the determination of
their customer base and hence to the level of future demand.
To see how, consider a general setting where a firm j produces output using
only labor and faces a demand function D(pj,t, bj,t) that depends on prices and
the level of customer base b. Firms accumulate customer base through sales,
so that customer base investments are a function of firm j’s sales F (yj,t).
The Lagrangian of a firm that has incentives to use prices to expand production











−φj,t[bj,t+1 − (1− δ)bj,t − F (yj,t)]

(2.B.2)
where the λ constraint is the technology the firms uses, the γ constraint is the
demand faced by firm j and the φ constraint is the law of motion of firm j’s
customer base. The optimal choice of the firm is described by the following
first order conditions:
[pj,t] : yj,t + γj,tDp(·) = 0 (2.B.3)
[yj,t] : pj,t − λj,t − γj,t + φj,tFy(·) = 0 (2.B.4)
[hj,t] : −Ptwt + λj,tfh(hj,t) = 0 (2.B.5)
[bj,t+1] : φj,t = Et [Λt,t+1((1− δ)φj,t+1 + γj,t+1Db(·|t+1))] (2.B.6)







≡ θht , I obtain the following condition that links firm-level
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The left hand side of equation (2.B.7) is the De Loecker and Warzynski [2012]
measurement equation. Note that if current output does not play any role in
creating customer base (i.e. Fy(·) = 0 ) then this condition collapses back to







ηj,t−1 . The willingness of firms to
use prices to expand their customer bases however, introduces a negative bias
to the standard measure of markups used in the literature. The size of the
bias depends on the relative magnitude of the multiplier on the customer base
accumulation process to the one on the technology used in production. In the
model the size of the Lagrange multipliers depend on the state variable, hence
we can think of the bias as being a function of firms’ customer bases. I exploit
this fact and I include a second order polynomial in firms’ sector shares in
three digits sectors to try to mitigate this problem as much as possible.
2.C Model and solution details
In this section I provide additional details about the model results and deriva-
tion discussed in the main body of the paper.
2.C.1 Rescaling of incumbent’s value function
I solve the model with the habit-adjusted consumption good as the numeirare.
The main consequence of this choice is that it is convenient to rescale the
incumbent value function Vi(bj,t−1, aj,t;St) to take the change into account.
In particular, consider the original problem
Vi(bj,t−1, aj,t;St) = max
pj,t,yj,t,hj,t,
mj,t,bj,t




subject to the relevant constraints










aj,t+1 = aj,t + 1.
Now divide both left hand side and the right hand side of the Bellman equation
in (2.C.1) by the aggregate habit-adjusted price index Pt and define Ṽ (·) ≡
V (·)/Pt.
Then, (2.C.1) becomes








































so that, defining Λt,t+1 ≡ β u
′(Ct+1)
u(Ct)
and substituting the price ratio and pro-
duction technology from the constraints the incumbents’ problem simplifies to






j,t)− wtPt (hj,t + ζ(mj,t)) +
+(1− ρ(aj,t))Et
[





bj,t = (1− δ)bj,t−1 +QtFi(Athαj,t,mj,t).
2.C.2 Derivation of firm demands
For varieties produced by listed firms, household expenditure minimization









































. Now, note that entry requires Xt
units of the habit-adjusted consumption good from listed firms , hence each


















then market clearing for each variety implies that















i=1 ei,tXt is the total expenditure in listed firms for this economy,













The incumbent problem for a firm in market i is







yj,t − wt(hj,t + ζ(mj,t))+















Using the individual firm demands to express the price ratio as a function of
y and b, the technology to express y as a function of h then the incumbents
problem can be simplified as follows51











η − wt(hj,t + ζ(mj,t))




bj,t = (1− δ)bj,t−1 +QtF (Athαj,t,mj,t))





































The same set of optimality conditions holds for all firms producing the same
products and facing the same exit probability (i.e. firms in the same cohort),
therefore the full equilibrium of the model can be described by the following
conditions:











































η − wt(ha,i,t + ζ(ma,i,t)) + (1− ρ(a))E[Λt+1Va+1,i,t+1)]









with initial conditions for customer bases in each product market b−1,i,t−1 >
0, calibrated to match sales profiles in the data. In practice, to simu-
late the model for each product market i, I draw idiosyncratic shocks
ui,t−1 ∼ U(−1, 1) and set b0,i,t−1 = b0,i · (1 + ui,t−1).
51Recall that as I am using the rescaled version of the incumbent problem and I am solving
everything in terms of the habit-adjusted price level, Pt, wt is indicating the habit-adjusted
real wage.
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where ωi are scaled by a common factor calibrated to ensure that aggre-
gate output is equal to 1 in the stationary solution with no aggregate
uncertainty.


























i=1 ei,t = Yt
At = ρaAt−1 + ε
A
t
Xt = ρXXt−1 + ε
X
t
Qt = ρQXt−1 + ε
Q
t
εjt ∼ N(0, σj), j = {A,X,Q}
2.C.4 Aggregation
As noted by Edmond et al. [2018], aggregate markups in a model economy like
the one presented in this paper are equal to the inverse of the labor share.









as the aggregate markup, where Hgt denotes the amount of labor inputs ded-
icated to the production of the output good and not to the accumulation of
customer base.





























yj,tdj then I can integrate both sides of the previous equation










so that the aggregate markup is the cost-weighted average of firm-level markups.




























Therefore, consistently with Edmond et al. [2018], also in the model presented
in this paper aggregate markups can be derived as the cost-weighted average
of firm level markups or as the harmonic weighted average of firm markups
with firms’ sales shares over GDP as weights.
2.C.5 Proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The optimal markup management of listed firms can be




















where ρ̃(aj,t) = (1−ρ(aj,t) is the surviving probability up to t, µj,t = wthj,tαyj,t
Pt
pj,t
is the firm-level markup and µ̄ is the markup under standard monopolistic
competition that would prevail without dynamic incentives in pricing.
Proof. From the first order conditions of an incumbent, equations (2.C.7),(2.C.8)












+ (1− ρ(aj,t))(1− δ)E [Λt,t+1γt+1] .
123
given that ki(bj,t) = κib
εib











+ (1− ρ(aj,t))(1− δ)E [Λt,t+1γt+1] .
Denote the survival probability to the current period for a firm of age a as































































s=0 ρ̃(aj,t+s)(1− δ)T+1γt+T+1Λt,t+T+1 represents the discounted
value, in utility terms, of an extra unit of customer base at infinity. Using
an argument similar to the transversality condition in consumer problems, as
profits are increasing in the size of customer base, at the optimal plan, an
incumbent firm has to choose a path for its customer base such that this value





















Now, using equation (2.C.8), we can express the value of γ as deviations of
firm-level markups from the monopolistic competition level. Using the demand






















is the inverse of
the ratio of firm level prices to marginal costs, hence a measure of firm-level







Combining the definition of γt from the forward iteration with the expression













































using the fact that qt,τ = EΛt,t+τ PtPt+τ from household’s optimality conditions.
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Chapter 3
Leveraging on human capital:
labor rigidities and sorting
over the business cycle
Joint with Edoardo Maria Acabbi and Luca Mazzone
Abstract
This paper introduces a structural model of the labor market that features
both worker and firm heterogeneity and where workers accumulate human
capital and can search on the job. We analyze the optimal provision of insur-
ance within the firm through an optimal dynamic contract, that, paired with
the assumption of limited liability on the firm side, implies downward wage-
rigidity. In our framework, insurance incentives and contractual rigidities are
crucial in determining the pattern of job matches and separations along the
business cycle. In particular, we show that aggregate fluctuations can alter
the sorting between workers and firms by affecting workers’ search strategies
and, as a consequence, distort their human capital accumulation. In addition,
we show that we can represent the optimal contracting problem using both the




Business cycle fluctuations and the accumulation of human capital are strictly
intertwined. Recessions have an impact on the matching process between
workers and firms, altering the job ladder and thus accumulation of human
capital on the job. At the same time, limits to investment in human capital can
produce relevant feedback effects and delay recoveries from recessions.
This article proposes a theoretical framework to evaluate the effect of tem-
porary aggregate fluctuations on workers’ careers when human capital accu-
mulation is linked to the quality of employer-employee matches. Notably, in
our model, workers’ human capital accumulation is linked to the quality of
employers, giving an important role to workers’ past careers for labor market
outcomes. In addition, we highlight the role of frictions in shaping the worker
search strategies and the worker-firm sorting along the business cycle. Specif-
ically, we show that aggregate fluctuations have the ability to influence the
search strategy of workers and consequently affect their human capital accu-
mulation path. In addition, we show that limited liability on the firm side
determines downward rigidity in wages and induces endogenous separations
during recessions.
In order to generate these rich interaction between workers and firms, we
develop a structural model of the labor market in which we nest a dynamic
contract setting between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms. Our frame-
work allows to characterize the interactions between workers human capital
accumulation over the life cycle and the matching with heterogeneous firms.
The model also characterizes the optimal amount of worker income insurance
within the firm and its interaction with workers’ human capital accumula-
tion.
In the model, heterogeneous workers accumulate on the job experience which
augments their skills and helps them climbing the job ladder. Search frictions
and the presence of aggregate uncertainty distort sorting of workers with firms
and generate inefficiencies in the economy. By studying the characteristics of
the optimal contract between heterogeneous workers and firms we are able
to draw some theoretical conclusions on how aggregate uncertainty influences
both workers and firms’ search strategies. In particular, we show that positive
aggregate shocks are associated with an upgrade in the quality of the firms
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targeted by workers. As we assume that human capital accumulation depends
on firms quality, our framework formalizes a potentially relevant mechanism
through which aggregate conditions have persistent effects on workers careers
by affecting the path of their human capital accumulation. In addition, the
characterization of optimal contracts between heterogeneous workers and firms
creates the scope for endogenous separations and therefore can be used to
evaluate the impact of rigidities on the pattern of job destruction at the onset
of recessions.
We populate the economy with overlapping generations of workers. Each
cohort is exposed to different aggregate conditions at the start of the working
career, a feature which determines a time-varying cross-sectional distribution
of workers. The OLG structure allows us to identify the different sources of
long-run changes in job sorting, wage growth and human capital accumulation
affecting each age group.
Akin to physical capital, human capital can play a persistent role in affecting
economic performance. An important difference between the two, however,
is that the intensive and extensive margins of investment in, and acquisition
of, human capital are likely much more limited given workers limited lifetime.
This feature amplifies output fluctuations and keeps workers’ productivity
below potential for a period longer than the duration of a temporary negative
TFP shock. Not only workers who enter the labor market in bad times, but
also those who are displaced during recessions, face a worsened job ladder
and trade worse employment prospects for a higher likelihood of exiting from
unemployment. In this sense even a transitory shock, if intense enough or
protracted enough, will generate a permanent loss in the human capital of the
labor force that, on aggregate, is not going to be completely offset as long as
the treated cohorts of workers are part of the workforce.1
We capture these rich business cycle effects as in Menzio and Shi [2010] and
Menzio et al. [2016], by adopting a directed search framework in which we
nest human capital accumulation. We also generate endogenous separations
through endogenous wage rigidity, resulting in inefficient separations when
a high wage induces negative continuation values for the firm. Rigidity re-
sults from an optimal insurance contract between firms and workers where
1The first study to advance this hypothesis is Ljungqvist and Sargent [1998], in which
the eurosclerosis of the 1990s’ is associated with an analysis of a rigid labor market with
slow human capital accumulation by workers.
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firms have limited liability, so they exit the contract when their continuation
value is negative. Our framework has the advantage of explicitly modeling
the dynamics of aggregate shocks and their effects on the entire earnings-skills
distribution and clearly presenting the trade-off between insurance incentives,
contractual rigidities and the efficient allocation of workers in the labor mar-
ket. The model, thus, allows to assess how these trade-offs vary along business
cycles and provides a framework to quantify what is the aggregate effect for an
economy of having different cohorts of workers who experienced recessionary
periods.
The analysis of how worker-firm relationships are shaped by business cycles
has gained prominence in recent years, especially during the latest recession-
ary periods. Throughout the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2009) and the
Sovereign Debt Crisis (2010-2012), it became evident that labor rigidities and
missing investments in human capital could be potentially very harmful for
workers who underwent periods of heightened instability and insecurity on
the job, and in many cases were forced to accept under-qualified, precarious
employment positions [OECD, 2014]. An assessment of aggregate dynamics
of the labor market around these kinds of recessionary events is thus instru-
mental to inform the policy debate regarding the optimal level of flexibility of
the market, and the possibility of enacting counter-cyclical policies, such as
putting into place targeted unemployment benefits, targeted hiring subsidies,
training programs or fiscal devaluations of labor costs to support unemployed
cohorts and employment in recessions.
Relation to the literature. Our paper relates to strands of research in
labor and macroeconomics analyzing the effects and costs that business cycles
can have on workers’ careers in the longer term.
From a theoretical standpoint, we contribute to the extensive literature ana-
lyzing long-term contracting with limited commitment (e.g. Harris and Holm-
strom [1982], Thomas and Worral [1988], Krueger and Uhlig [2006], Xiaolan
[2014], Lamadon [2016]). Contrary to these papers, however, our main focus is
to quantify the aggregate effects of the interaction of insurance incentives, pro-
vided by the contract and crucial in determining the patterns of job separations
along the business cycles, and the long-term term effects on the macroeconomy
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of having cohorts of workers exposed to worse employment relationship early
in their careers.
Models of the labor market focusing on related topics have been recently pro-
posed, among others, by Jarosch [2015] to analyze how workers value job
security with respect to the salary, or by Burdett et al. [2016] to structurally
estimate the cost of job loss. We complement these studies by explicitly mod-
eling the contracting problem between the worker and the firm, taking into
account the relevance of human capital accumulation for both the workers’
careers and the aggregate economy.
In addition, we show that it is possible to describe the recursive structure of
our contractual framework using both the formulation based on the inclusion
of promised utilities as additional state variables, as in Spear and Srivastava
[1987], that currently dominates the literature on optimal contracts between
firms and workers, with the more computationally feasible formulation of re-
cursive contracts developed by Marcet and Marimon [2019] 2.
At this time, and to the best of our knowledge, few studies have managed to
incorporate the influence of the economic cycle together with the dynamics of
human capital accumulation and firms-workers matches in a structural model
of the labor market. Also, little is known about how the contractual framework
influences firms decisions’ on workforce mix, training programs and overall
hiring strategies, especially in relationship to business cycle fluctuations. The
search-and-matching literature has recently been trying to address how the
sorting of workers and firms varies cyclically (see for instance [Lise and Robin,
2017]).
Structure of the paper. The paper is divided as follows: in Section 3.2 we
briefly discuss some existing preliminary evidence regarding the dynamics of
sorting, matching and the relevance of human capital accumulation along the
business cycle; in Section 3.3 we present the model; in Section 3.4 we discuss
features of the solution of the model and of the equilibrium conditions (proofs
are in Appendix); finally, in Section 3.5 we conclude.
2The approach is known as the recursive Lagrangean method. Notable contributions,
besides the seminal paper, include Cole and Kubler [2012], Messner et al. [2012], and Mele
[2014]
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3.2 Discussion of existing evidence
The model and the contractual environment developed in this paper imply a
strong dependence of workers’ careers on the history of aggregate shocks they
are exposed to throughout their working lives. In addition, the fact that work-
ers can accumulate human capital while working, paired with the assumption
that working lives are finite, gives a disproportionate importance of aggregate
shocks to matches early in workers lives. The intuition of why this is the case
relies on noticing that early in workers lives human capital accumulation is
more important both because the level of human capital workers are endowed
with is lower and because the net present value of higher human capital levels
in the future are greater the longer is the period a worker is able to reap the
benefits of these higher levels. Both these reasons are stronger for younger
workers searching for their first job than for older workers that are possibly
trying to reallocate. As a consequence, any shock that induces missing in-
vestments or impairs the accumulation of human capital, especially early in
workers careers, will generate a persistent loss in workers’ earnings. This line
of reasoning has numerous counterparts in the labor literature.
The existing empirical literature, in fact, has developed two main methodolo-
gies that are usually employed to measure the effects of recession on workers’
career outcomes: (i) event studies and other kinds of reduced form empirical
approaches, leveraging on an identification (necessarily in partial equilibrium)
based on the observation of quasi-exogenous separation shocks or the possi-
bility of matching workers in the data with very similar characteristics but
different employment dynamics; and (ii) structural theoretical models, char-
acterized by search frictions in job markets, which attempt to describe the
effects of different kinds of shocks, both aggregate and idiosyncratic, on wage
dynamics, distributions, and matching of workers to firms.
A number of recent studies have analyzed the long-run effects of unemployment
for workers’ earnings, and the importance of the economic cycle on lifetime
outcomes. Many empirical studies, following the seminal paper by Jacobson
et al. [1993], have analyzed the impact on earnings and work careers of losing a
job during a recession finding large income penalties for workers that lose their
job in bad economic times. A related literature, following in particular Kahn
[2010], Oreopoulos et al. [2012], Schwandt and Von Wachter [2019], focused
instead on the long term effects on graduates’ and young workers’ careers of
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entering the labor market in a recession, switching the analysis from matches
that are already formed to the analysis of how aggregate conditions influence
labor-market matches in the first place.3 These studies use geographical vari-
ation in aggregate labor market conditions across cohorts of new graduates
and they estimate a significant and persistent effect of entering the labor force
under worse aggregate economic conditions.
In this line of research, and closely related in spirit to our work, Arellano-Bover
[2020] estimates on Spanish data that the size of first employer can explain
up to 15% of the scarring effects of recessions. In addition, he shows that the
quality of initial matches between firms and workers have persistent effects
on workers careers: when a worker is hired in a firm one standard deviation
higher than the average, his lifetime income (20 years in the future) is esti-
mated to be approximately one-third higher. In this case, firm size is taken as
a proxy for firm specific attributes that can directly impact workers’ careers,
such as the availability of training programs or simply being exposed to better
management practices, that are notably very difficult to measure accurately.4
Similarly, Fernández-Kranz and Rodŕıguez-Planas [2017], Garcia-Cabo [2018]
estimate the loss of an average recession in a range between 6-12% of annual
earnings over 10 years, stronger and more persistent for less educated workers
(7 years persistence for high-school graduates versus 5 years for college grad-
uates). Other recent studies provide some evidence on the dynamic role of
employment at heterogeneous firms also for job mobility and other labor mar-
ket outcomes. Abowd et al. [2018], for example, show getting the first job in
a top-paying firm can lead to up-ward movements in the earnings distribution
later in workers careers. Bonhomme et al. [2019], instead, show how past firm
types can have an impact on future earnings after changing jobs.
There is a large body of empirical evidence that estimates how the economic
cycle can have a substantial impact on cohorts currently in the job market and
especially on the ones entering the labor market for the first time in a recession.
Even if the impact of this condition has already been analyzed as regards the
impact on lifetime earnings by means of a reduced form approach, no analysis
3See also, among others, Schmieder et al. [2018], Lachowska et al. [2017], Altonji et al.
[2016], Huckfeldt [2018].
4The model presented in this paper does not feature an explicit firm size distribution as
we adopt the approach of one-job-one-firm, which is standard in the search and matching
literature. As a consequence, we are silent on which are the specific channels through which
firm quality influences human capital. The mechanism we have in mind, however, is akin to
the effect of being exposed to better management practices and more efficient organizations.
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has been carried out about the potentially persistent effects for the entire
economy and for overall labor and firm productivity of having cohorts with
a slower accumulation of human capital in the context of general equilibrium
model of the labor market.5
Thanks to the computational tractability of the model developed in this pa-
per, an interesting application that we leave to future research is the use of
detailed matched employer-employee datasets to structurally estimate the ef-
fects of having cohort of workers exposed to negative aggregate conditions at
the beginning of their careers and quantitatively asses the persistence of busi-
ness cycles on the aggregate economy through labor market channels.
3.3 Model
In this section we present our model of the labor market. We start by dis-
cussing the environment, the timing and the preference structure of the econ-
omy. Then we discuss the features of a frictional labor market with directed
search, and finally we characterize the workers problem and the optimal re-
cursive contract.
3.3.1 Environment
Time is discrete, runs forever and is indexed by t ∈ Z. The economy is popu-
lated by two kinds of agents: a unit measure of finitely-lived risk-averse house-
holds (workers) and a continuum of infinitely-lived, risk-neutral entrepreneurs
who have the ability to invest in enterprises and thus run an endogenously
chosen number of operating firms. All agents in the economy share the same
discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
Following Menzio et al. [2016], we populate the economy with T ≥ 2 over-
lapping generations of households, that face both aggregate and idiosyncratic
risk. Each household lives for T periods deterministically, with age τ ∈ T ≡
{1, 2, 3, . . . , T}. Every period workers participate to the labor market and,
as in Shi [2009], Menzio and Shi [2010], direct their search towards different
submarkets. Workers can only search for work and consume, as we do not
5Theoretical analyses of the impact of recessions on workers careers are presented in
Audoly [2020], Guo [2018], Wee [2016]. Their models share some of the features of our model,
but do not feature optimal dynamic contract and endogenous separations, or heterogeneous
firms.
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model saving decisions.6 The objective of the household is to maximize its







where t0 characterizes the time of entry into the labor market and τ character-
izes the age of the agent. Workers can either be employed or unemployed, and
we denote by e and u their employment status. Workers are characterized by
heterogeneous human capital levels h, with h ∈ H ≡ [h, h]. Workers start off
their life with a baseline level of human capital drawn from an initial exoge-
nous continuous distribution with density l(h) and can get training on-the-job
over the course of their working career. The way in which they get training
is another source of heterogeneity in the model across workers. Workers are
matched with firms characterized by different levels of (permanent) firm qual-
ity y ∈ Y ≡ [y, y], which in our model are isomorphic to capital levels. This
maps into the dynamics of human capital as explained below.
The only form of human capital accumulation in the model is on-the-job.
Following Lise and Postel-Vinay [2019], we model human capital accumulation
in this way: depending on the level of quality of the firm and their own level
of ability, workers accumulate human capital according to some law of motion
g(h, y) : H × Y → H. In this setting, training is similar to “catching-up”
of the firm quality with respect to the “training” ability of the firm, up to a
point (depending on y) when the worker will not be able to learn anymore
from the match and would possibly like to transit to a higher y match. At
the same time, coherently with the concept of “mismatch”, workers who lost
their job and only manage to re-match with a low quality firm see their ability
progressively deteriorating with the same g(h, y) function. We assume that
the function g(h, y) is concave in both arguments.7 Firms are, as common
in labor-search studies, just one worker-one job matches, and we are thus
abstracting from firm size.8
6Modeling wealth accumulation in a model with two-sided heterogeneity, life-cycle, hu-
man capital accumulation and directed search (also on-the-job) is undoubtedly interesting
and important and left to future research.
7This is needed to ensure that the firm’s optimal profit function is smooth and does not
exhibit kinks as workers start to accumulate human capital.
8Modeling multi-worker firms in our context is an immensely interesting advancement
that we leave for future research.
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We denote future values in recursive expressions by adding a ′ to them, or index
elements by t in non-recursive ones. The aggregate state of the economy Ω
is characterized by the level of aggregate productivity a ∈ A ⊂ R+ and by
the distribution of agents across states µ ∈ M : {e, u} × H × Y × T → [0, 1].
Let Ω = (a, µ) ∈ A ×M represent the aggregate state of the economy and
let M represent the set of distributions µ over those states. Let µ′ = Φ(Ω, a′)
be the law of motion of the distribution. Aggregate productivity evolves as a
stationary Markov process, namely a′ ∼ F (a′|a) : A → A.
The timing of each period is as follows: a productivity shock for the period is
drawn; entrepreneurs open vacancies across the submarkets and post their of-
fers; workers search from unemployment or on-the-job, and workers transition
to a new job if on-the-job search is successful; production of both surviving
and newly created firms takes place; employed workers accumulate human
capital; an exogenous share of matches breaks down; at the same time, and
before knowing what the next period productivity draw will be, incumbent
firms decide whether to shut down, endogenously destroying their matches, or
continue producing. State contingent policies prescribe an action for each re-
alization of the story of worker-firm matches. For ease of notation, we denote
the sequence of stories as {sτ}Tτ=1. The sequence of actions just described is
summarized in Figure 3.1.
3.3.2 Labor markets
Search is directed. The labor market is organized as a continuum of submar-
kets indexed by the expected offers of lifetime utility vy ∈ V ≡ [v, v]. Each
worker, characterized by an (h, τ) tuple of human capital and age, directs
search while entrepreneurs decide which kind of firms y to open and, corre-
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spondingly, an offered lifetime value vy.
9 There is free entry for entrepreneurs
in submarkets. The process of opening a firm, which amounts to posting a
vacancy at a quality-specific cost κ(y), will be described in Section 3.3.6. We
will also prove that, given a choice of worker (h, y) to whom an offer is made,
there is going to be only one kind of firm y offering a defined value vy. In other
words, given (h, τ), vy is an injective function fv : Y → V, and any vacancy in
submarket (h, τ, vy) is actually offered by the same y kind of firm.
The search process is characterized by a constant return to scale, twice con-
tinuously differentiable matching function M(u, ν) for each submarket, where
the tightness of each submarket is as usual defined as θ = vν . Households job




p() : R+ → [0, 1] is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave function with p(0) = 0, lim p(θ)
θ→+∞
= 1 and p′(0) <∞, whereas
the vacancy-filling is q(θ(h, τ, vy; Ω)) =
M(u(h,τ,vy ;Ω),ν(h,τ,vy ;Ω))
ν(h,τ,vy ;Ω)
, where q() :
R+ → [0,+∞] is twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing and
strictly convex, with q(0) = 1, lim q(θ)
θ→+∞
= 0 and q′(0) < 0. We have that
q(θ) = p(θ)/θ, and p(q−1(·)) is concave.
Upon match, workers produce next period according to a production function
f(a, h, y) : A × H × Y → R+, increasing and concave in both arguments.
The compensation of the worker depends on workers’ and firms’ kinds, and is
defined by means of dynamic contracts through which firms deliver a promised
utility. Contracts are going to be described in Section 3.3.5.
Matches are destroyed at an exogenous rate λ each period. Moreover, firms
are subject to limited liability and matches separate endogenously either if the
worker is poached by another firm (quit) or if the value of the match for the
firm becomes negative (fires).10 Workers are always allowed to search while
unemployed and search while employed with probability λe. Notice that the
timing of each period implies that newly separated workers can immediately
search in the same period.
9As in Menzio and Shi [2010], given a menu of offers from any firm, workers are able
to search in any submarket will separate by type in equilibrium, and any given type (h, τ)
visits a particular market. For this reason submarkets can then be represented directly by
(h, τ, v).
10Notice that separations happen in two waves during the same period. Fires and exoge-
nous separations happen before the worker’s search (at the end of previous period), whereas
quits happen afterwards.
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3.3.3 Informational and contractual structure
A contract defines a transfer of utility from the risk neutral firm to the risk
averse worker with the match for all future possible histories of shocks. Given
a match formed at a generic hiring time t0, the state of the match is defined
by st0 = (ht0 , τt0 , a
t0 , µt0) ∈ S = H × T × Ωt0 , that is the worker skill, age
and the history of aggregate productivity shocks and workers’ distributions
across employment states and submarkets (specifically, the specific worker’s
history of employment). We define st0+(T−τt0 ) as the history of realizations
between t0, the time of hiring of the worker, and t0 + (T − τt0), the time of
maximum duration of the match with the worker before retirement (τt0 is the
age at which the worker is hired and T is the retirement age).
The workers’ history and the history of productivity are common knowledge,
and histories are fully contractible. In this sense, the contract is fully state-
contingent. Nevertheless, markets are incomplete as we assume that workers’
actions are private knowledge in the search stage and firms are thus unable to
counter outside offers. The contract offered by the firm can thus be defined
as:
C := (w, ζ) with w := {wt(sτt−τt0+t0)}t0+(T−τt0 )t=t0 , and ζ := {vt(s
τt−τt0+t0)}t0+(T−τt0 )t=t0
(3.1)
According to the contract the firm promises a series of state-contingent wages,
to which the worker replies by enacting its own state-contingent search strat-
egy, defined by the series of vt sought at each node of the history.
11 As
in Lamadon [2016], ζ is the action suggested by the contract, which in our
analysis is bound to be incentive compatible for the worker. The contract is
otherwise fully flexible in the degree to which the firm can determine wage
levels and adjustment paths over the match histories.
3.3.4 Worker problems
Given the fact that the relationship of workers and firms is going to be char-
acterized by a recursive contract with forward looking constraints, the state
space of the problem needs to include the current utility promised to employed
workers (or the current utility of unemployed agents), as in Spear and Srivas-
11Similarly to Menzio and Shi [2010], Tsuyuhara [2016], Lamadon [2016], and in order
to guarantee, at least for the general proofs, that the problem is well behaved and the firm
profit function is concave, the contract will require a randomization, a two-point lottery,
which specifies probabilities over the actions prescribed.
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tava [1987]. Job seekers, comprised of both unemployed agents and a share λe
of incumbents, face similar search problems. Given a generic current lifetime
utility V , any job seeker characterized by human capital h and age τ has to
decide in which submarket to direct the search. Submarkets are indexed by
the posted offered utility vy. As it will be proved in Section 3.3.6, the choice
over v will also indirectly determine which kind of firm y the worker matches
with, and thus the human capital accumulation path. For now, assume that
this mapping exists, and thus that, given (h, τ), the function vy(y) is an injec-
tive function fv : Y → V such that any value v ends up being offered to the
same kind of worker (h, τ) by one specific y firm only. This means that, even
if workers only care about offered life-time utilities v, their choices determine
which firm quality y they can match with and the human capital accumulation
that concurs to deliver the promised utility v itself.
A worker characterized by (h, τ) who got the opportunity to search enters the
search stage with lifetime utility V + max{0, R(h, τ, V ; Ω}, where the second
component of the expression embeds the option value of the search, and R is
the search value function. R is defined as:
R(h, τ, V ; Ω) = sup
{vy,Ω}
[
p(θ(h, τ, vy,Ω; Ω))
[
vy,Ω − V ]
]
(3.2)
We denote the solution of the search problem as v∗y = v
∗(h, τ, V ; Ω), and
p∗(h, τ, v∗y,Ω; Ω) = p(θ(h, τ, v
∗
y,Ω; Ω)) as the associated optimal job-finding prob-
ability. Notice that, given the timing of the choices outlined in Figure 3.1, a
job seeker can devise search strategies that are contingent on the state in which
the search actually takes place.
The lifetime utility of an unemployed worker at the beginning of the production
stage can be define as
U(h, τ ; Ω) = u(b(h, τ)) + βEΩ
(
U(h, τ + 1; Ω′)
+ max{0, R(h, τ + 1, U(h, τ + 1; Ω′); Ω′)}
)
(3.3)
where b(h, τ) is a (possibly) skill and age dependent unemployment benefit.
Given finite workers’ lives, U(h, τ ; Ω) = 0 ∀(h, τ ; Ω) ∈ H× T ×A×M where
τ > T .
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The corresponding lifetime utility of an employed worker with current promised
utility Vy,Ω at the beginning of the production stage can be expressed as:
Vy,Ω = u(wy) + βEΩ
(
λU(g(h, y), τ + 1; Ω′) + (1− λ)
[
Vy,Ω′
+ λe max{0, R(g(h, y), τ + 1, Vy,Ω′ ; Ω′)}
])
(3.4)
where wy is the currently promised wage and Vy,Ω′ is next period’s state-
contingent promised lifetime utility of remaining in the current firm, which be-
comes the ”outside option” in the search problem. Notice that in the worker’s
problem there is nothing specific to firm quality y per se. The worker targets
its search towards a desired level of promised utility, which we are going to
show is going to be offered by one kind of y firm only in equilibrium. For this
reason, we can index wages and utilities by y (and the aggregate state Ω, given
the state-contingency of promises). The promised utilities V are an equilib-
rium object themselves, as they are the outcome of the firm optimization of
the dynamic contract.
By means of their search strategy workers indirectly have an impact on their
current contract too, as firms internalize workers’ strategies in their optimiza-
tion, and post wages and utility offers to maximize profits and thus retention.
In fact, a worker quit drives profits to zero, independently of their previous
level. Workers future promised utility incorporates both higher wages and
higher option values of search, also through the human capital accumulation
dynamics defined by g(h, y).
The policy functions are uniquely defined, and allow to identify y uniquely
as long as there exists a injective mapping between the offered utility v and
y given {h, τ,Ω}, which we assume for now and prove given the structure of
contracts in Section 3.3.6. Proofs for the uniqueness of the policy functions
and the optimal policy are provided in Appendix 3.A.
The solution of employed workers’ on-the-job search problem implicitly de-
fines two “policy” functions, which incorporate workers’ incentive compatibil-
ity which firms internalize in their optimization.
Definition 3.3.1 (Optimal retention probability and utility return). The so-
lution of the worker’s problem defines a retention function p̃ : H×T ×V×Ω→
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[(1− λ)(1− λe), 1− λ] and a utility return r̃ : H× T × V × Ω→ V:
p̃(h, τ, Vy,Ω; Ω) ≡ (1− λ)(1− λep∗(h, τ, v∗y,Ω; Ω)) (3.5)
r̃(h, τ, Vy,Ω; Ω) ≡ λU(h, τ ; Ω) + (1− λ)
[
Vy,Ω + λe max{0, R(h, τ, Vy,Ω; Ω)}
]
(3.6)
The two functions r̃ and p̃ incorporate the optimal behavior of the worker,
and thus its incentive-compatible best replies when evaluating offers by firms.
These functions are what the firms internalize while setting the optimal con-
tract.
3.3.5 Contract
The contract is structured in such a way that the firm is subject to limited
liability but commits to the delivery of a utility value to the worker, who on
the other does not have to commit. Specifically, this means the worker is able
to search at any period, and the firm is not able to counteract with another
offer when its employee matches with another firm. The sequence of stories st
is common knowledge and, while the firm cannot observe any of the actions
of its workers, it has enough information to incorporate the worker’s optimal
policy decision.
Our choice of timing of exit decision is such that exiting firms know from the
start of the period whether the productivity level is below the critical one a∗ for
the match (h, τ, y,Wy), and thus whether they will exit or not. In particular,
given the current state, we can define the following indicator function:
Definition 3.3.2 (Exit policy). Incumbent firms make their exit decisions
before the realization of aggregate productivity. The following indicator takes
value one if the firm does not decide to exit in the following period:
ηt+1 =
 1 if a ≥ max{0, a∗}0 otherwise
with the productivity threshold defined as
a∗(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω) : EΩ[Jt+1(h
′, τ + 1, y,Wy,Ω′ ; a
′, µ′)|h, τ, y,Wy,Ω, a, µ] = 0.
(3.7)
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Given ηt+1 = 1, the value function of a continuing incumbent in state (h, τ,Wy,Ω; Ω)
can be rewritten recursively using the promised utilities to the workers as ad-
ditional state variables as:







f(y, h; Ω)− wi
+EΩ
[
p̃(g(h, y), τ + 1,Wiy,Ω′ ; Ω




s.t. Wy,Ω = EΩ
(





πi = 1 (3.10)
where equation (3.9) is the promise keeping constraint ensuring that the cur-
rent value of the contract is indeed based on the current wage and future
utility promises with r̃t() implicitly including the incentive constraint of the
worker.
In this kind of contracts, the firm (principal) optimizes over its possible of-
fers taking into account the utility of the worker (agent) and its incentive-
compatible best replies. The resulting equilibrium is a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the kind identified in leader-follower sequential games, as in
Von Stackelberg [1934]. The problem also resembles a Ramsey optimal pol-
icy problem, in that the principal in our case is akin to a policy-maker who
maximizes aggregate utility according to some Pareto weights, taking into
account optimization on the part of the agents in the economy (worker-firm
match).
3.3.6 Vacancy opening and free entry
The economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Each
entrepreneur can invest to reach the desired level of firm quality y. The start-
up costs of the firm are priced in terms of the consumption good and they
consist of the posting a vacancy in the frictional labor market.
The cost of each vacancy is proportional to the quality of the firm being
created, hence in order to post a vacancy for the creation of a firm with
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quality y the entrepreneur is forced to pay c(y) in terms of the consumption
good.
Thus, each entrepreneur at a generic time t, chooses in which submarket to
post the vacancy selecting a lottery over the offered utility Wy, which maps
into the set of firms’ qualities y ∈ Y, and worker characteristics (h, τ) ∈
H × T .
As the entrepreneur chooses the submarket in which to open a vacancy, he faces
the following problem internalizing the optimal contract dynamics:
Πt(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω) = sup
y,h,τ,Wy,Ω
− c(y) + q(θ(h, τ,Wy; Ω))β[Jt(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω)]
(3.11)
and, given perfect competition, free entry and the possibility for all entrepreneur
to choose any possible firm kind y the profits from opening a vacancy should
be driven down to 0 in submarkets which actually open:
Πt(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω) ≤ 0 for ∀{h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω} ∈ {Y × V × S} (3.12)
Assuming that q(·) is invertible, it delivers the equilibrium definition of marker
tightness in each submarket:








Recursive Equilibrium. Let Θ = A×M×H×T . A recursive equilibrium
in this economy consists of a market tightness θ : Θ×V → R+, a search value
function R : Θ × V → R, a search policy function v∗ : Θ × V → V, an
unemployment value functions U : Θ → R, a series of firm value functions,
{Jt}Tt=1 : S×V×Y → R, a series of contract policy functions {ct}Tt=1 : S×V×
Y → C, a mapping between firm qualities and promised utilities fv : Y → V,
an exit threshold for aggregate productivity a∗ : S × V ×Y → A and a law of
motion for the aggregate state of the economy ΦΩ,a′ : A×M→ A×M such
that:
1. given the mapping fv, market tightness satisfies equation (3.13)
2. the unemployment value functions solves equation (3.3)
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3. the search value function solves the search problem in equation (3.2) and
v∗ is the associated policy function
4. the series of firm value functions and the associated contract policy func-
tions are a solution to equation (3.8) for each t ≤ T
5. the exit threshold satisfies equation (3.7)
6. the law of motion for the aggregate state of the economy respects the
search and contract policy functions and the exogenous process of ag-
gregate productivity
Definition 3.3.3 (Block Recursive Equilibrium). A block recursive equilib-
rium is a recursive equilibrium such that the value and policy functions de-
pend on the aggregate state only through aggregate productivity, a ∈ A and not
through the distribution of agents across states µ ∈M.
We provide a proof for the existence of a BRE equilibrium in Appendix 3.D.
3.4 Discussion
In this section we briefly discuss the properties of the equilibrium of the model
economy developed in the previous sections. All propositions and correspond-
ing proofs are reported in Appendix 3.A and 3.B.
3.4.1 Workers optimal behavior
In the following proposition we summarize the main results regarding the
behavior of the workers and their objective functions.
Proposition 3.4.1. Given the worker search problem, the following properties
hold:




, are strictly concave
with respect to promised utility, vy,Ω.
(ii) The optimal search strategy
v∗(h, τ, V ; Ω) ∈ arg max
vy
{




is unique and weakly increasing in V .
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(iii) For all promised utilities, the search gain R(h, τ, V ; Ω) is positive, weakly
decreasing in V .
(iv) The survival probability of the match, given the optimal choice of the
worker, is increasing in the value of promised utilities, so p̃t(h, τ,Wy,Ω; Ω)
is increasing in Wy,Ω.
Proof. See Proposition 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A.
The first statement implies that the marginal returns of searching towards
better firms are decreasing. The intuition is that as workers search for work
at better firms, their job-finding probability decreases as better employment
prospects are also subject to higher competition.
As a consequence of the strict concavity established in the first statement, we
can say that the optimal search strategy of each worker is increasing in the
value of life-time utilities granted by the current contract. The intuition is
that, as the search stage happens after the realization of the aggregate state
and workers only care about the posted utility offers, given their type (h, τ),
workers have a unique preferred option among utility offers.
The third statement follows from the fact that returns to search are decreasing
and the set of utility promises is compact. The intuition is that employees
at firms that promise an higher value of future utilities don’t have a lot of
incentives to search. To clarify this, imagine an individual working under a
contract that guarantees her the best possible utility: there is no point in
searching elsewhere as no other firms could match her current option. This
leads directly to the finding that when firms offer better prospects to their
workers, workers also have fewer incentives to leave. This guarantees a longer
expected duration of the match, and generates retention probabilities that are
increasing in promised utilities.
As human capital accumulation is tightly linked to the quality of the employer,
workers that are able to start their working careers in good times have a higher
chance of finding themselves on an higher path of human capital growth. As
worker careers are limited and human capital accumulation follows a slow-
moving process, business cycle effects are hard to fade and the quality of
initial matches bears a long-standing effect on workers careers.
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3.4.2 Characteristics of the optimal contract
The contracting problem between the worker and the firms allows us to analyze
directly the trade-offs between the insurance provision and the optimal search
behavior of the workers. The following proposition allows us to characterize
the various incentives along the business cycle.
Proposition 3.4.2. The Pareto frontier J(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; a, µ) is increasing in
the aggregate productivity shock a, while retention probabilities, p̃(h, τ,Wy,Ω; a, µ)
decrease in aggregate productivity.
Proof. See Proposition 3.B.1 in Appendix 3.B.
The intuition behind this proposition relies on the observation that higher
productivity realization are associated not only with better outcomes on im-
pact but also to better future prospects due to the monotonically increasing
Markov process of productivity. In addition, the model allows us to char-
acterize the optimal behavior of the workers along the business cycle. The
following proposition summarizes how the search strategy changes depending
on the realization of aggregate productivity.
Corollary 3.4.1. The optimal search strategy of the workers is increasing in
aggregate productivity.
Proof. The claim follows directly from the fact that retention probabilities at
the Pareto frontier, p̃, are decreasing in a as discussed in Proposition 3.4.2.
As discussed more in detail in Proposition 3.4.2, positive shocks to aggregate
productivity will induce workers to search in submarkets that offer higher
life-time utilities as firms optimally react to the positive shock increasing the
number of vacancies posted. As firm promises and firm-qualities are linked
by a one-to-one mapping, as discussed in Proposition 3.4.4, in booms workers
manage to get matched with better firms.12
The combination of these two effects implies that, as firms became more pro-
ductive, they are willing to post more vacancies in each submarket to increase
the prospect of hiring in good times incorporating the higher benefits due to to
12In our model a better firm is an higher quality firm. We do not specifically model the
determinant of quality heterogeneity but we take the existence of profound differences in firm
quality as a reduced form meant to capture differences in management styles, organizational
capital, technology, product qualities, availability of training programs and other firm level
characteristics that can affect workers human capital accumulation.
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the improvement in future prospects of aggregate productivity. The resulting
higher tightness impacts workers’ optimal search behavior as the job finding
probability increases in all submarkets. As a consequence, workers respond
optimally to the productivity increase searching in submarkets that guarantee
higher life-time utility promises. Notice that as submarkets that guarantee
higher lifetime utility are also populated by firms of better quality, see Propo-
sition 3.4.4, this results shows how, in this framework, aggregate fluctuations
modify workers’ search incentives.
Firms are willing to commit to higher utility promises as the optimal contract
guarantees that the provision of insurance ensures wage paths that can only
partially follow productivity realizations. The following propositions provide a
clear picture of the wage growth path prescribed by the optimal contract for a
continuing firm. First, let us define the productivity threshold that determines
whether a worker-firm match does not survive.
Corollary 3.4.2. There exists a productivity threshold a∗(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω) below
which firms will not continue the contract.
The intuition of why this has to be the case is linked to the fact that the
Pareto frontier is strictly increasing in a and decreasing in the level of promised
utilities to the worker. Hence, once the aggregate state realizes, a firm is able
to perfectly predict whether next period it will exit the market or stay in.13
The choice is taken before new realizations of productivity, so the firm might
for one period at most end up staying but make negative profits.
Proposition 3.4.3. For each state in which the firm is willing to continue the
contract, the optimal contract delivers a wage path that follows firms profits











with Θ ≡ (g(h, y), τ + 1,Wiy,Ω′ ; Ω′) being the definition of the relevant state
and wi,Ω′ is the wage paid in the future state.
Proof. See Proposition 3.B.4 in Appendix 3.B.
13Notice that. given the timing, the decision is based on expected profits, and is thus not
state-contingent to next period’s productivity
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The optimal contract links the wage growth to the realization of firms profits.
The right hand side of equation (3.14) shows that, in providing insurance to the
worker, the firm links wage growth to profits and to the incentive to maximize
retention, incorporated in ∂ log p̃∂Wy . As the production stage happens after exit
choices are taken by the incumbent firms, the wage growth related to the con-
tinuation value of the contract is bound to be (weakly) positive, hence workers
enjoy an non-decreasing wage profile under the optimal contract.14
A feature that the optimal contract derived in our model shares with the lit-
erature on long-term contracts with lack of commitment on the worker side is
the backloading of wages. Workers in our model make search decisions that
are going to affect the survival probability of the match. However, in doing
so they do not appropriate the full future value of the match when making
these decisions (unless the firm makes zero profits). This makes it optimal
for the firm to front-load profits and back-load wages, as already among oth-
ers noted by Tsuyuhara [2016], and Lamadon [2016]. The reason is that the
firm provides insurance and income smoothing to the worker, but given its risk
neutrality it prefers to front-load its profits and provide an increasing compen-
sation path to maximize retention. The contract thus optimally balances the
consumption smoothing motives (i.e. the insurance provision of the contract)
with the commitment problem of the worker.
Notice that the wage Euler equation derived in equation (3.14) implicitly also
pins down why, under the optimal contract, wages are downward rigid. To
see this, consider that as firms have limited liability but commit to honor the
contract as long as its value is weakly positive and that retention probabilities
are increasing in promised utilities, i.e. ∂p̃(Θ)∂Wiy,Ω′
≥ 0, Jt+1(Θ)p̃(Θ) ≥ 0, then the
left-hand side of (3.14) is always weakly positive. This implies that the future
wage prescribed by the optimal contract cannot be smaller than the current
one, in order for the difference in the marginal utilities on the right-hand
side of (3.14) to be positive.15 The downward rigidity of wages, therefore,
is a direct consequence of the incentive structure embedded in the optimal
contract.
14As the exit decision takes place by considering expected profits next period, a firm might
continue operating low but positive expected profits and end up, at most for a period, to have
a negative continuation value. This would imply that wage growth can be negative before
a firm’s closure, which is actually a common finding in empirical studies (firstly observed in
Ashenfelter [1978]).
15This last step follows from concavity of the utility function.
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The next proposition, instead, confirms our initial conjecture that in equi-
librium firm qualities and utility promises are related to a one-to-one map-
ping.
Proposition 3.4.4. The mapping defined by the function fv : Y → V is an
injective function for each worker characteristic (h, τ).
Proof. See Proposition 3.B.2 in Appendix 3.B.
The intuition for this result is better expressed graphically in Figure 3.2. The
figure shows the optimal choice of an entrepreneur that ex-ante has to choose
whether to enter posting a utility promise W . Out of the equilibrium path,
for a given θ, the optimal choice for the entrepreneur would be to pick the
firm quality that guarantees the highest possible return to open a vacancy.
Under free entry, however, the possibility of making positive profits however,
attracts additional potential entrants. The increase in vacancy posting in the
submarket drives the tightness up, lowering the ex-ante return to opening a
vacancy to zero. As the firm value function is concave in y, in equilibrium, only
one type of firm would be able to fend off the competition and remain active
in the submarket. Finally, we provide the alternative recursive formulation for
the contracting problem described in the paper. The saddle-point functional
equation that can be, alternatively used, to define the recursive contract in
equation (3.8) is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4.5. The solution to the contracting problem in equation (3.8)
is the same as the solution to the following saddle-point functional equation:




(f(at, yt, ht)− wt) + µ1tWy,t − γ1t (Wy,t − u(wt))+
βEt(λUt+1 + (1− λ)λept+1v∗t+1) + βEtp̃t+1Pt+1(ht+1, τt+1, yt+1, at+1, γt+1)
with µt = γt1 for some starting γ0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.C for the details of the derivation of the SPFE following
Marcet and Marimon [2019].
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Note: The figure shows the intuition behind the proof of Proposition 3.4.4. Given
(h, τ,Wy,Ω), an entrepreneur, ex-ante, will ideally select the firm quality that guarantees
the maximum possible profits. Free entry in vacancy posting, however, guarantees that, as
long as positive profits are available in the submarket, entrepreneurs will continue posting
vacancies driving down the vacancy filling probability, q(θ), and lowering the expected value
of a match, progressively pushing firms out. In equilibrium, only entrepreneurs with one
firm quality, in the figure’s example y1, will find it profitable to remain in the market.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a rich model of on-the-job search and human capital
accumulation that features heterogeneity both on the worker and on the firm
side.
In the model, ex-ante heterogeneous workers accumulate on-the-job experience
which augments their skills and helps them climb the job ladder. Search
frictions in the labor market and the presence of aggregate uncertainty prevent
an efficient allocation of workers to firms and expose different cohort of workers
to different human capital accumulation paths depending on the aggregate
state at the time of entry in the labor force. As workers’ lives are finite,
investment in human capital early in workers lives are more valuable and
initial losses on this front are difficult to recoup as they worsen future labor
market prospects, amplifying the effects of transitory aggregate fluctuations
and affecting the aggregate behavior of the economy.
In addition, we explicitly model workers-firms relationships by constructing a
contractual framework that endogenously accounts for the different incentives
between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs. We characterize
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how insurance incentives are of paramount importance in shaping the response
to business cycles of the labor market, the efficiency of workers-firms matches
and the overall dynamic of human capital accumulation. Moreover, we show
how, even in absence of institutional frictions, optimal contracts can endoge-
nously generate rigidities in compensation. The intuition relies on the fact
that employment relationships are subject to a one-sided limited commitment
problem, where the firm can commit to a state-contingent wage path as long
the value of the employment relationship is weakly positive, whereby work-
ers can constantly search in the job for better matches. This framework is
regulated by a dynamic contract that endogenously determines the optimal
provision of insurance to workers. Within this framework, downward wage
rigidity emerges as the optimal contract prescribes the firm to pay the worker
a (almost) never decreasing compensation path.
The incentives underlying the optimal contract affect also workers behavior.
In particular, we show that aggregate fluctuations have the ability to influence
workers search decisions. We establish that workers that look for employment
in bad economic times direct their search towards less productive firms, this
limits their ability to accumulate human capital and imposes a drag on the
overall labor productivity of the economy that persists as long as these cohorts
of workers are active in the labor force.
Finally, we show that it is possible to represent the contracting problem be-
tween workers and firms using both the promised utilities framework and the
more computationally feasible Lagrangean approach of Marcet and Marimon
[2019]. For future research, we plan to leverage the computational feasibility
of this framework and bring the model developed in this chapter to the data
to structurally quantify the effects of aggregate fluctuations on worker-firm
matches, their consequences for human capital accumulation, workers careers




3.A Properties of worker optimal behavior
The following propositions characterize the properties of workers’ optimal
search strategies that solve the search problem in (3.2), restated here for con-
venience:
R(h, τ, V ; Ω) = sup
{vy,Ω}
[
p(θ(h, τ, vy,Ω; Ω))
[
vy,Ω − V ]
]]
. (3.A.1)
Lemma 3.A.1. The composite function p(θ(h, τ, v; Ω)) is strictly decreasing
and strictly concave in v.
Proof. For this proof we follow closely Menzio and Shi [2010], Lemma 4.1 (ii).
From the properties of the matching function we know that p(θ) is increasing
and concave in θ, while q(θ) is decreasing and convex. Consider that the
equilibrium definition of θ(·) is
θ(h, τ, v; Ω) = q−1
(
c(y)
βJ(h, τ, y, v; Ω)
)
,
and that the first order condition for the wage and the envelope condition on
V of the optimal contract problem in (3.8) implies





so that as u′(·) > 0, J(·) is decreasing in v.
From the equilibrium definition of θ(·) and noting that q−1(·) is also decreasing
due to the properties of the matching function we have that















β(J(h, τ, y, v; Ω))2
< 0,
which, in turn, implies that







· ∂θ(h, τ, v; Ω)
∂v
< 0.
Suppressing dependence on the states (h, τ, y,Ω) for readability, to prove that
p(θ(v)) is concave, consider that J(v) is concave16 and a generic function cv is
16J() concave give the two-point lottery in the structure of the contract. See Menzio and
Shi [2010] Lemma F.1.
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strictly convex in v. This implies that with α ∈ [0, 1] and v1, v2 ∈ V:
c
J(αv1 + (1− α)v2)
≤ c




+ (1− α) c
J(v2)
.






























and as θ(v) = q−1( cJ(v)):
p(θ(αv1 + (1− α)v2)) > αp(θ(v1)) + (1− α)p(θ(v2))
so that p(θ()) is strictly concave in v.
Proposition 3.A.1. Given the worker search problem, the following proper-
ties hold:




, are strictly concave
with respect to promised utility, vy,Ω.
(ii) The optimal search strategy
v∗(h, τ, V ; Ω) ∈ arg max
vy
{




is unique and weakly increasing (and Lipschitz continuous) in V .
(iii) For all promised utilities, the search gain R(h, τ, V ; Ω) is positive, weakly
decreasing in V .
(iv) The survival probability of the match, given the optimal choice of the
worker, is increasing in the value of promised utilities, so p̃t(h, τ,Wy,Ω; Ω)
is increasing (and Lipschitz continuous) in Wy,Ω.
Proof. The proofs follow closely Shi [2009], Lemma 3.1 and Menzio and Shi
[2010], Lemma 4.4. More formally, for each triplet (h, τ,Ω) given at each
search stage, we can re-define the search objective function as K(v, V ) =
p(θ(v))(v − V ) and v∗(V ) ∈ arg maxvK(v, V ) as the function that maximises
the search returns (i.e. the optimal search strategy of the worker) and prove
the following
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(i) To show that K(v, V ) is strictly concave in v consider two values for v,
(v1, v2) such that v2 > v1 and define vα = αv1 + (1− α)v2 for α ∈ [0, 1].
Then by definition:
K(vα, V ) = p(θ(vα))(vα − V )
≥ [αp(θ(v1)) + (1− α)p(θ(v2))][α(v1 − V ) + (1− α)(v2 − V )]
= αK(v1, V ) + (1− α)K(v2, V ) + α(1− α)[(p(θ(v1))− p(θ(v2))](v2 − v1)
> αK(v1, V ) + (1− α)K(v2, V )
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of p(θ(·)) (this is
true if J() concave with respect to V ) and the second inequality stems
from the fact that p(θ(·)) is strictly decreasing hence α(1−α)[(p(θ(v1))−
p(θ(v2))](v2 − v1) > 0.
(ii) Given that v ∈ [v, v], and submarkets are going to open depending on
realizations of the aggregate productivity, a, there is only one region in
the set of promised utilities where the search gain is positive, conditional
on being in a job that pays lifetime utility V . That is [V, v(a)] with v(a)
being the highest possible offer that a firm makes in the submarket for
the worker (h, τ). As any submarket that promises higher than v(a) is
going to have zero tightness, the optimal search strategy for V ≥ v(a)
is v∗(V ) = V . For V ∈ [V, v(a)], instead, as K(v, V ) is bounded and
continuous, the solution v∗(V ) has to be internal and therefore respect
the following first order condition
V = v∗(V ) +
p(θ(v∗(V )))
p′(θ(v∗(V )) · θ′(v∗(V )) . (3.A.2)
Now consider two arbitrary values V1 and V2, V1 < V2 < v and their
associated solutions Wi = v
∗(Vi) for i = 1, 2.
Then, V1 and V2 have to generate two different values for the right-hand
side of (3.A.2). Hence, v∗(V1) ∩ v∗(V2) = ∅ when V1 6= V2. This also
implies that the search gain evaluated at the optimal search strategy is
higher than the gain at any other arbitrary strategy so that K(Wi, Vi) >
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K(Wj , Vi) for i 6= j. This implies that
0 >[K(W2, V1)−K(W1, V1)] + [K(W1, V2)−K(W2, V2)]
= (p(θ(W2))− p(θ(W1)))(V2 − V1).
Thus, p(θ(W2)) < p(θ(W1))) and as p(θ(·)) is strictly decreasing (Corol-
lary 3.A.1) v∗(V1) < v
∗(V2). Uniqueness follows directly from strict
concavity shown in (i). Lipschitz continuity still to show but coming
from assumption of J() being bi-Lipschitz continuous and θ(), p() being
bounded functions.
(iii) The Bellman equation for the search problem is:
R(h, τ, V ; Ω) = sup
{vy,Ω}
[




hence a simple envelope argument shows that
∂R(h, τ, V ; Ω)
∂V
= −p(θ(h, τ, vy; Ω)) ≤ 0,
as the job finding probability is weakly positive for all utility promises.
As p(θ(·)) ≥ 0, v∗(·) ∈ [v, v] then R(·) ≥ 0.
(iv) Given the optimal search strategy, v∗(h, τ, V ; Ω), we can define the sur-
vival probability of the match as in (3.5):
p̃(h, τ, Vy,Ω; Ω) ≡ (1− λ)(1− λep(θ(h, τ, v∗y,Ω; Ω))).















because p(·) and v∗(·) are both increasing functions while θ(·) is a de-
creasing function in promised utilities.
3.B Properties of the optimal contract
Lemma 3.B.1. The Pareto frontier J(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω) is concave in Wy,Ω.
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Proof. This is a direct consequence of using a two-point lottery for {wi,Wiy,Ω′}
as shown by Menzio and Shi [2010], Lemma F.1.
Lemma 3.B.2. The Pareto frontier J(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω) is increasing in y.
Proof. The intuition for this proof follows the fact that a higher y firm, once
the match exists, can always deliver a certain promise V and have resources
left over. Within a dynamic contract, future retention is already optimized
as the match is formed. This means that the promise V can be delivered
by the greater capacity on the part of producing with respect to a close y
firm. In presence of human capital accumulation, the worker is compensated
through greater option values in the future, which again means that, even
with lower retention, the firm cashes in more profits while decreasing wages
(and respecting the V promise). The reason why one does not have to worry
about, for instance, variation in retention is that we are evaluating changes
in y given the optimal contract, and given that by definition J is maximized,
any indirect derivative of controls over y will get to their respective first order
conditions and thus have no direct impact on the comparative static.
One can get to the same conclusion by starting from time T , noticing that
the function J is trivially increasing in y in the last period, and the stepping
back. At T − 1, given V , any higher y function can make greater profits with
the same delivery of value V , given the contract’s optimal promise, which is a
fortiori true with human capital accumulation (the option value is greater, so
the firm can decrease w as a response).
Proposition 3.B.1. The Pareto frontier J(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; a, µ) is strictly in-
creasing in the aggregate productivity shock a, while retention probabilities,
p̃(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω) decrease in aggregate productivity.
Proof. For a generic period t, a firm matched to a worker in submarket {h, T−
1, y,Wy,Ω} will face the following Pareto frontier
Jt(h, T − 1, y,Wy,Ω;a, µ) = sup
wi,{Wiy,Ω′}
(
f(y, h; Ω)− w
+EΩ
[
p̃(h′, τ + 1,Wy,Ω′ ; a
′, µ′)(f(y, h; a′)− w′)
] )
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The fact that period flows are increasing in a is immediate and follows from the
properties of contracts with one-sided lack of commitment, as in Thomas and
Worral [1988], Kocherlakota [1996] or Krueger and Uhlig [2006]. At the same
time, following the logic of Lemma 3.B.2, the envelope condition on controls
guarantees that one does not have to worry about the variation in optimal
retention. This proves that J is increasing in a.












where the sign of the second derivative on the right hand side comes from the
free entry condition and the properties of vacancy filling probability function
q(·). Given this, it has to be that ∂p(θ)∂a and
∂J(·)
∂a have the same sign in
equilibrium. This immediately implies that ∂p̃∂a < 0 according to the optimal
contract.
Corollary 3.B.1. There exists a productivity threshold a∗(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω) below
which firms will not continue the contract.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Proposition 3.B.1 and the timing
of the shock. Given the timing of the shock, exit is fully determined by the
current productivity shock and incumbent firms know in advance whether they
are willing to produce in the next period.
Therefore, as the Pareto frontier is strictly increasing in a, firms are willing to
continue the contract if EΩ[Jt+1(h′, τ+1, y,Wy,Ω′ ; a′, µ′)|h, τ, y,Wy,Ω, a, µ] ≥ 0,
so that the threshold that determines exit is
a∗(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω) : EΩ[Jt+1(h
′, τ + 1, y,Wy,Ω′ ; a
′, µ′)|h, τ, y,Wy,Ω, a, µ] = 0.
Corollary 3.B.2. The productivity threshold a∗(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω) below which
firm y in match with worker (h, τ) and given promised utility Wy,Ω in the
aggregate state Ω is decreasing in y.
Proof. Consider two firms characterized by y1, y2 with y1 < y2. Consider
the threshold for firm y1, a
∗
1 = a
∗(h, τ, y1,Wy,Ω). Firm y1 makes 0 profits if
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state a∗1 materializes next period. Consider firm y2 trying to mimic the current
contract offered by y1 to (h, τ). We know that J is increasing in y from Lemma
3.B.2, which implies that the firm is making a profit at a∗1. This completes the
proof.
Lemma 3.B.3. The Pareto frontier J(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω) is strictly concave in
y.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that the flow component of the profit
function is always a concave function in y.
More formally, start from the last period T . The concavity is trivially given by
the concavity of f . Now moving backwards to the problem at τ = T − 1, one
can still consider the behavior of J given a promise Wy,Ω. Again, given the
option to search, the flow value is concave in y, retention probability is constant
in Wy,Ω, and the continuation value is a concave function. By induction, the
statement holds for J at all τ ∈ [0, T ].
Corollary 3.B.3. As Jt(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω) is concave, the tangent line at a
generic y0 ∈ Y is above the graph of Jt(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω) so that
Jt(h, τ, y0,Wy,Ω; Ω) +




(y − y0) ≥ Jt(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω).
Proof. Dropping dependence on (h, τ,Wy,Ω; Ω), consider two values for firm
quality y0 < y1 both in Y. Then, as Jt(·) is concave in y, taking α ∈ [0, 1] the
following inequalities are true:
J(αy0 + (1− α)y1) ≥ αJ(y0) + (1− α)J(y1)
⇒J(αy0 + (1− α)y1)− J(y0) ≥ (1− α)(J(y1)− J(y0))
⇒J(αy0 + (1− α)y1)− J(y0)




where the third inequality comes from noting that y1 > y0 and αy0 + (1 −
α)y1 − y0 = (1− α)(y1 − y0).









(y1 − y0) ≥ J(y1). (3.B.1)
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again the left hand side and the right hand side for (y1 − y0) < 0 still delivers
(3.B.1).
Proposition 3.B.2. Define the mapping between promised values and firm
installed capital by the function fv : Y → V. Then fv is an injective function
for each couple of worker characteristics (h, τ).
Proof. Note: throughout the proof we drop the dependence of the functions
to the state (h, τ,Ω) to ease readability.
If the function fv is an injective function then it defines a one-to-one mapping
between Y and V so that for (y1, y2) ∈ Y, and fv(y1) = W1 and fv(y2) = W2,
(W1,W2) ∈ V, fv(y1) = fv(y2)⇒ y1 = y2.17 We proceed by contradiction. To
begin, assume that fv(y1) = fv(y2) and y1 6= y2.
As the optimal contract is a concave function in firm quality, we know that
the tangents at each point are above the graph of the function. Thus, we can












Without loss of generality, consider the case in which y2 > y1. Knowing that
Ti(y) ≥ J(y) for i = 1, 2 due to the concavity of J(·), we can define the
following inequalities:
T1(y2)− J(y2) ≥ 0 and T2(y1)− J(y1) ≥ 0.



























However, the free-entry condition in vacancy posting implies that in the sub-
market (h, τ,W ) both firms must be respecting c(yi) = q(θ)βJ(yi) for i = 1, 2.
17As the contrapositive of Definition 2.2 in Rudin [1976], that defines a one-to-one map-
ping for (x1, x2) ∈ A as x1 6= x2 ⇒ f(x1) 6= f(x2).
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As c(yi) is a linear function of firm quality
∂c(yi)
∂yi
= c for i = 1, 2 and therefore






which is a contradiction of the slopes of the two tangents being decreasing as
shown in equation (3.B.2). Note that if c(y) is convex and twice differentiable,
then the derivatives of c(y) are increasing in y while the derivatives of J(·) are
decreasing leading again to a contradiction. The proof for the case in which
y1 > y2 follows the same arguments and leads to a similar contradiction on
the implied slopes of the optimal contract and those implied by the free entry
condition.
Lemma 3.B.4. Given a state (y, h, τ,Wy,Ω) the optimal contract implies that





so that promised utilities and wages move in the same direction.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the envelope theorem and the concavity
of the utility function u(·), as discussed in the proof of Proposition 3.B.4.
Corollary 3.B.4. The Pareto frontier J(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω) is decreasing in promised
utilities Wy,Ω.
Proof. The envelope condition in Lemma 3.B.4 and note that u′() ≥ 0.
Proposition 3.B.3. Assume q(θ(h, τ,Wy,Ω; Ω)) is not too convex. Then util-
ity promises are unique and increasing in y, ∂W∂y > 0.
Proof. Uniqueness follows directly from the concavity of the composite func-
tion.
The increasing property follows from the maximization of the entrepreneur in
the free entry condition equation (3.12).
Assuming the same (h, τ, y), the entrepreneur has to choose which is the opti-
mal value Wy,Ω to deliver in the contract. We know it is unique by assuming
concavity of the composite function (which eventually amounts to assuming
that the functional form of q(θ(W ))) is not too convex in W .
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For the rest of the proof we consider as given the dependence of the func-
tions on (h, τ) and consider directly the composite function q(θ(W )) as q(W ).
The optimization involves a trade-off which respects the following first order
condition:
qWJ(y,W ) + q(W )JW = 0 (3.B.3)
For this to be a unique sup, the second order condition must be negative:
qWWJ + 2qWJW + qJWW < 0 (3.B.4)
where, as mentioned above, the only element which might lead to a violation
is qWW in case it is too convex (JWW < 0) by 3.B.1. Notice this hypothesis
amounts to assuming that q(θ(h, τ,Wy,Ω; Ω))J(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω) is concave.
By the implicit function theorem, the derivative of equation 3.B.3 is:
(qWWJ + 2qWJW + qJWW )Wy + qWJy + qJWy = 0 (3.B.5)
The first term in parenthesis is negative, as second order condition. The
second term is positive, given Lemma 3.B.2 and the fact that qW is positive.
The third term is 0, as the partial derivative of J in y does not contain V
(which is the reason why Lemma 3.B.2 trivially holds). This means that, in
order for the equality to be respected, Wy > 0.
Proposition 3.B.4. For each state in which the firm is willing to continue
the contract, the optimal contract delivers a wage path that follows firms profits











with Θ ≡ (g(h, y), τ + 1,Wiy,Ω′ ; Ω′) being the definition of the relevant state.
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Proof. Consider the firm problem in equation (3.8), restated here for conve-
nience






f(y, h; Ω)− wi
+EΩ
[
p̃(h′, τ + 1,Wiy,Ω′ ; Ω
′)Jt+1(h
′, τ + 1, y,Wi,Ω′ ; Ω
′)
] )












πi = 1, h
′ = g(h, y).
For i = 1, 2, the first order conditions with respect to the wage and the
promised utilities are:














Note that by definition,
r̃(h, τ, Vy,Ω; Ω) ≡ λU(h, τ ; Ω) + (1− λ)
[
Wy,Ω + λe max{0, R(h, τ, Vy,Ω; Ω)}
]
therefore we can use the envelope theorem as in Benveniste and Scheinkman
[1979], Theorem 1 and the definition in equation (3.5) to derive an expression




= p̃(h, τ,Wy,Ω; Ω).
Similarly, using the envelope condition on the firm problem and the first order
condition for the wage, we can establish that
∂Jt(h, τ, y,Wy,Ω; Ω))
∂Wy,Ω





Moving these two expressions one period ahead, substituting them in (3.B.7),












with Θ ≡ (g(h, y), τ + 1,Wy,Ω′ ; Ω′) and where wΩ′ is the wage next period in
state Ω′.
3.C Derivation of recursive contract SPFE
Solving the optimal contract and the overall model given the recursive struc-
ture obtained by following the promised utility method of Spear and Srivastava
[1987] is computationally infeasible. This is due to the fact that the optimal
contract requires to define a valid recursive domain and codomain of promised
values that respects all the future forward looking constraints. Known solution
methods for these kinds of models [Abreu et al., 1990], although robust, easily
become computationally unmanageable as the number of states of the model
increases. We thus follow Marcet and Marimon [2019] in deriving a recursive
expression for the optimal contract in which the Lagrange multiplier for the
promise keeping constraint equation 3.B.8 is added as a co-state of the model,
and allows us to circumvent the problem of searching for valid promised values
domains altogether.
The reason why the recursive contracts method in Marcet and Marimon [2019]
simplifies our problem is simple. As shown in equation 3.B.8, wage growth
and levels in any next period and at every node are determined by the state-
contingent multiplier on tomorrow’s promise keeping constraints. This con-
siderably reduces the complexity of the problem, as by definition Lagrange
multipliers are defined over R+.
We follow Marcet and Marimon [2019] (hereby MM) and their terminology
to define how a recursive saddle point functional equation (SPFE) can be
obtained from the sequential formulation of the problem. For the present ex-
position of the constructive method to obtain the SPFE, for simplicity and
without loos of generality, we ignore the randomization of the contract over
the lotteries and the limited liability constraint. The latter choice, in partic-
ular, does not create any problem in terms of thinking about of developing
the sequential problem over time: our choice of timing of exit decision is such
as that exiting firms know form the start of their period whether the produc-
tivity level is below the critical one a∗h,τ,y,W for the match (h, τ, y,Wy), and
thus whether they will exit or not. The lack of uncertainty and optimization
over the next periods makes the problem of these firms, at some low states,
equivalent to the problem of a firm with a lower maximum length (which is
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T , the retirement age, in general). At an exiting state t the firm knows with
certainty that any Jj = 0 for j > t, match with a worker of age T .
Consider the problem
Jt(ht, τt, yt,Wyt , at) = sup
wt,{Wy,st+1}
(
f(at, yt, ht)− wt
+Est
[
p̃(ht+1, τt+1,Wy,st+1 , ast+1)(Jt+1(ht+1, τt+1, yt + 1,Wy,st+1 , ast+1)
] )
(3.C.1)
s.t. Wt = u(wt) + βEst
(
λUt(ht+1, τt+1, at+1)+
(1− λ)(λept+1(ht+1, τt+1,Wy,st+1 , ast+1)v∗(ht+1, τt+1,Wy,st+1 , ast+1)
+ (1− λept+1(ht+1, τt+1,Wy,st+1 , ast+1))Wy,st+1)
)
(3.C.2)
We define as endogenous states xt = [ht, τt, yt,Wy,t], controls ct = [wt,Wy,st+1 ] ∀t, st+1,















In the subsequent notation, where appropriate, we omit listing all states on
which elements in the equation, and subsume their dependence under just
listing the time t. J can be rewritten, by developing forward the recursion
until time T , at which the match surely dissolves, as








f(at, yt, ht)− wt
)
(3.C.4)
where p̃t0 = 1. Notice that the forward-looking constraint in equation 3.C.2
is state contingent and an instance of it applies at every node of any possible
history st ∀t given the prevailing Wy promised at that node. The equilibrium
is an instance of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which an agent chooses
its strategies while anticipating the best response of the following agent, as
common in dynamic games with a leader-follower component introduced by
164
Von Stackelberg [1934]. The structure of the problem and the solution also
shares some commonality with Ramsey optimal policy problems in which a
policy maker (in this case the firm) optimizes the utility of all agents according
to some weights and taking into account their optimal behavior. 18
We can redefine the problem:










f(at, yt, ht)− wt
)
(3.C.5)








f(at, yt, ht)− wt
)
−R ≥ 0 (3.C.6)
[j = 1, st] : Wy,st − u(wst)− βEst
(
λUst+1+
(1− λ)(λepst+1v∗st+1) + p̃st+1Wy,st+1)
)
≥ 0 (3.C.7)
where the constraint 3.C.13 is a slack participation constraint for a sufficiently
small R, so that the principal (the firm) is willing to enter the contract in the
first place.
In the terminology of MM we can label
h00(xt, ct, at) = f(at, yt, ht)− wt (3.C.8)
h01(xt, ct, at) = f(at, yt, ht)− wt −R (3.C.9)
h10(xt, ct, at) = Wy,t (3.C.10)
h11(xt, ct, at) = Wy,t − u(wt) + βEt(λUt+1 + (1− λ)λept+1v∗y,t+1) (3.C.11)
and define the Pareto problem (PPµ)
18In the terminology of MM, we treat constraints coming from equation 3.C.2 as a set of
one period ahead forward looking constraint, which makes the analysis of our case akin to
their case where one have j = 1 forward looking constraints, and N1 = 0. The difference with
their problems, however, is that our problem features finite time, and thus each one period
ahead forward looking constraint technically applies to a different function jt (indexed by
t).
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f(at, yt, ht)− wt
)
−R ≥ 0 (3.C.13)
[j = 1, st; γ1st ] : Wy,st − u(wst)− βEst
(
λUst+1+
(1− λ)(λepst+1v∗st+1) + p̃st+1Wy,st+1)
)
≥ 0 (3.C.14)
Still following the notation from Marcet and Marimon [2019], we can define
the Saddle Point Problem (SPPµ) as:

























λUt0+1 + (1− λ)λept0+1v∗y,t0+1
))
+
+ γ0 (f(at0 , yt0 , ht0)− wt0 −R) (3.C.15)







































































Wy,t − u(wt)− β(λUt+1 − (1− λ)λept+1v∗t+1
)]
(3.C.17)
where µ0t = µ




t−1 for some starting γ
1
t0−1.
The problem can now be written in recursive form. Define
Pt(ht, τt, yt, at, γt) = sup
Wy,t
Jt(ht, τt, yt,Wy,t, at) + µ
1
tWy,t (3.C.18)
Given equation 3.C.17 the SPFE of the problem can be written as




(f(at, yt, ht)− wt) + µ1tWy,t − γt(Wy,t − u(wt))+
βEt(λUt+1 + (1− λ)λept+1v∗t+1) + βEtp̃t+1Pt+1(ht+1, τt+1, yt+1, at+1, γt+1)
(3.C.19)
One can easily verify that the solution of this equation is the same we found
in the maximization of equation (3.8) in the main text. Take the first order
conditions and compute the envelope condition:




= µ1t − γt (3.C.21)







where equation3.C.22 is obtained by adding and subtracting from equation
3.C.19 βγtp̃t+1Wy,t+1. The reader should also keep in mind that the condi-
tion in equation 3.C.22 is actually state contingent and applied to all future
states next period, with a different set of co-states γst+1 for each realization
of at+1.
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= γt+1 − µ1t+1 (3.C.23)
which, given the law of motion of the co-states and the definition in equation









which is exactly equation (3.14), namely the Euler equation that governs the
behavior of wage setting and disciplines the provision of insurance within the
contract.
3.D Existence of a Block Recursive Equilibrium
In order to show that a Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) exists in our
model we need to show that the equilibrium contracts, the workers’ and the
entrepreneurs value and policy functions do not depend on the distribution of
employed and unemployed workers.
Most of the results are tightly linked to our search protocol, directed versus
random search, and our contracting structure whereby workers have finite
lives and therefore contracts end in finite time. The intuition for why directed
search is paramount for the existence of a BRE is linked to the fact that
with directed search, workers that are matched with a particular job accept
that job with certainty as they are actively looking for it in the labor market.
This certainty of acceptance makes the probability of filling a vacancy, and
consequently the return of opening it in a particular submarket, independent
from the type of worker a firm meets. This implies that the only element of
the aggregate state that matters for a firm when making an hiring decision is
the state of aggregate productivity but not the distribution of worker types
(e.g. employed vs unemployed).
Proposition 3.D.1. A block recursive equilibrium as defined in Definition 3.3.3
exists.
Proof. We follow the approach in Menzio et al. [2016], Herkenhoff et al. [2019]
and prove the existence of a BRE using backward induction.
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Consider the lifetime values of an unemployed and an employed worker before
the production stage in the last period of households lives with τ = T :
U(h, T ; Ω) = u(b(h, T )) (3.D.1)
V (h, T,W ; Ω) = u(w(a)), (3.D.2)
their values trivially do not depend on the distribution of types as both
valuations are 0 from T + 1 onward. Hence, U(h, T ; Ω) = U(h, T ; a) and
V (h, T,W ; Ω) = V (h, T,W ; a).
The optimal contract for agents aged τ = T , instead, solves the following
problem
Jt(h, T, y,W ; Ω) = sup
w
[f(y, h; a)− w] s.t. W = u(w),
that clearly does not depend on the distribution of worker types due to the di-
rected search protocol and where the aggregate state only affects the promised
utility and the optimal wage through realization of the aggregate productivity
processes. Therefore, Jt(h, T, y,W ; Ω) = Jt(h, T, y,W ; a).
This also implies that the equilibrium market tightness
θ(h, T,W ; Ω) = q−1
(
c(y)
Jt(h, T, y,W ; a)
)
is independent from the distribution of worker types and it is only affected by
realization of aggregate productivity, so θ(h, T,W ; a).
This in turn implies that the search problem workers face at the beginning
of the last period of their lives depends on the aggregate state only through
aggregate productivity a:
R(h, T, V ; a) = sup
{vy,Ω}
[
p(θ(h, T, vy,Ω; a))
[
vy,Ω − V ]
]]
,
does not depend on the distribution of worker types.
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Stepping back at τ = T − 1, the value functions for the unemployed and the
employed agents are solutions to the following dynamic programs
sup
{vy,Ω′}
u(b(h, T − 1)) + βEΩ
(
Ut+1(h, T ; a
′) + p(θ(h, T, vy,Ω′ ; a
′))
[
vy,Ω′ − Ut+1(h, T ; a′)
])
u(w) + βEΩ
 λUt+1(g(h, y), T ; a′) + β(1− λ)WΩ′+
+β(1− λ)λe max(0, R(g(h, y), T,WΩ′); a′)]
]]
 ,
where both do not depend on the distribution of worker types.
The optimal contract at this step is a solution to










′, T,Wi,Ω′ ; a
′)(Jt+1(h









′, T,Wi,Ω′ ; a
′)
)







′, T, y,Wi,Ω′ ; a
′)
)
≥ 0 and t ≤ T
which does not depend on types distribution.
Therefore, also the equilibrium tightness and the search gain at T − 1 are
independent from types’ distributions, as
θ(h, T − 1,W ; a) = q−1
(
c(y)
Jt(h, T − 1, y,W ; a)
)
R(h, T − 1, V ; a) = sup
{Wy,Ω}
[
p(θ(h, T − 1, vy,Ω; a))
[
vy,Ω − V ]
]]
.
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